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ABSTRACT
LANGUAGE AND LEARNING: AN INTERPRETIVE STUDY OF THEWORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND AN EXPLORATION OF THE
IMPLICATIONS OF HIS THOUGHT FOR PROCESSES OF LEARNING
(May 1980)
Patricia Ann McNally, B.S., Clark University
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Peter Wagschal
This dissertation focuses on language and how its use and
structure in Western society affect the way man learns. The paper is
set forth in two parts. Part One is an interpretation of Martin
Heidegger's phenomenological exegesis of early Greek words. Using
this phenomenological exegesis of early Greek language as a
philosophical foundation, Part Two proposes a theory of learning and
looks at the linguistic structures through which Western man has
characteristically learned.
Chapter I, GENERAL INTRODUCTION, offers the reader a
statement of the problem and advances the hypothesis that
continuance of the disassociative Zeitgeist which plagues Western
society may be related to man's failure to question those linguistic
contexts and frameworks through which learning is attempted and
content is transmitted and conveyed. Part One begins with a general
VII
introduction to Martin Heidegger and an overview of his work. This
is followed by an exploration of terms pivotal to an understanding of
Heidegger's work, along with a fairly detailed interpretation of the
structural changes Heidegger chronicles in the historical development
of language.
An epistemology, or theory of learning, is advanced in Part
Two. This proposed theory states essentially that learning requires
motion; more specifically, that learning requires a recognition of
relational motion. Furthermore, it is advanced that where there is a
lack of motion, which is to say where relational motion is not
perceived by the learner, the learning that occurs is partial. The
paper then proceeds to a discussion of those processes of learning
which the author sees as representative of Western man's structuring
of language. These include the contradicting process, the idealizing
process, the valuing process, the explanatory process, the
commotioning process, and the either-or process. Finally, the
implications of this theoretical discussion for future studies in
learning and education are raised.
viii
CHAPTER
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The overall purpose of this paper can be summarized as an
attempt to explore the linguistic contexts through which Western man
r
^
learns to learn in an effort to discern whether these contexts impede
or contribute to man's knowledge of himself and the world, and to
explore to what extent man's present contexts underlie the profound
disassociation afflicting modern man.
This overall purpose involves several relational concerns.
These concerns are set forth in two parts. The first part of the
paper is an interpretive study of Martin Heidegger's extensive work
in exploring the nature of the relationship between man and language.
For Heidegger, disclosure of the nature of this relationship involves
"re-thinking" the language of early Greek philosophy, for it is out of
the early Greek philosophical language that Western metaphysics and
epistemology have evolved their linguistic structures and premises.
The purpose of the first part of the dissertation, then, is twofold:
1) to build a philosophical foundation for the theory of learning
proposed in Part Two, and 2) to ressurect Martin Heidegger's
extensive work in the area of language.
1
2The purpose of Part Two is multiple; 1) to set forth an epis-
temology, or theory of learning, that proceeds upon the
phenomenological groundwork of Part One; 2) to look at some of
Western man's present contextual frameworks and processes of
learning in light of this proposed theory of learning; and 3) to
outline the possible directions and implications of this theory of
learning for future studies in education.
Statement of the Problem
Western man has spent the last century, and more noticeably
and emphatically, the last forty years, wrestling with alienation,
fragmentation, and meaninglessness. In an effort to undercut this
gnawing experience of the world and in an attempt to create meaning
where meaning no longer seems to exist, man increasingly turns to
language--to the creation of new metaphors, to the espousal of new
ideas, to the publication of countless books. The new metaphors that
arise, however, very quickly and quietly go the way of the old
metaphors, becoming swallowed up in the fragmentation of the age.
This year's facts become next year's factions, only serving to reveal
more vividly the pervasiveness and depth of the fragmentation that
man's new metaphors had set out to overcome. Ironically, man's
search for meaning often only unearths a deeper meaninglessness.
3In some way, man seems undermined and defeated on "another
level," on a level that is so encompassing that it cannot be pierced,
on a level that somehow holds man in its hands. In his recent
biography on Carl Jung, Laurens van der Post speaks of the
profound disassociation that typifies our culture and its people and
how difficult it is to heal. In speaking of this profound
disassociation, van der Post addresses this "other level."
It was so difficult to heal, I believe, because it was
supported by a similar tendency to dichotomy in the spirit of
an entire civilisation backed up, as it were, by all that was
negative in the twentieth-century Zeitgeist
,
and so was in a
sense incapable of cure without healing at the same time the
mass of huyianity and cultural pressures rallied unconsciously
behind it.
Van der Post says here that the fragmentation Western man
experiences is difficult to heal because it is supported by a
fundamental dichotomy in the thought and spirit of the times. That
is to say, the fragmentation man experiences is supported by the
structured ways and contexts through which man reflects upon
himself and the world. These structures, forms, contexts constitute
man's "use" of language. If Western man's thought patterns and
linguistic structures are themselves dichotomized, or more broadly
phrased, disassociative, then modern man's attempts to heal frag-
mentation and disassociation are indeed being subverted at another
level--at the level of man's contextual frameworks.
4Man has long since recognized that neurosis, and very often
psychosis, are, for the most part, the result of mental attitudes
rather than organic disorders. Man's way of conceptualizing who he
is informs his behavior; man's way of conceiving the world and the
self determines his actions. Subsequently, if man conceives himself
and the world through fragmented and disassociative contextual
frameworks, man is then in danger of becoming fragmented. If man
is to attempt to speak of healing, then, and is to address himself to
"the whole man," in whatever field of endeavor he plies his trade, it
seems of preliminary importance that man turn his eyes towards those
very structures, forms, frameworks, and contexts through which he
structures, forms, and frames his perception and conception of the
world and the self. Man needs to address those frameworks through
which the question itself is raised.
After years of struggle with profound disassociation, under
countless labels and metaphors, perhaps it is time to suspect that
inserting new metaphors into old contexts has not dented the over*
riding dilemma. Perhaps it is time to suspect that swapping content
for content does not reach to the heart of the matter , because the
dilemma is not one of content, but rather a dilemma that exists at the
level of "context," to borrow Gregory Bateson's term. This paper is
an attempt to address this "other level." As such, it pursues the
following questions: What are the present forms and contexts
through which man learns to learn? (That is, what are the contexts
through which content is conveyed?) How do these contexts structure
5man's experience of the world and affect his behavior? What are some
alternative contexts through which man may view the world and the
self, and how do these contexts augment man's self-knowledge?
Such questioning strikes at the roots of "how man learns," and
thus concerns itself with education at a most profound level, for such
questioning calls for educators (and by educators I mean those people
who attempt to communicate something to someone else) to reflect upon
the contexts, frameworks, and linguistic structures through which
content is communicated and transmitted. This is no easy task, for it
asks, not only the author, but the reader to "suspend" those con-
texts through which this content itself is to be filtered. It asks of
both the author and reader a certain suspension of the familiar ways
of structuring the input that comes to us from the world. Such
letting-go requires what John Keats called a certain "negative
capability": "... when a man is capable of being in uncertainties,
2
mysteries, doubts, without an irritable reaching after fact ..."
This "negative capability" invites educators to take a step back
and look at those structures and contexts through which content is
passed. For as Paulo Freire has attempted to point out, it is when
educators (and that somehow includes all of us) can no longer reflect
upon the contexts through which content is transmitted that
education, unknowingly, transmits, inculcates, and perpetuates the
disassociation and fragmentation it purports to be combating. That is
to say, if the aim of education is for man to know himself
and his
world, educators must "step back a pace or two" and ask:
Do the
6processes man processes with impede or accelerate, contribute to or
detract from, knowledge of the world and of the self? Do the
frameworks through which man "learns about learning" retard or
propel learning? Such questioning addresses itself to learning about
the contexts through which man learns content. It addresses itself to
looking at the forms through which information and data are
transmitted and conveyed.
Western man's long-standing reluctance to undertake such ques-
tioning, as the philosophical groundwork of this paper will attempt to
demonstrate, forms the root of man's present experience of himself
and the world as disassociative, fragmented, and alienated. That is,
questioning context in an effort to undercut fragmentation is not "one
way among many ways" to address the disassociative Zeitgeist
,
but
rather the necessary way to address the problem for it is man's
failure to call context into the question of knowledge and learning
that is the root of the problem. Specifically, then, this paper
explores the hypothesis that the contexts through which Western
educators transmit content (among them specialization,
compartmentalization
,
polarization, contradiction, subjectivism,
objectivism) have arisen through Western man's failure to reflect upon
context, and that such failing has given rise to man's present
experience of himself and the world as disassociative, which is to
say, man experiences himself and the world as un-whole and
un-known
.
7The tremendous reticence and fear in undertaking a questioning
of context now, after so long a time having been concerned only with
content, is that Western man has come "to function under the illusion
that categories of human thought alone maintain cosmic cohesive-
3
ness." That is, questioning context involves letting-go of the
ordei— "the categories of human thought"--man has, and this is scary
because the categories of human thought Western man has is the only
order Western man presently has. Viewing thought contexts as the
only order he has, man holds tightly to context, but freely changes
the content inserted into those contexts. It is this process,
however, which initially gave rise to man's experience of himself and
the world as fragmented, thus it is the continuance of this process
which aggravates the problem of disassociation one hopes to address.
For when context, which is the only order man sees himself as
having, is at root one of content (that is to say, when context is
itself a thought, an idea, a category of human thought), man's sense
of order becomes dependent upon a thing which he himself has
created. Man becomes dependent on the thought of man. Letting-go
of such a man-made or willed order involves chaos. Therefore, the
fear involved in letting-go of a context based upon content is always
tapped in questioning the contexts through which man learns to
learn
.
The suspension called for in the author and the reader, then,
is a willingness to question the present-day idea that
order, in the
world and in the self, is dependent upon human thought.
It is an
8openness to question the prevailing assumption that the only order
man has is the willed order of thought he himself creates.
Western man fears that he will never be whole; that he will
always remain fragmented. Yet he clings tenaciously to his
manufactured categories of perception as if whatever unity
exists will not survive without them. He frantically struggles
to re-establish temporary connections by way of rapidly
changing cults, hoping to keep pace with his transitory
world
.
The openness to question the contexts man presently has is, by
its very nature, a questioning of the forms, structures, frameworks,
and contexts through which man questions. Thus, the process of
this paper itself--that of questioning context--is the process needed
to approach the content that follows. The process, then, is at once
the attempted product. If a willingness to question context is not
undertaken, what follows will remain only another "object-thing" ; it
will remain only another fragment to be swallowed up in the
contextual fragmentation which has arisen from Western man's "being
content with content." If a suspension of will is not undertaken,
what follows will simply become additional content inserted into the
already overloaded and "seam-bursting" contextual frameworks man
presently has.
The contexts through which modern man "learns to learn" have
been passed down to him through a philosophical tradition particular
to Western man. Subsequently, any attempt to address oneself
to
questions of knowledge and learning, i.e. to epistemology, benefits
from a "working through" of the relationship between
epistemology
and phenomenology.
9The underlying considerations behind the preceeding statement
are twofold. First, Western man's experience of himself and the
world as fragmented and disassociated is accentuated when man cannot
understand from where content and context alike arise. Speaking to
this problem, Rudolph Arnheim notes man's inability to learn in what
he calls "an invisible culture": a culture where man needs to consult
"the specialist" because he can no longer experience for himself such
basic things as where electricity and water come from, not to mention
such things as the origins of new ideas. Unable to comprehend the
source and relation of one thing to another--what Arnheim calls "the
visible continuity of existence"--man's sense of Isolation and
disassociatlon increases. In contrast, Arnheim speaks of his
experience in Italy:
When I moved to Italy I saw that the elements of life still
displayed themselves. In the country I could see women with
copper jars on their heads going to the well--just as in the
days of Isaac and Rebecca. There was a visible continuity of
existence there that impressed me deeply. The relation
between man and nature was right on the surface. It
occurred to me then that the perceptual experience of a life
In which all the basic facts of existence are sti^
understandable to the senses was the origin of cognition.
Arnheim is echoing an awareness of the need for continuity and
association in the learning process that is hardly new, though for
modern man, it is very often obscured or forgotten. Centuries ago,
the early Greek philosophers--the fathers of Western thought and
learning--expressed a similar awareness: "Men perish because they
0
cannot join the beginning with the end."
10
This paper is an attempt to acknowledge man's need for
connections. As such, the setting forth of new metaphors proposed
herein, or more precisely, the setting forth of old metaphors
employed in a different way, can benefit from a grounding in
philosophical sources and origins in order to reduce the risk of
perpetuating those fragmented and disassociative contexts that this
paper has set out to expose as "blocks" to man's ability to learn.
Second, (and this is an outgrowth and partner of the first), if
the purpose of this paper is a questioning of the contexts through
which Western man learns to learn, it seems necessary that such
questioning take place at the "level" where such contexts are born,
and that is the realm of philosophy. Regarding this, Rollo May says:
It is a gross, albeit common, error to assume naively that one
can observe facts best if he avoids all preoccupation with
philosophical assumptions. All he does, then, is mirror
uncritically the-^ particular parochial doctrines of his own
limited culture.
In the late 1950s, Abraham Maslow was calling for psychology and
g
education to set forth a firmer base in ontology and metaphysics.
Perhaps Maslow was aware then that unless education and psychology
could unearth roots through a return to the sources and origins of
Western man's own particular educational and psychological theory,
they would end up disciplines as "cut off" and fragmented as the
individuals they purported to serve. As the quote below amplifies,
Rollo May realized just such a danger with regard to the psychological
fields, and psychology today is certainly one of the ways in which
man attempts to educate.
11
. there is considerable danger that psychoanalysis, as
well as other forms of psychotherapy and adjustment
psychology, will become new representations of the
fragmentation of man, that they will exemplify the loss of the
individual's vitality and significance, rather than the reverse,
that the new techniques will assist in standardizing and
giving cultural sanction to man's alienation from himself rather
than solving it, that they will become expressions of the new
mechanization of man, now calculated and controlled with
greater psychological precision and on the vaster scale of
unconscious and depth dimensions--that psychoanalysis and
psychotherapy in general will become part of the neurosis of
our day rather than part ofgthe cure. This would indeed be
a supreme irony of history.
One of the more visible signs attesting to the fact that the
supreme irony May speaks of has taken place is Western man's
preoccupation with gimmicks and techniques, a preoccupation that is
not confined only to the fields of education and psychology. Man
demands quick results and immediate answers. Man asks that ideas
prove something. "Instant success is the order of the day; 'I want it
now !' I wonder whether this is not part of our corruption by
machines. Machines do things very quickly and outside the natural
rhythm of life, and we are indignant if a car doesn't start at the
first try."
Man's impatience with, and disparagement of, long and deep
journeys, however, only confirms the severity of the wound. Man's
reticence to unearth foundations and search deeply reflects his
haunting suspicion as to the depth and pervasiveness of the
wound
itself. Faced with this threshold awareness, and yet once
again
lacking the structural and formational tools to go
further, man
settles, with a sense of exhaustion and defeat, for
anything that
12
promises quick relief. In this sense, Western man is an addict. It is
only the individual means of addiction which varies. Thus the claim
that "this is what Everyman wants" when used to support man's
current enthusiasm over fast-order systems and superficial formats
can be unmasked as a justification for impotence once viewed against
the enormity of man's task and the extent of his fatigue.
With these concerns in mind, working out the relationship
between epistemology and phenomenology takes on an added
importance. One way to visualize the importance of working out this
relationship is to look at this approach through the lenses of healing
we have come to apply to the individual. In the personal realm, man
does not "get through" something that has had an impact on his life
by "turning his back on it," no more than turning his back succeeds
in making something go away. Man "gets through" something that
unconsciously determines his perception of himself and the world by
seeing how those perceptions determine him, and how, in such
determining, they have rendered him powerless. This is no less true
in the contextual realm. Even if we leave aside for a moment the
realization that language embodies perception, it is important to note
that when a linguistic context has had import for an entire culture,
man does not "undo" the power It holds over his life and perception
through denial or substitution, neither through throwing the context
away nor through inserting new content. For when man simply
discards linguistic contexts without knowing v^, or despairingly
inserts another's contexts into one's own contexts, as
in slotting
13
Eastern contexts into a Western linguistic framework, again without
noting the underlying relationships, man's language and spirit become
junkyards for discarded parts of the self. Initially, then, man needs
to recognize the danger in throwing words away lightly. Otherwise,
the dismissal of linguistic contexts perpetuates the disposal mentality
symptomatic of the disassociative Zeitgeist one hopes to address.
Each word is a creation of man, which is also to say, a part of
man. As such, a metaphor or group of metaphors discarded
perfunctorily, as If one were throwing out a broken toy, diminishes
not only one's language but oneself. Signaling this awareness,
Archibald MacLeish says "A world ends when its metaphor has died,"
1 1
and a metaphor dies when, though still seen, it "no longer means."
When a root metaphor dies, a world is lost, and we are too if
we cannot release ourselves from idolatrous fixations upon the
forms of our knowing.
Approaching epistemology through phenomenology, therefore,
intentionally takes it slowly . Such a process takes it word by
word in an effort to signal the importance of each word in creating
the shape of our lives and in determining our ability to learn about
ourselves and the world. For it is Western man's present disregard
for language which merely underscores a corresponding and equally
fundamental disregard: disregard for being, for life itself.
Questioning the contexts through which man learns to learn,
therefore, is a fragile process, for in calling into question the
meanings that man has attached to metaphors--meanings that have
14
come to determine man's perceptions and thus his behavior--the
creation and destruction of man's experience of the world is at hand.
Thus the slow process of working out the relationship between epis-
temology and phenomenology is an attempt to call attention to the
dynamic fluidity and interaction through which metaphors and man
affect each other profoundly. It is a call to recognize the extent to
which the creation and destruction of contexts becomes our own
creation and destruction. It is a call to recognize the close inter-
relationship between being and language.
Significance
The significance of this dissertation is twofold; 1) to draw
attention to the possible practical implications of Martin Heidegger's
work for future approaches to, and research around, the question of
"how man learns"; and 2) to provide a theory of learning which
attempts to undercut the dichotomous thought patterns common to
Western man.
15
Guide to the Reader
Some brief comments about the author's initial intent and
subsequent process in writing this dissertation may help the reader
understand the development of the paper, and thus enable the reader
to focus more easily on areas of the paper which are of greater
interest.
This paper began as an attempt to bring together many of the
author's divergent thoughts and questions concerning the role
language plays in learning. Due to the vast number of ideas dealing
with language and learning, not to mention the various paths leading
to the subject, the author initially thought that limiting the
philosophical grounding to the work of one man would prove a viable
way of narrowing the parameters of the topic. In retrospect.
however. whether this choice narrowed or expanded the work
involved is open to considerable debate, The author quickly
discovered that ideas placed under a long and narrow microscope tend
to unearth the proverbial iceberg, where what is hidden is so much
vaster than what is initially seen, and also where what is hidden
changes the perspective on what is seen. In this way, the paper was
a constant discovery involving unforseen turns in direction.
This became apparent first with regard to Heidegger.
Heidegger was chosen for the philosophical groundwork of this
dissertation for two reasons: first, the more obvious, Heidegger was
16
familiar to the author; and second, Heidegger had done extensive
work in the phenomenology of language.
Familiarity with Heidegger took the simple form of
undergraduate introductions to "Heidegger the existentialist." This
paper, then, was initially approached with this assumption;
Heidegger is an existentialist. Subsequent readings in Heidegger,
however, challenged that assumption and raised many questions
concerning not only Heidegger's placement in the existentialist camp,
but also the critiquing of Heidegger by other philosophical camps,
namely the neo- Marxists. Exploring Heidegger, then, raised
questions not only as to where Heidegger belonged, but also
questions as to what Heidegger was saying. This surfaced issues and
questions that were not the intent of this dissertation to set out and
explore. However, in that interpretatons of Heidegger have varied
from existentialist to essentialist, the author's interpretation of
Heidegger became central to any attempt to explicate the implications
of his work. Nonetheless, to discuss in any depth the politics and
questions surrounding the issue of where Heidegger belongs and what
he is saying, requiring a detailed study of various antithetical
interpretations, is a dissertation in itself.
This realization has been dealt with, or more specifically, not
dealt with, by adhering to the author's initial intent in enlisting
Heidegger: to interpret, through translations available in English,
Heidegger's work in the phenomenology of language with an eye for
their implications for learning. Certainly, by its very nature, the
17
interpretation and the subsequent discussion of the implications of
Heidegger's work for a theory of learning reflect a point of view.
That point of view, which is by no means a definitive one, has
evolved in this direction: Heidegger has suffered from a
philosophical pidgeonholing that seems to have resulted from a
tendency to emphasize certain aspects of his work and life without
regard for the whole. For example, a recurring emphasis on
Heidegger's early work, namely his discussion of the "existentialia" of
man in Being and Time
,
has resulted in his inclusion in existentialist
camps, although Heidegger stated repeatedly that he was not an
existentialist. This placement also seems to have accentuated some of
the critiquing Heidegger receives from such philosophical circles as
the Frankfurt School, who question not only Heidegger's ability to
relate his thought to practice but also Heidegger's seeming lack of
perspective in critiquing the obscure language of traditional
metaphysics with his own very obscure language. Conventionally,
then, Heidegger has either been praised as an existentialist or
attacked as an ethereal essentialist.
Both of these views are challenged in this paper, not so much
through intent or design as through the direction in which the paper
evolves. The very process of trying to explicate the practical
implications of Heidegger's phenomenology questions the Frankfurt
School's frequent critiques of Heidegger, while the detailed discussion
of Heidegger's critique of subjectivism questions his inclusion in
existentialist circles. Granted, these are implicit challenges, and
as
18
such, will raise many unanswered questions, especially for the reader
interested in the politics surrounding Heidegger and his work.
In that interpretations of Heidegger's work are varied and still
very much open to debate, coupled with the fact that it is not within
the scope of this paper to deal explicitly with that debate, this
discussion will perhaps at best serve to expand the questions already
being asked by the people already asking. The total impact of
Heidegger's work is still difficult to assess. Viewing a writer's
thought in its entirety often happens posthumously, and with
Heidegger's death as recent as 1976, this may again prove to be the
case. Interpretations that now seem partial may simply prove to be
the result of critiquing what was available at the time.
/
For the reader not interested in the philosophical groundwork
of Part One, the author has spent a considerable amount of time at
the beginning of Part Two working out the transition from phenom-
enology to epistemology in the hope of making Part Two fairly
self-containing. The reader of only Part Two need note mainly that
the theory of learning proposed is based on a philosophical language
of paradox, motion, and relationality . There are several philosophical
systems that describe being through metaphors of paradox and
motion, most notably those philosophical systems associated with
Eastern thought. The author intentionally chose a Western
philosopher who stressed the language of paradox, motion, and
relationality in an attempt to look at Western linguistic
structures and
processes of learning through a philosophical system that had
evolved
/
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out of its own particular heritage. Both these clarifying notes reveal
the author's underlying biases; 1) a preference for the language of
paradox and relationality
; and 2) a preference for examining Western
linguistic structures through the contexts of a Western philosopher.
Part Two, naturally, had its own special "iceberg," where once
again what was initially seen was one-tenth of what lay beneath the
surface. Discussions turned out to be more complex than were
supposed, making the transition from theory to practical application
much longer than anticipated. This left some choices: 1) skip some
key points in the transitional theoretical stage to arrive at practical
application sooner; 2) include a few key theoretical points and a few
practical applications; or 3) include as many key theoretical points as
possible and arrive at the application much farther on down the line.
The latter was chosen in an effort to keep the paper consistent with
its purpose of developing a theory of learning based on a Western
philosophy. This dissertation is a theoretical paper working towards
practical application, and as a theoretical paper, it is aimed at the
widest practical application possible. Application of a writer's
proposed theories are only limited by the number of practitioners
available, and as such, applying the theory proposed herein to
present-day processes of learning, as the author does in Part Two, is
only one direction in which the theory may be taken. Similarly,
those directions proposed in the final chapter are offered as
jumping-off points rather than ends. Theories are mountain streams
destined to be rivers which eventually join oceans. Theories
benefit
20
most when they expand as they move from their source, rather than
narrow; otherwise, they become wells of thought which simply turn
stagnant.
Note on Translations
It might be useful for the reader, especially the reader
interested in philosophy, to note from the bibliography the particular
translations of Heidegger used In this discussion. Translations
involve individual interpretations, and when an attempt is made to
work from translations rather than original sources, the transmission
of several voices and styles is often unavoidable. The author has
tried to present an interpretation that does justice to the translations
involved, while presenting a discussion of Heidegger that has
benefited from a reading of several different translations.
Oftentimes, for the sake of uniformity in this paper, the author has
taken minor stylistic liberties, such as leaving the word "being"
uncapitalized throughout the paper, (as it is in the Manheim
translation), even though it is capitalized in most of the other
translations noted. The exception to this appears when "being" is
capitalized in a direct quote. Similarly, some translations capitalize
Greek words such as logos while others leave them uncapitalized and
underlined. Greek words in this translation are uncapitalized and
underlined, except where they appear in a direct quote.
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PART ONE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCERNS
Builders of bridges and highrise apartments, cyberneticists,
research scientists, painters and poets, farmers and
philosophers, each in his own way has to do with beings and
thinks about them: from the many inclinations of his solitary
way Heidegger wishes to address all these. To build,
calculate, investigate, create; to see, hear, say, and
cultivate; to think; all are ways men and women involve
themselves with beings as a whole. For humans are among
the beings that for the time being are. The question of
Being is not bloodless after all, but vital.
For what?
For recovery of the chance to ask what is happening
with man on this earth the world over, not in terms of
headlines but of less frantic and more frightful disclosures.
For maintenance of the critical spirit that can say No
and act No (as Nietzsche says) without puncturing the
delicate membrance of its Yes.
For nurturing awareness of the possibilities and
vulnerabilities implied in these simple words, are, [s,
since Being may be said of all beings and in many senses,
though always with a view to one.
For pondering the fact that as we surrender the
diverse senses of Being to a sterile uniformity, to one that
can no longer entertain variation and multiplicity, we become
immeasurably poorei—and that such poverty makes a
difference.
David Farrell Krell
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER
There are many ways to approach the work of Martin
Heidegger. The most common way has been through the
"existentialia" of man as Dasein *; an approach which has led to
Heidegger's establishment, along with Soren Kierkegaard and Karl
Jaspers, as the founding fathers of modern existentialism. However,
there are several other ways to approach Heidegger; through his
book on Kant ( Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ); through the
distinct notions of history set forth in Hegel and Heidegger that
illustrate their fundamental differences beneath many similarities;
through Husserl, Heidegger's predecessor at Freiburg, whose
introduction of phenomenology into philosophical tradition bears upon
Heidegger's own methodology; through Heidegger's interpretation of
pre-Socratic thought; or through Heidegger's writings on poetry and
language.
This particular presentation, in an effort to disclose the
intimate connection that exists between being and language,
approaches Heidegger, for the most part, through his interpretation
or "re-thinking" of pre-Socratic thought and through his writings on
language. It is through his historical-linguistic exegesis of
*For an explanation of the Heideggerian term Dasein , see the
discussion beginning on page 44.
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pre-Socratic thought that Heidegger grounds his major thoughts on
the meaning of being, truth, thinking, and language. Through this
"re-thinking," Heidegger challenges the traditional interpretation of
pre-Socratic thought by Western philosophers such as Plato and
Aristotle, for in Heidegger's view, it is this traditional interpretation
which forms the basis of subsequent Western thought. It is also,
then, this traditional interpretation which for Heidegger underlies the
nihilism Western man presently experiences.
This presentation, therefore, emphasizes Heidegger's later
writings. This is not to suggest, as many writers speaking of
Heidegger have suggested, that his work is not a unity. For a
writer whose works, for the most part, have come to the public in
"bits and pieces," (a situation which has led to the slightly
misleading division of Heidegger into early, middle, and late), his
thought development forms a basic unity. Whether Heidegger is
presenting an exegesis of the pre-Socratics or an exegesis of human
Dasein
,
the question under consideration is always the question of
being. The various writings of Heidegger are basically different
paths to being, and as such, a presentation of Heidegger's work does
justice to this unity of thought around the central question of being
to the extent it does not fragment and segment Heidegger, but rather
lets his many variations upon a single theme flow in and out of each
other.
This is not to deny, but rather to affirm that Heidegger's
thought developed and grew. As Heidegger ages, the accent shifts.
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In Being and Time
,
man as Dasein
,
as the being which is "thrown"
out into the world, stands out into "the clearing of being" basically
alone and homeless, while in Heidegger's later works, man is part of
"the fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals," and as such,
belongs with all of life. Dasein is now a being among beings, a being
which dwells and builds in the house of being, living poetically in
homecoming. Man's "authenticity" now comes in recognizing the
reciprocal belonging-together of himself with all other things, rather
than simply from the ownership of his own "to-be" that characterized
the man of Being and Time . So, too, Heidegger's notion of "will as
resolve" starts out as man's ability to face his being-unto-death, and
mellows into man's ability to let his being-unto-death be. Thus,
man's standing out into the clearing of being softens somewhat from
the harsh "thrownness" of early Dasein . Truth becomes lighter and
easier to handle, and man grows from the hero who survives to the
craftsman who is not merely thrown, but who reaches from out of his
thrownness into a dwelling that builds the future possibilities of
Dasein
,
and thus builds the history of being itself. Dasein as Dasein
is, in fact, deemphasized, and, for the most part, Heidegger speaks
of man as simply man in relation to being. The meaning of man is
viewed through the meaning of being, while Being and Time initially
addressed the meaning of being through the meaning of man as
Dasein. In truth, for Heidegger, they are reciprocal: the loss of one
entails the loss of the other.
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Such changes are certainly not fundamental, if by fundamental
one means changes that alter the central themes and pivotal questions
of Heidegger's thought. Rather, changes of this order seem to
reflect the unfoldings of a man whose thought is constantly
broadening and expanding. They seem to be developments in a
thinking that is constantly reaching beyond itself into the "can be" of
the possibilities for being.
With respect to the tendency of writers to fragment and divide
Heidegger, it should be noted that this tendency may be partly due
to the fact that Heidegger did not write Part 2 of his inaugural work.
Being and Time
,
as he had initially set out to do. Part 2 was to
examine the philosophies of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle in light of
Heidegger's innovative understanding of time and his revolutionary
view of history as historicity laid out in Part 1 of Being and Time .
By Heidegger's own admission. Being and Time failed to convey a
unity of thought around the meaning of being by attempting to do too
much too soon, and by standing too close to the traditional ontology
that he wished to unveil as nihilistic.
What we do have of Heidegger's subsequent thought, however,
by way of books, essays, and lectures, is quite extensive and
expands his thought considerably, particularly with regard to the
question of being itself, and the important role language plays in
disclosing the meaning of being. In Being and Time , Heidegger had
not fully developed his own notion of language. Consequently,
Heidegger still employed many terms from traditional ontology in
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attempting his "break" with traditional ontology, which led, not
surprisingly but unfortunately, to his early thought being viewed
through the lenses of traditional ontology. However, it was precisely
the failure of traditional ontological terms to manifest the meaning of
being that forced Heidegger to think about the meaning of language
in obscuring or disclosing the meaning of being. This led Heidegger
to delve deeper into the roots of language and being by way of early
Greek thought. It is in these roots of Western man's first
philosophical utterances that Heidegger unearths an interpretation of
being, truth, thinking, and language. This is not to say that
Heidegger did not recognize the inseparability of being and language
in his early work. He did, and noted that the understanding of
being could not be divorced from words or Rede
,
which was
2
Heidegger's early word for the essence of language. His later
writings, however, expand and refine considerably the nature and
scope of the relationship between being and language.
In approaching this limited presentation of Heidegger's work, it
is important for the reader to note that, due to the depth and
complexity of Heidegger's work, this discussion will include many
oversights. But, by the same token, due to the linguistic
interweaving involved in this depth and complexity, it is often
necessary to discuss what may initially seem like superfluous ideas
with regard to the scope of this particular paper. A presentation of
Heidegger however, seems more endangered by brevity than by
length. For it has been exactly those attempts to present Heidegger
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in simplistic terms that have done the most to fragment and obscure
two of the implicit aims of Heidegger's undertaking: 1) to signal the
complexity of being; and 2) to undercut that fragmentation which
comes by way of superficiality in language.
This presentation attempts to retain the complex unity and
revolutionary nature of Heidegger's thought, while presenting the
countless interconnections in as clear a manner as possible. This is
not an easy task, for often in attempting to retain the complexity of
an author or a work, ensuing misinterpretation comes at the hands of
the very complexity one sought to retain. On the other hand,
attempts to render complex thoughts "accessible" often negates the
complexity the author attempted to convey through giving the
appearance that life "has an easy answer." A recognition of this
struggle is especially pertinent with regard to Heidegger. Heidegger
worked throughout his life to reestablish the "weight" of the
possibilities inherent in man's original understanding of being and to
restore recognition for the manifold complexity inherent in life. The
"weight" of this complexity is lost in rendering the relational
movement between man, being, and language into static conceptions
that try to offer the reader quick and easy answers. For Heidegger
,
there is movement and relation in that which is stationary. The
failure to recognize such movement renders stationary thoughts static.
With regard to a reader or writer of Heidegger, therefore, it is
important to acknowledge the intended movement beneath stationary
words.
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This presentation is viewed in its intent, then, when seen as
an interpretation (in the Heideggerian sense), rather than as a
summary of his work. In the same way that translations are
interpretations for Heidegger, so too, interpretations of translations
are themselves interpretations. Heidegger's view of authentic
interpretation is, thus, enlisted at the outset of this particular
presentation. As Heidegger might say, in interpreting another writer
or thinker, it is important "to think thoughts out of being as a
whole" rather than simply to repeat thoughts. An interpretation,
therefore, is authentic and thoughtful to the extent the author thinks
in relation to being as a whole. Such a thinking not only brings
what has already been thought "to stand," but more importantly still,
constantly reaches beyond what has been thought to what remains
"unthought." It is a thinking that tries to move beyond the merely
literal, because for Heidegger a literal interpretation is no
interpretation at all, in that a literal interpretation takes only the
words and fails to hear what is being spoken, though unstated, in
the words themselves. A thoughtful interpretation, on the other
hand, in attempting to think thoughts out of being as a whole, not
only safeguards and spares the thought already spoken, but raises
the "unthought" that lies in the interpreter's own relation to being
into a life of its own.^ As such, an interpretation always reveals the
interpreter's own relation and misrelation to being. Thus, the ability
or inability of this particular interpretation to transmit the complexity
of Heidegger's thought reflects the meeting between the translations
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enlisted and the author. Ideally, an interpretation is an encounter
between two or three people where everyone's voice is heard, but
such relational conversation is not always achieved. In view of this
Heideggerian sense of interpretation, it is important to recognize that
fragmentation in this presentation does not mean, accordingly, that
there is fragmentation in Heidegger or in the translations of
Heidegger that have been employed. This interpretation of the grand
interpreter will become thoughtful, then, when the author can
creatively rethink in relation to being as a whole. As Carl Jung has
noted, the original legend cannot be read often enough, for man
cannot hear what has to be heard often enough. In this sense, all
thinking is creative rethinking. This is the root meaning of
originality: the re-search of origins in order to rethink the unthought
from out of its ground of yet-to-be-realized possibilities of being.
There is one more issue that needs to be addressed briefly in
this introduction and that is the conventional tendency to associate
Heidegger with the movement known as existentialism, and
subsequently, the attendant elevation in importance of Heidegger's
exegesis of the "existentialia" of human Dasein .
Heidegger's first major philosophical publication, and the one
with which he is most commonly associated. Being and Time
(Sein und Zeit
,
1927), addresses itself to the question of the meaning
of being through the discussion of being's most unique being
Dasein . In Being and Time , Heidegger presents an exegesis of the
"existentialia" that structure human Dasein , among them
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being-in-the-world, being-unto-death, anguish, dread, care, guilt,
the call of conscience, and resolve. With such a presentation,
Heidegger becomes the first philosopher to set forth an ontology of
being that begins with, and revolves around, the structure and
essence of man. This is not to suggest, however, as some critics
have suggested, that Heidegger's work is subjectivist. On the
contrary, it is Heidegger's implicit purpose in Being and Time to
dethrone the prevailing subjectivism that characterizes the history of
Western metaphysics, for it is precisely this subjectivism that, in
Heidegger's view, lies at the root of the nihilism afflicting modern
man. It is this subjectivism, then, that Heidegger has set out to
overcome.
For Heidegger, man as Dasein is neither subject nor object, but
the relation to being. Therefore, if one were to apply the terms
subject and object to Heidegger's view of man as Dasein
,
although
such an application of terms would be totally un-Heideggerian, one
would say that Dasein is the relation between subject and object.
"Man is the gap which separates and at the same time unites subject
and object. He is the 'in-between' subject and object (das
Zwischen ) . Heidegger's own term for "in-between" is "being-in"
( I n-Sein ) , denoting man's dwelling in, and belonging to, being.
Thus, to view Dasein through conventional subjectivist lenses is to
misinterpret Heidegger's intended meaning. More importantly still,
viewing Dasein in a subjectivist context obscures Heidegger's
underlying intention to cut through traditional ontology's view of
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being in subject/object terms, terms which for Heidegger hide the
relationary character of being.
Let's look briefly now at the importance and place of the
exegesis of Dasein in Heidegger's thought, Heidegger says that the
discussions of Dasein and its "existentialia" are only a starting
0
point. As such, the exegesis of Dasein is viewed correctly when
recognized as the groundwork that is to underscore Heidegger's
subsequent thought on the question and meaning of being. Thus,
although Being and Time begins with the "existentialia" of Dasein in
an effort to revive the question of being, what is aimed at in the
exegesis of Dasein is the setting forth of a foundational path to the
meaning of being. That the meaning of being is the central issue
under consideration has often been overlooked, and usually in
connection with a simultaneous elevation in importance of the
"existentialia" of Dasein
,
such as dread, care, guilt, etc. It is also
through the "existentialia" of Dasein that Heidegger has become
associated with the movement known as existentialism, although
Heidegger reiterated over and over again that he was not an
existentialist.* With regard to this question, George Seidel says:
Statements made at the end of Sein und Zeit , stating that the
existential analysis of Dasein was only one way , the purpose
of which was a working out of the question of being; or in
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik that the fundamental
ontology of Sein und Zeit was not a metaphysics of Dasein
but rather, as Dasein
,
the necessary happening of meta-
*For further discussion, see "Letter on Humanism"
(Brief uber den 'Humanismus' ), trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi, in
collaboration with J. Glenn Gray, in Basic Writings , ed. David
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
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physics should have made early commeritators on Heidegger
'the existentialist' a little more cautious.
Werner Brock says in Existence and Being :
Heidegger may well meet with a similar fate as did Hume, in
that his greatest contribution to philosophic thought, held
back at the time, will be recognized only very slowly and
gradually, while other more congenial results of his thought
found a ready acceptance and, however much distorted,
helped to stimulate what is now commonly termed the move-
ment of 'Existentialism.' °
Similarly, David Farrell Krell states with regard to Heidegger's
Being and Time :
That the book was considered an 'existentialist' manifesto for
such a long time testifies to the historic oblivion of the
question it raises. Even today readers often find various
parts of the analysis of Dasein accessible but miss altogether
the sense of the question of Being as such. Understandably
so, for precisely this sense is difficult. It cannot be rattled
off and put out as information it remains a problem which
here we can only cursorily pose.
Therefore, in that what has risen to the fore in Heidegger's thought
has been the "existentialia" of Dasein
,
although Heidegger stated
first, that Dasein was simply a starting point for his questioning the
meaning of being, and second, that he was not an existentialist, it
seems clear that such misapplied emphasis fulfills a need of the times
to perhaps not look at what Heidegger is truly trying to say, for
such emphasis does not seem to reflect the intent of the man. In this
regard, it seems important that the author and the reader approach
Heidegger with as few prior conceptions as possible.
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CHAPTER
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
In order to lay some groundwork for the interpretation of
Heidegger's exegesis of pre-Socratic thought set forth in Chapters
IV, V, and VI, and in order to ease the reader into Heidegger's
uncommon style of language, this chapter discusses some pivotal
Heideggerian thoughts and terms, namely ground and the absence of
ground, the hermeneutical process, man as Dasein
,
the essence of
questioning, the fundamental question, and history as historicity.
Nihilism
The spiritual decline of the earth is so far advanced that
the nations are in danger of losing the last bit of spiritual
energy that makes it possible to see the decline (taken in
relation to the history of 'being'), and to appraise it as such.
Martin Heidegger
Metaphysical thought in the Western tradition has always been
based on a notion of "being" (i.e. an ontological ground or essence
that lies, in some way, behind, beyond, or underneath passing
appearances). Heidegger claims in Being and Time that this
ontological ground has, over the years, become obscured and
"forgotten." This "forgetting of being" (Seinsverqessenheit ) , as
Heidegger calls it, also constitutes an "absence of ground"
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(Abgrund).* "The age for which the ground fails to come, hangs in
the abyss." The task Heidegger sets for himself, therefore, is to
reintroduce into the mainstream of thought "the question of being"
(Seinsfrage ) . Thus, one of the pivotal questions underlying
Heidegger's thought is: "What accounts for the nihilism of the day?"
Nihilism (Latin 'nihil * = "nothing") is the word commonly used to
refer to an absence of ground or "forgetting of being." It is the
word applied frequently to the age in which man is presently
standing--an age characterized by disassociation and the loss of
meaning. Heidegger's own description of nihilism (Nihilismus ) is the
pbelief In things ^ objects to the total exclusion of being (Sein ).
That is, in a nihilistic age, man tends to ask after the being of
things rather than the being of things. For Heidegger, the emphasis
on things without regard for being obscures the meaning (Sinn ) of all
things. Nihilism is the age, etymologically speaking, in which
"no-thing" any longer reveals meaning. The meaning of being
(Sinn von Sein ) remains veiled.
Let's look at this a little more closely. An absence of ground
occurs when man lives only in fore-grounds and forgets to ask after
the ground of fore-grounds. The ground for Heidegger, remember,
^Ground (Grund) means "bottom, especially of the sea."
Ground, with regard to the early Greek understanding of being as
physis
,
is the original arising from the sea, the primal setting-apart
wherein all things come to be. This being as physis is ground for
Heidegger. Abgrund is the absence of ground. It is the abyss, the
Greek 'abyssos ' meaning "without bottom."
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is the ground of being, thus when man forgets to ask after ground,
he forgets to ask specifically after the ground of being. Said
another way, man forgets to "think" things out of their relation to
being as a whole. And, for Heidegger, man forgets to ask after the
ground of being by forgetting to ask after the man who asks after
being. That is, man forgets to call the questioner--man--into the
question of being. And man forgets to call the questioner into the
question of being by positing man as a subject or substance which
detachedly observes being.
For Heidegger, therefore, it has been Western man's failure to
call the essence and nature of the interpreter into the interpretation
of being that comprises man's destroyed relation (zerstorte Bezug ) to
being. It is this destroyed relation to being that has led to an
absence of ground in which the things or beings of the world become
fore-grounds detached from the relational ground of their being.
Fore-grounds are things or beings whose relation to being as a
whole--whose ground--remains veiled from view.
Furthermore, man's destroyed relation to being becomes man's
subsequent misrelation (Missverhaltnis ) to language. That is, man's
language "houses" man's destroyed relation to being. It is this
simultaneous misrelation to language, then, that renders man almost
incapable of asking after the relational ground of being as such, so
enmeshed in thinking in linguistic fore-grounds has man become.
Therefore, "... man has even forgotten that he has forgotten the
true nature of being," so pervasive has the forgetting of being
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4become.
Then the destitute time is no longer able even to experience
its own destitution. That inability, by which even the desti-
tution of the destitute state is obscured, is the time's
absolutely destitute character.
Assuming that a turn still remains open for this destitute time
at all, it can come some day only if the world turns about
fundamentally-and that now means, unequivocally: if it turns
away from the abyss. In the age of the world's night, the
abyss of the world must be experienced and endured. But
for this it^ is necessary that there be those who reach into
the abyss.
Heidegger is one of those who reaches into the abyss. Heidegger
reaches into the abyss to unearth the forgotten ground by turning
back to the very beginnings of Western philosophy. For nihilism,
which represents the visible wound or "open sore" of Western
thought, is a wound that has to be seen in its "thought-projective
C
origins" in order to be healed. For, in Heidegger's mind, it has
been precisely man's refusal, through the positing of static truths
and easy unities, to face the depth of his own destitution that
accounts for man's inability to pierce the destitution of the day. It
has been man's refusal to face the abyss that perpetuates the nihilism
of the age.
Nihilism does not result from excessive preoccupation with the
nothing. On the contrary, only by -^sking the question of
the nothing can nihilism be countered.
For Heidegger, like Hegel, begin and nothing belong together: a for-
getting of one becomes a forgetting of the other.
... to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of
nothingness, to draw nothingness into the question of
being--this is the first ^nd only fruitful step toward a true
transcending of nihilism.
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The Hermeneutical Process
. . . 'hermetic'--turning endlessly upon itself, complex and
dazzling in its intricacy, representing by its very nearly
atrophied difficulty the plight of the decadent bourgeois
society with which it deals.
Joyce Carol Oates
In an attempt to reestablish ontological ground, and with it,
meaning, Heidegger turns to hermeneutics. Hermeneutics
(Hermeneutik ) comes from the Greek word hermeneuein and means "to
interpret." Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation, particularly
with regard to literary works, and has been used most often in the
theological interpretation of Scriptural texts. Hermeneutics interprets
interpretations. Essentially, therefore, hermeneutics is an
interpretative exegesis in search of meaning. In the same way that
people interpret works of art in search of their meaning, Heidegger
searches being as a whole in search of its meaning.
Specifically, Heidegger searches the phenomena of the world in
search of meaning.* In this sense, Heidegger's thinking on being is
phenomenological (displaying the influence of his predecessor at
Freiburg and the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl), in that
it turns to the things of the world in search of their essence and,
therefore, their meaning.
The expression 'phenomenology' can be formulated in Greek as
legein ta phainomena . But legein means apophainesthai .
Hence phenomenology means; apophainesthai ta phainomena -~to
^Phenomenon is derived from the Greek phainomenon , a
derivative of the verb phainesthai meaning "to show itself." In
Greek, phaino means "to bring into daylight, to P'^ce in
brightness." Phenomenon, then, is that which shows itself as
itself in the light of day.
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let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows
itself from itself. That is the formal meaning of the type of
research that calls itself 'phenomenology.' But this expresses
nothing other tharu the maxim formulated above; 'To the
things themselves!'
Phenomenology searches the ground of things or beings in
order to unveil the meaning of being itself. Through phenomenology,
meaning is unearthed; it is not assigned. Therefore, for Heidegger,
to see something as it is, in its essence, whose very essence
comprises its ground of being, is concurrently to understand its
meaning. Meaning, then, is expressed as man's encounter with
things as they are.
As such, Heidegger's process is circular (zirkelhaft ) rather
than linear. A linear process assumes a beginning and an end, a
cause and an effect. Heidegger tries to avoid such assumptions. For
Heidegger, to question the nature and essence of things, to question
the existence facing man, is simultaneously to question the nature and
essence of man as questioner. To question the meaning of being
(die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein ) is to question the meaning of
man. This kind of reflexive reciprocity mirrors the circular or
relational essence of the being known as man.
... to work out the question of Being adequately, we must
make an entity-the inquirer--transparent in his own Being.
The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of
Being
;
and as such it gets its essential character from what
is inquired about--namely , Being.
An entity for which, as Being-in-the world, its Be.^igg is itself
an issue, has, ontologically , a circular structure.
This questioning of being by being, like the invention of the wheel.
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reflects the circular structure of man as being-in-the-world
. In the
same way that man can only use language to speak of language, only
the being of man can speak about the essence and nature of being.
"There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being." says
the early Greek thinker Parmenides. A recognition of this
circularity places man within the circle of questioning, which, for
Heidegger, is where he inherently belongs.
Moreover, then, it has been traditional metaphysics' failure to
recognize man's inherent placement within the circle of being through
positing man as the detached observer of being that has fostered
linear conceptions of existence. This becomes, for Heidegger, the
abyss in the circle of being, for when man is removed from the
question of being, not only is the essence of man forgotten, but in
this forgetting, the essence of being as a whole is forgotten. The
inherent relation of part to whole is veiled, thus obscuring the
ongoing circular flow of relational movement which comprises the
ground of being. The motion between man (a being) and being is
hidden from view. It is then that man and his world appear to stand
statically at opposite ends of a straight line; man as detached subject
and world or being as object under question.
Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology tries to reestablish a
recognition of man's being within being . Not surprisingly then,
Heidegger's ontology begins with an interpretation of the nature and
essence of the interpreter himself. In this sense, his ontology is
basically a metaphysics of metaphysics, a meta-interpretation. It is
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a process of questioning (Fragen ) which questions itself in search of
the essence of the question and the questioner. In calling the
questioner into question, hermeneutical phenomenology reestablishes
man within being by the very nature of the process. This process
turns itself Immediately to the encounter or relation (Bezug ) between
man and being. Such a process, then, re-includes man.
Because Dasein is itself historical all inquiry concerning it
must scrutinize its own history: ontology of Dasein must be
hermeneutical
,
that is, aware of its own historical formation
and indefatigably attentive to the problem of interpretation.
Implied in such awareness of its own interpretive origins is a
'destruction' or dismantling of the transmitted conceptual
apparatus, a clearing of the congested arteries of a
philosophical tradition that ha^
2
^l' answers but no longer
experiences the questions. . .
Heidegger initially called this process of phenomenological and
hermeneutical investigation "fundamental ontology" in an effort to
distinguish his process from that of "traditional ontology."*
*The word 'ontology' came into existence in the 17th Century to
describe the branch of philosophy that deals with the question of
being. However, for Heidegger, ontology had long since ceased to be
the question of being and had, instead, become the ordering and
classification of being. This is traditional ontology, whose
destruction (de-structuring) is Heidegger's stated task in
Being and Time. (Heidegger employs the German word Destruktion to
denote a de-structuring which builds anew, rather than the German
word Zerstorung
,
which carries a more negative connotation.)
Meister Eckhardt's statement, "only the hand that erases can write
the true thing," carries the intent of Heidegger's destruction.
Juxtaposed to traditional ontology, Heidegger describes his
ontology as "the endeavor to make being manifest itself, do so
by way of the question 'how does it stand with being?'
process he initially called "fundamental ontology.
|' However, he
eventually ventures that perhaps it is better to dispense with the
term altogether since two modes of questioning which search so
differently should not bear the same name. His process, over time,
becomes called simply the questioning of being. Over ti^me, also,
Heidegger refers to "traditional ontology" as simply metaphysics.
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The latter, for Heidegger, is concerned with categorizing the nature
of things without questioning the meaning of the relation between man
and being. Heidegger wanted to stress his concern with relations
rather than categories and facts. Therefore, Heidegger's initial
concern became the nature of man in relation to being as a whole. It
becomes understandable, then, why Heidegger approaches his
fundamental questions regarding being, "What accounts for the
nihilism of the day?" and "How does it stand with being?", initially
through a third question: "What being asks after the nature and
essence of being itself?" What is the nature and essence of the
interpreter? Thus, Heidegger begins his inquiry into being in
Being and Time with an inquiry into the nature of man. This inquiry
not only signals a new process of questioning, then, but additionally
points to where Heidegger sees the "forgetting of being" as having
occurred: in man's failure to call himself into the question of being,
specifically through defining himself as a subject which questions
being but is himself not questioned.
Man as Relation
It is his wisest gesture to let all things pass away, but his
most human gesture to make them stay and make a tragic
shape out of them.
Joyce Carol Oates
An understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of man is
important in order to differentiate man as Dasein from traditional
ontology's "man the subject," the view of man which has characterized
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W6st6rn thought frorn Plato to tho prasont day. This briaf discussion
of human Dasein is not an attempt to summarize Heidegger's extensive
thought on the subject. It is an attempt to provide the reader with
the language and understanding needed to approach the remainder of
Part One.
Man as Dasein
,
as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein ), is
relation to being.* Man is not a subject or a substance; man is
being-as-relation. To speak of relation, for Heidegger, is to
acknowledge at the outset a space wherein relation can occur.
Dasein
,
then, is essentially a space, a distance, an in-between.
Heidegger uses the word "being-in" ( In-Sein ) to denote "a dwelling
14
in, a space of dwelling." It is in this space, in this "clearing in
the forest," to use Heidegger's early metaphor for man, where being
reveals and discloses itself. Man is the space where being shows
15
itself; man is "being held out into the nothing."
It is also in this space that man understands (versteht ), and it
is man's capacity for understanding being (Seinsverstandnis ) that
differentiates man from other beings. In that man is the space
*Dasein is an everyday German word meaning "existence."
Heidegger, however, in his linguistic freeplay, breaks the word down
into its components ^ (there) and Sein (being), giving it the
meaning "being-there" to denote the unique aspect of being which is
only man's: the capacity to project into a there beyond its here. For
with understanding, for Heidegger, man not only }s, but additionally
knows that he is. This knowing that one's being is, this projecting
beyond where one is, is understanding. This understanding
introduces a different dimension into the unity of being, and in this
sense, such understanding could be said to "part" the unity of
is-ness, the unity of being without reflection.
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where understanding (Verstehen ) takes place, man does not "have"
understanding; rather, man \s understanding.^^
Understanding, for Heidegger, presupposes an "other" and this
"other" is precisely the "other" which is not being. The "other"
which is not being--which is other than being--is nothingness. That
is, the "other" which is not thing is no-thing. Understanding, then,
not only involves man in an encounter with being but also involves
17
man in an encounter with not being. For in encountering the finite
things of the world--things which are--man encounters the limits and
ends of such things. In this meeting, man comes face to face not
only with the finiteness of things, but also with his own finiteness.
Man encounters his own "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit ) . For Heidegger,
man is a being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode ) . When man
understands, then, man essentially understands death. In
understanding, man meets the not being that exists together with
being
.
Moreover, for Heidegger, nothingness grounds being. Without
nothingness, there would be no being and not being because there
would be no space whereby things come to be. Nothingness makes
the relation of thing to thing possible. Thus Heidegger states that
nothingness is the space where being discloses itself and
understanding happens. Being and nothing exist together. Dasein
faces being when he faces not being. "'Death' is the 'end' of Dasein
whereby it becomes a 'whole.' In facing the space, the hole, man
faces and discloses whole; in facing not being, man [s being. In
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encountering the finite (endlich ), then, in the world and in the self,
man is understanding. It is in this encounter that, for Heidegger,
man is what he is .
Man's encounter with nothing, therefore, reveals the essence of
man-as-relation
. And, for Heidegger, the revealed essence of a
being is at once its meaning (Sinn ) . Thus Heidegger says that
meaning itself is grounded in nothingness. That is, in relating--in
being what man is--man not only discloses being but also meaning.
For Heidegger, then, the meaning of man and the meaning of being
disclose themselves simultaneously when man faces the essence of his
own being.
To face the essence of one's own being--to own oneself as one
really is--is what Heidegger calls mineness or ownership. The
German word in Heidegger's writings is Eigentlichkeit , and it most
often gets translated in English as authenticity. Eigentlichkeit is not
employed by Heidegger in its casual German usage, but rather with
respect to its root, eigen
,
which means "own."* Eigentlichkeit , for
Heidegger, denotes ownership.
. . .
because Dasein is in each case essentially its own
possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only
'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially
something which can be authentic " ~that is, something of its
own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes
of Being, authenticity and i nauthenticity . . . are both
grounded in the facjtg that any Dasein whatsoever is charac-
terized by mineness.
*The word "authentic" is derived from a Greek root meaning
"one who does things with his own hands; one who does things
for himself."
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To be authentic is to own oneself as oneself really is . In light of the
preceeding discussion of Dasein as a finite and temporal being, this
ownership is none other than the owning of all one's self-possibilities,
whose possibilities include one's not-to-be or not being. To be
authentic is simply to exist-unto-death
. Essentially, then, authen-
ticity is owning the relation to being that man is.
The extent to which man owns his relation to being is the
extent to which man exists . A man exists in the Heideggerian sense
of the word to the extent he "stands out from, into" (the Greek root
meaning of exist or Existenz ) his relation to being.
Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence--in
terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.
Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got
itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the
particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by
taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existen^0
never gets straightened out except through existing itself.
In existing, man discloses being, and subsequently, the meaning of
being. It is precisely this "disclosure" ( Eroffnung ) of being which,
in Heidegger's view, unlocks what the "forgetting of being" closes
21
and hides.
Authenticity or ownership is not be be viewed as a
once-and-for-all decision. The question of ownership is something
which confronts man at every moment of his life. Man s
being-towards-death is there at every turning, thus man is constantly
encountering the choice of facing his own not-being or fleeing. This
is the choice of authenticity: the choice of owning one's to-be (being)
and not-to-be (nothingness), i.e. all one's possibilities, or not
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owning them. For Heidegger, man both owns himself as he is and
does not own himself as he is.
The failure to own oneself as one really is--as a being towards
non-being--places man in inauthenticity. Inauthenticity (Uneigen -
lichkeit ), then, is stated as man's flight from his own nothingness.
In fleeing, man seeks refuge in what Heidegger calls the anonymous
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safety of the masses (das Man ). That is, man flees toward that
which seems not to be moving toward death. Man turns from the
journey towards death which he is, i.e. from the eternal and
never-ending movement as relation which he is, towards that which
seems static, towards that which seems stationary and secure.* In
such a flight, however, not only is the semblance of motionlessness
itself an illusion, but more importantly still, man, in fleeing the
movement or relation, is fleeing himself. That is, in fleeing
nothingness, man flees being also, for as was stated previously,
nothingness is the place of man where being discloses and reveals
itself. Death is the space in man whereby man lives. Therefore,
when man flees his own not-to-be, man flees his own to-be.
*The other "existentialia" of Heidegger can be briefly mentioned
here. In inauthentic existing, the voice or "call of conscience
(Gewissen), which is silence, beckons man back _to his own
nothingness, asking man to acknowledge the "guilt" (Schuld ) which
comes through man's failure to be (himself) in the face of not-being.
Guilt is a call to acknowledge one's lack of being. Heideggers notion
of "will as resolve" ( Entschlossenheit ) , then, is the resolve to
be
oneself in the face of nothingness; to be oneself in the face of one s
own death. Such resolve is care (Sorge ) in the face of dread
(Angst).
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In fleeing the w-hole, the parts themselves become obscured. Both
the meaning of one's own existence and the meaning of being as a
whole remain undisclosed. For if meaning is grounded in
nothingness, and man refuses to own nothingness, meaning itself
withdraws. In turning away from one, man turns away from both
,
for being and nothing belong together. This is then to say that
when man fails to "own" his essential nature, his own total ground
and meaning, the very ground and meaning of being as a whole is
obscured in its essential nature.
Moreover, Heidegger says that man's essence as relation has
historically been obscured (and, consequently, being has been
"forgotten") through linguistically positing man as a substance or a
subject who detachedly observes being. Positing man as a subject
presents man as if he is stationary and apart, and to the extent
language presents this picture, it acts to obscure not only man's
essence as relation but also being as a relational whole. Man's flight
from his essence as eternal movement within being becomes "housed"
in man's linguistic contexts. Language then acts to further "...
the fabulous deception, whereby one comes to imagine that a creature
in existence is not also of existence, that what man is is not also
what everything is; . . . we . . . cannot see the whole for the
parts. In linguistically positing man as that which looks
instead of o^ of, being, man not only obscures his own relation to
being, but simultaneously he obscures the relation of all things to the
whole. For when man is linguistically posited as a "subject" who
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detachedly observes being, being itself becomes the "object" of
detached observation. Traditionally, this is known as "the
subject-object split."
It is here that the ground and therefore the meaning of man
and being as a relational whole, now linguistically obscured,
eventually fosters the experience of disassociation, an experience
which is at root explicitly a loss of association or relation. For
Heidegger, then, the disassociative Zeitgeist or nihilism modern man
wrestles with has come at the hands of a long-standing inauthenticity.
Inauthenticity, for Heidegger, denotes a lack of ownership, and
precisely a lack of ownership of the nothing or not-being which exists
together with being. The irony here, then, is that man's failure to
"own" his being as relation, his being as not-being, does not succeed
in rendering the relationship inoperative. Quite the contrary. The
relationship between man and being continues regardless of man's
awareness or acceptance of its paradoxical nature. That is, being
determines the nature of beings. The whole determines the parts.
Consequently, what man fails to own finally comes to own man . The
external nothingness, the nihilism, then, that now holds man captive
is unmasked as the internal nothing of man which man refuses to
own. The death man flees becomes the death man faces. This is the
nature of the dynamic relationship which exists between man and
being as a whole; the whole determines the essence of the parts.
However, in the same way man's failure to own his relation to
being has led to the nihilism of the day, similarly, for Heidegger, it
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is in a remembrance and reownership of that relation where the
dynamic possibilities for the future of being lie grounded. For, as
Heidegger often notes, false separations point to prior bonds.
This brings us to a brief discussion of "questioning" (Fragen )
because for Heidegger, man "owns" or "reowns" his relation to being
through questioning that very being
.
Questioning
All that I have said and done.
Now that I am old and ill,
Turns into a question till
I lie awake night after night
And never get the answers right.
W. B. Yeates, "The Man and the Echo"
Man's dread (Angst ) and care (Sorge ) concerning his own
not-to-be exhibits itself, for Heidegger, in man's questioning his
being-in-the-world . Overcoming the dread of nothingness, man
expresses concern and care over his own being, and therefore over
being itself, in questioning that very being (Seinsfrage ) . It is in
this act of questioning being that, for Heidegger, man relates
to that in which he is totally related . Heidegger speaks of this ques-
tioning as the "leap" through which man recognizes ("knows again")
that which he is. It is the "leap" through which man owns himself as
the relation to being which he is. Similarly, man's refusal or fear in
questioning his own being-in-the-world is a refusal to "own" the
relation to being which he is. Therefore, for Heidegger, it is in the
act of questioning that man becomes "open" to his relation to being.
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To question one's own being is to be engaged in what
Heidegger calls a "project" or "projection" (Entwurf ). Etymologically,
the word "project" means "to throw forward, to extend." ("Extend"
means "to stretch out, to enlarge.") In projecting, man extends "the
essential possibilities of being" (Wesensmbglichkeit ). In questioning,
man gives birth to future being. Man discloses being. Projection,
for Heidegger, refers then to man's "driving forward toward its own
possibility of being." To be engaged in a project or projection is
. . . the mode of being of human being in which human being
js in its possibilities ^ possibilities. It is not the mere
having of a preconceived plan, but is the projecting of
possibility in human being that occurs antecedently to all
plans and makes planning possible.
Man, therefore, for Heidegger, is "a being of possibility"
(Mdglichsein ) . For while being denotes all beings, everything that
"is" and "comes to be," only the "being-there" which is particular to
being-human (Menschsein ) can (so far as we know) project its being
forward, i.e. ask after being itself. When man questions, then, the
"what" or "whom" that must be asked is man himself. Man asks after
that being whose very "mode of being" (Seinsmodus ) is to question
being
.
Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it,
choosing, access to it--all these ways of behaving are con-
stitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being
for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are
ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being
adequately, we must make an entity--the inquirer--
transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this
question Is an entity's mode of Being ; and as such it gets its
essenti^^ character from what is inquired about--namely.
Being
.
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Every question, therefore, is essentially a oneself-question or
self-question. Every project is essentially a self-project
(Sichentwerf )--a project of the temporal and relational being which
asks after being. Thus, even when man questions what is "other,"
man is essentially questioning himself.
The relationship-of-Being which one has towards Others would
then become a Projection* of one's own Being-towards-oneself
'into ^something else'. The Other would be a duplicate of the
Self.^°
For as a temporality (Zeitlichkeit ), man is that being which projects
itself towards the future. That is, in questioning, man is
fundamentally asking after his eventual or future not-to-be. and
therefore is asking also after the future of being itself. In
questioning, man is projecting his temporality forward. Man is
rendering his own 1nothingness. his own space-of-possibilities. his
own future. into !being. In questioning one's own future or
temporality, in calling one's own being and non-being into question,
man becomes historical. As historical being (geschichtliches ) , man
affects not only man's fate, but being's fate as well. Questioning
being, therefore, "unlocks" the possibilities of being into future and
actual being. Questioning, for Heidegger, is thus the way in which
man manifests himself, and subsequently the way in which history
begins. Similarly, Hegel says that history is what man does with
*Projection here is the German 'Projektion' . As Macquarrie and
Robinson state in the translator's note, "here we are dealing with
'projection' in the familiar psychological sense, not in the sense which
would be expressed by 'Entwurf'."
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27death, and Gordon Childe suggests that in making history, "man
po
makes himself."
For Heidegger, then, when man fails to own his relation to
being, through forgetting that his being is the being which is asked
after in guestioning
,
relational being as a whole is forgotten. This
"forgetting of being" has become for Heidegger the inauthentic
historical tradition Western man has been handed.
In summary, then, for Heidegger, authentic history and
philosophy (i.e. authentic language) is created to the extent man
"owns" himself as he is, to the extent he "stands out into" his
relation to being. History, philosophy, and language are authentic to
the extent man recognizes guestioning as the way he relates to that
in which he is totally and intimately related.
In light of this interpretation of questioning, Heidegger's
hermeneutical process is an attempt "to think in terms of this other
'ground,' i.e. Dasein .
"
The sequence of questions is itself a mode of thinking,
which, instead of supplying concepts merely ^gfeels and tests
itself as a new mode of relationship to Being.
Accordingly, such questioning creates a new mode of languaging.
For Heidegger, it is language that allows man to be historical in the
first place, and thus it is language which grounds history and
philosophy. It is being, however, which grounds language. Thus,
it is firstly man's destroyed relation to being that accounts
for man s
ensuing misrelation to language, although once language
"houses"
man's destroyed relation to being, language itself
perpetuates man's
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loss relation to being as a whole.
Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's
relation to being
,
the questi^ of being will involve us deeply
in the question of language.
For Heidegger, then, man needs to reown his relation to being (the
part needs to reown its relation to the whole) in order to recover its
original relation to language. However, understanding how language
itself has come to house man's destoyed relation to being, through a
word history which presents man and being, i.e. the part and the
whole, ^ if they were unrelated entities, may be a step in helping
man find the way back to his being within being.
The Fundamental Question and Its Historical Relevance
The fact of existence, the very use of language--these are
what seem to me inconceivable ... It is existence itself that
seems unimaginable; and, that being so, there is nothing
within existence that has the power to startle my credulity.
Eugene Ionesco
In an attempt to unearth the fundamental nature of questioning
as man's encounter with his relation to being, Heidegger begins his
ontology with the question of being. Thus his book. An
Introduction to Metaphysics (Einfuhrunq in die Metaphysik , 1953),
begins with the question: "Why are there essents (beings)* rather
than nothing?"^^ Why is there anything at all rather than nothing
*Essents or beings refers to all things-that-are. Essents is the
term used in the Ralph Manheim translation of An Introd uction to
Metaphysics. Although the Manheim translation is f^Ployed
throughout this paper, I use the term beings (or things-that-are)
rather than essents, except where essents appears in a direct quote.
57
at all? Through this question, Heidegger tries to give words to
man's encounter with his own relational existence. Heidegger is
looking for a "ground question" which will take man out of thinking
merely in foregrounds. He is looking for a question that will bring
man face to face with being. As such, the words give way in
importance alongside the possible "event" of man encountering that in
which he is totally related.
Such a meeting or event can happen at any time in a man's life,
through any encounter, although Heidegger says many people never
encounter the question of being in the "full ground" of its "weight."
Every human being, however, in that his "being-there" is the relation
to being as a whole, is "brushed" by the question now and again,
even if he does not realize that it is the question of his own being,
and therefore being as a whole, which is upon him.
And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more
than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he
is not aware of what is happening to him. The question
looms in moments of great despair, when things tend to lose
all their weight and all meaning becomes obscured. Perhaps
it will strike but once like a muffled bell that rings into our
life and gradually dies away. It is present in moments of
rejoicing, when all things around us are transfigured and
seem to be there for the first time, as if it might be easier to
think they are not than to understand that they are and are
as they are. The question is upon us in boredom, when we
are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything
about us seems so hopelessly commonplac^ that we no longer
care whether anything is or is not . . .
Man may encounter the question of being at any time. Thus,
for Heidegger, it is the broadest and deepest of all questions. It is
the question of questions. It is in a sense a meta-question in
that
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it does not ask after "this" and/or "that;" it does not ask after
particular beings, or the relation of particular beings one to another,
or the properties and traits of beings. It is not a question of
foregrounds. Rather, the question in which man comes to relate to
that In which he is intimately involved is a question of ground . It
is a question of the "underlying," a question of the being of all
beings. In asking the question, therefore, being as a whole is
confronted, for the question no longer is "Is it 'this' and/or 'that?'."
The question is rather "Why 'this' and/or 'that?'." With this
question, with this "why," man "opens up" a view of ground.
For through this questioning the essent as a whole is for the
first time opened up ^ such with a view to its possib^^
ground, and in the act of questioning it is kept open.
What if man does not question? Heidegger says trees still grow
and planets still move. In other words, life goes on. But, it is the
if of possibility that is important for Heidegger. For if the question
is asked, whose very asking involves a "leap" and constitutes an
"event" (Ereignis ), the questioner encounters his own ground.*
"... the leap in this questioning opens up its own source--with this
leap the question arrives at its own ground. We call such a leap.
*The event ( Ereignis ) for Heidegger is "the event of
appropriation." The event of appropriation is discussed on page
Briefly, however, it means the happening of ownership whereby man
"owns" his belonging to being. The root of event is er-e gnen,
and
like the word ownership, event comes from ei^^
come into one's own, to come to where one belongs. • +0
of event is er-augnen (Auge - eye) meaning 3^‘^\nnr^oDriation
see with the mind's eye, to see face to face._
Appr p
(Aneignung ) means also "of one's own, to make ones own.
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which opens up its own source, the original source or origin
(Ur-sprung )*, the finding of one's own ground.
The ground (or origin) for man is his relation to being, thus
the question opens up man to his relation to being as a whole. For
Heidegger, such "opening up" constitutes meeting not only one's own
ground but also one's own meaning.
Our question is the question of all authentic questions, i.e.
of all self-questioning questions, and whether consciously or
not it is necessarily implicit in every question. No
questioning and accordingly no single scientific 'problem' can
be fully intelligible if it does not include, i.e. ask, the
question of all questions. Let us be clear about this from the
start: it can never be objectively determined whether anyone,
whether we, really ask this question, that is whether we
make the leap, or never get beyond a verbal formula. In a
historical setting that does not recognize questioning as a
funda^ntal human force, the question immediately loses its
rank.
In asking the question of questions, in wondering, all formulas
(prescribed or appointed forms) drop away, for man is asking after
the ground of all forms. All illusionary security of "this" and/or
"that" falls into ground, for in such asking, man confronts his own
ground. Man encounters the relational movement that he is. This
for Heidegger is the event of appropriation : the event whereby man
relates to that in which he is totally related. When man fails to
question, man begins to "take 'things-that-are' for granted." Mans
relational movement within being then gives way to an illusionary
*Origin ( U rsprung ) denotes a primal leap. The word origin is
derived from the Greek o/ow m c and means "to arise, to jump or
stir up." "To originate something by a leap, to bring something
into
being from out of the source^yf its nature in a founding
leap--this is
what the word origin means."
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positing of "this" and/or "that," in which the movement of relation is
obscured. Being then seems stationary or stated.
To state means "to set into position" or "to fix in place."
Statements set into position; they fix in place. Statements, however,
need not obscure questioning. That is, "fixing in place" does not
need to denote rigidity and the lack of motion. Statements are
"being-things" if there is a recognition of the relational movement
inherent in such a "fixing in place," i.e. if there is a recognition of
the inherent questioning behind all statements. Statements are seen
as "fixed" in 'the sense of rigid and motionless when man's relational
movement within being is forgotten.* (See also the following
discussion of the Greek word thesis on page 88.) When statements
become rigid and motionless, the figures and forms of ground become
viewed as mere formulas or foregrounds. Primal questions degenerate
into rigidified answers. Things are seen as objects, parts are seen
as fragments, prior bonds are seen as false separations. It is here
that the reality of relations becomes the illusion of facts.
According to Heidegger, Western thought, for the most part,
does not "recognize questioning as a fundamental human force," and
thus forgets the relational movement underlying all "fixing in place."
And for Heidegger, the failure to acknowledge questioning in Western
thought is none other than Western man's failure to acknowledge
*The propositional statement, in which there is usually ^a
subject, a verb, and an object reveals the extent to which man's
forgetting of being has become conveyed in the grammatical
construction of the sentence itself.
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himself as an eternally moving question. The positing of rigid and
motionless statements, then, becomes man's feeble attempt to dam what
is forever moving, i.e. to flee his own eternal movement within being.
Unfortunately, attempts to dam what is forever moving only stagnate
the waters of being. In this light, perhaps the external pollution
afflicting modern man and the world is only a visible symbol for the
internal pollution infecting the damned waters of the being within
man
.
The interpretation of questioning as man's encounter with being
underlies Heidegger's understanding of philosophy. Authentic
philosophy is questioning says Heidegger. As such, philosophy is
always "untimely" for it entails encountering one's own being and not
being, i.e. one's own death. Therefore, philosophy never
contributes to making things easier (in the sense of readily available
and easily grasped) but "only more difficult" (in the sense of
complex, mysterious, and multiple) in that "it restores to things, to
essents, their weight." Authentic philosophy, therefore, cannot be
"learned" in the sense of "passing on the facts," for philosophy is
man's encounter with being as a whole. Philosophy is an "event of
appropriation," an event of ownership in which man comes to own who
he is. Thus, as Heidegger says, it is correct to say "'You can't do
anything with philosophy'," but this is not the final word.
For the rejoinder imposes itself; granted that we cannot do
anything with philosophy, might not philos(^|^hy , if we
concern ourselves with it, do something with us ?
In the questioning in which man encounters his relation to being as a
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whole, man encounters what being has to do with him
,
and it is this
meeting with the whole that restores to things, to beings, their
"weight," i.e. their being. This meeting unveils the total possibilities
inherent in being. It unveils the complexity, depth, and magnitude
that comprises relational being. This is what Heidegger means by
saying that philosophy as questioning "restores to things their
weight." Philosophy as questioning restores man to his being as
possibility. Such a restoration holds an accompanying recognition:
there is no statement (as a formula) that can reveal the truth of
being, for being encompasses man's very stating, and in so doing,
being encircles the motionless in motion. Being is the movement of
relation, and as movement, being is "the encounterable.
"
The history of Western philosophy, however, would have man
believe otherwise, for it has perpetuated the illusion, through
presenting statements as formulas, that truth, and therefore being,
are capturable and graspable. The misinterpretations which have
steadily crept into philosophy whereby statements are viewed as
unmoving facts (facta ) , says Heidegger, come mainly at the hands of
teachers (Schullehrer ) of philosophy, such as Plato and Aristotle.
That is, philosophy presented as statement is "learned" most often in
schools. The tradition (Uberlieferung ) of "teaching truth" is so
widespread that, for Heidegger, it almost precludes anyone getting
outside the deception of statement in order to ask after the deception
of statement. This long-standing tradition almost precludes an
asking
after the ground underlying foreground statements. Philosophy
as
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questioning has thus become the realm of "the few." That is, the
deception of statement is an historical reality which is so widespread
that only "the few" seem to "get outside of it" and truly encounter
being.* It is then that the time of "no one" looms alarmingly close to
the time of "the few." The time of "no one" is "being's end"--^^i^
(To denote "being's end," Heidegger writes being crossed
out.) That man is dangerously close to "being's end" is reflected for
Heidegger in the visible wound of nihilism afflicting the modern
world
.
Thus, for Heidegger, the asking of the question of being,
through which man encounters what being has to do with him, has
immediate relevance for the future history of man and being. It is
the question that must be asked.
*Because of statements like these, Heidegger has often been
criticized for espousing an elitist philosophy. This, I believe, is a
misleading interpretation. No one hoped more than Heidegger for the
understanding of man's relation to being as a whole to become the
realm of "the many." In speaking about the task of language in his
essay "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Heidegger says that
"the essential word, if it is to be understood and so become a
possession in common, must make itself ordinary." He follows this
statement with a quote from the poet Holderlin: "The fruit must
become more ordinary, more everyday, and then it will be mortals'
own." Heidegger's use of the words common, ordinary, and everyday
are not to be understood here as the "everyday babbling of crowds,"
or "the passing of accepted and common opinions held by the
masses," which constitutes for Heidegger "the counterfeit word" or
glossa that Heidegger hopes to unveil as man's attempted flight from
death. Here, Heidegger employs ordinary, everyday, and common as
"essential words"--words understood in relation to the being that all
things share and have in common. For being is all "things"that-are,
"
all being that confronts man everyday, all the ordinary things of life
that wait to be ^^vealed in their very being with , and relation to, the
whole of being.
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To ask 'How does it stand with being?' means nothing less
than to recapture, to repeat (wieder-holen ) , the beginning of
our historical-spiritual existence, in order to transform it into
a new beginning
. . . with all the strangeness, darkness,
insecurity that attend a true beginning.
The asking of the question concerning being is, therefore, historical
in that it attempts
. .to restore man's historical being-there--and
that always includes our own future being-there in the totality of the
history allotted to us--to the domain of being, which it was originally
AO
incumbent on man to open up for himself."
Essentially, then, it is philosophy as questioning, coupled with
an understanding of man as a temporal and historical being, that
underlies Heidegger's innovative approach to history (Geschichte )
(discussed below).
It is important to note here that, for Heidegger, both
philosophy and history are grounded in language (Sprache ), i.e. in
the words of questioning and not-questioning . Therefore,
Heidegger's historical research turns to the words themselves ". . .
for words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed
for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and
language that things first come into being." This is why, for
Heidegger, the misuse of language in idle talk and in formulated
slogans and cliches can destory man's authentic relation to things.
The process of researching the words of history in an effort to
reestablish ground and meaning is, understandably, one that involves
patient questioning. Not surprisingly then, Heidegger ends the
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book, An Introduction to Metaphysics
, on the following note.
To know how to question means to know how to wait,
even a whole lifetime. But an age which regards as real only
what goes fast and can be clutched with both hands looks on
questioning as 'remote from reality' and as something that
does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbered. But the
essential is not number; the essential is the giaht time, i.e.
the right moment, and the right perseverance.^^
Man is "the shepherd (Hirt ) of being" says Heidegger. As a
shepherd, man unfolds authentic history and being through a patient
guardianship that constantly questions its own being.
Heidegger's Understanding of History
to know is to know how it comes into being
coming-into-being and passing-away
History is not historicism but origins
Doctrines must take their beginning from that
of the matters of which they treat
.
(Giambattista Vico)
Principles . .
.
primordial; primeval: German Ur-
origin as Ur-sprung
,
primeval leap
A New Science: the cyclical view of history
The cycle ends in a ricorso
recirculation
Etymology is ricorso : as it was in the beginning.
First comes a body language:
The universal principle of etymology in all languages:
words are carried over from bodies and from the properties
of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and spiritTCVico)
First comes the senses:
The sense of an ending:
Western Civilization is over.
Norman O. Brown
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The disclosure of being's possibilities is tempered, for
Heidegger, by man's "thrownness" (Geworfenheit )--bv man's having
been cast out into a world which present man did not create, but
which he, nonetheless, has been handed. Simply stated, man carries
his past with him. Man's realization of the future possibilities for
being, therefore, comes about in relation to what already has been.
As a being of temporality (Zeitlichkeit ) , man is past, present,
and future. That is, man as relational being, is a continuity :
"having been " is present in present being in the same way that "can
be " is present.
The future, the character of having been, and the
Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the
'towards-oneself
,
the 'back-to', and the
'letting-oneself-be-encountered-by . The phenomena of the
'towards. . .', the 'to. . .', and the 'alongside. . .', make
temporality manifest as the ^ ^ctt'cL'T'LKO tf pure and simple.
Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself in and
for itself . We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the
character o^^having been, and the Present, the 'ecstases' of
temporality.
Past, present, and future are what Heidegger calls "the 'ecstases'
( Ekstasen ) of temporality" and they refer to the how of man's
"standing out into" being. (The words ecstasy and ecstatic come
from the Greek and denote "standing out" or "displacement.") Past,
present, and future refer to the continuous journey in time that [s
man, rather than to time as clock or chronological time. In this
sense, for Heidegger, man does not "take" a journey; man is a
journey. As a journey, man remembers, presences, and hopes.
Man looks back, looks out, and looks ahead, and in so doing, man
belongs to time.
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This ecstatic belonging, which is the essence of "being-there,
"
is obscured, says Heidegger, when man denies either past, present,
or future. For example, attempts to live only in the present (such
as are often prevalent today), without a regard for the future and
the past, are doomed to failure, as are attempts to live only in the
past or only in the future. In denying any one of the three, man
denies his very being for when man posits himself as only a creature
of the past, or only a creature of the present, man as a journey in
time--man as relational movement--is obscured.
With regard to history, therefore, Heidegger says man belongs
(gehort ) to his history. Subsequently, for Heidegger, to view
history as only a science (i.e., as only the recording of data and
facts) is to strip man of his belonging to history, and thereby to
obscure man's continuous relation to being.
Consequently, in his conception of history (Geschichte )
,
Heidegger distinguishes between historicity (Geschichtlichkeit ) or
authentic history, and historiography (Historie or Geschichtswissen
schaft) or the science of history.* Historiography is "concerned
*ln an effort to aid the reader in understanding these two
terms, George Seidel says that it may help to conceive historiography
as "the factual" and historicity as "the a^ual," although he notes
that Heidegger did not employ these terms. The word "actual may
be understood via its root, which denotes "being-deed, or
"being-act." Actual denotes the being in acts and deeds, i.e. the
being of history. Factual, on the other hand, refers to the
viewing
of deeds, facts, acts, without a recognition of the beir^ of
action,
i.e. without a recognition of the movement of relation that
unlerlies
all things.
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with the past (Vergangenheit ) , that which is no longer around (nicht
mehr vorhanden )," with those deeds and facts (facta ) that are over
and done with. Historicity, on the other hand, is concerned with the
"past" that is still somehow around (noch vorhanden ), and thus still
effects the present (Geganwart ) . Historicity is the "past" that is
still with us, the "past" "which still makes its presence felt." It is
the "has been " (dagewesene ) which, precisely because of its
"has-been-ness" (Gewesenheit ), is still present. Thus, for
Heidegger, the "past" of authentic history or historicity is not
something finished, and it is not finished because the "past" still
belongs to man and man still belongs to his "past."
In this light, man does not uncover nor disclose authentic
history by merely unearthing the facts and deeds of history in a
scientific manner. The possibility of uncovering and revealing
authentic history depends, for Heidegger, upon a recognition of the
temporal and historical nature of man. Man, as an historical being,
is "open" to his ecstatic temporality, i.e. to his past, present, and
future. Authentic history, therefore, involves man "owning" the
"past" which is still present in the present.
For Heidegger, it is upon authentic history or historicity that
historiography must be based if it is to realize the future possibilities
of being; that is, if it is to create the future in relation to being as
a whole. Historiography, therefore, must ground itself in historicity
for historiography, to be authentic, depends upon the actual history
of the historical being that is man. Moreover, due to a historiog-
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raphy that has not been grounded in man's temporal relation to
being, much of the "has-been" (i.e. the being of the "past") of being
has been forgotten. This "forgetting of being" is the historical
tradition that modern man has been handed.
This is not to say that the "has-been" of man--the past
being--cannot be remembered, for it is precisely in the hope of
disclosing the being of man that was
,
and thus still is (and,
therefore, "can ^") that Heidegger asks his questions concerning
being: How does it stand with being? What accounts for the nihilism
of the day? What is the nature of the being that asks after being?
It is in view of the future, in view of the "can be of being"
(Seinkbnnen ), in view of the yet-to-be-realized possibilities of
human-being that Heidegger undertakes a re-search of man and of the
early words of Western thought. Heidegger's "re-turn," therefore, to
actual history (a history thought out of its relation to the being of
acts and concerned with more than the merely factual) is in service of
actualizing the possibilities for future being. It is a return to the
"past" in the service of actualizing future being within the present.
For Heidegger, then, the possibilities for man's future
existence, and therefore man's history, lie grounded upon man's
temporal, projective, and historical relation to being. As such,
Heidegger's concept of historicity continues his efforts to reestablish
being as ground through man acknowledging his relational movement
and journey within being.
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It is in this light, perhaps, that man can view the recent call
from Norman O. Brown in his book closing time to "return from
history to mystery" as a call to turn away from history understood
merely as historiography and towards the mystery of the journey
itself. For when history is understood as historiography only, the
"mystery" for Brown and the "being" for Heidegger are forgotten.
For when man is robbed of his being and mystery, he is robbed of
his authentic history; so, too, when man is robbed of his authentic
history, he is robbed of his being and mystery, and therefore his
meaning
.
With the understanding of history as historicity, Heidegger
attempts to "re-think" the historical tradition (geschichtliche
Uberlieferung ) handed modern man. Historical tradition, then, is
approached with an eye for the future possibilities still present in the
"past" of being, and not approached with a sense of rejection or
denial of that tradition.
The misinterpretation of thought and the abuse to which it
leads can be overcome only by authen|^c thinking that goes
back to the roots--and by nothing else.
This authentic re-thinking (Andenken ) of roots (which Heidegger
often calls a "re-trieving" (Wiederholung ) of tradition) involves an
"historical dialogue" (Gesprach ) with the words and philosophers of
the past. It involves a return to origins (ursprunglich uber ). With
regard to the concept of "historical dialogue," Heidegger advances an
understanding of "interpretation" (Auslegung ) and "translation
(Ubersetzung ).
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Man's efforts to converse with the thoughts and thinkers of the
past always involve him in interpretation. This interpretation will be
authentic, says Heidegger, if man can disclose that which lies beneath
the formulation or nomenclature, i.e. if man can "think" out of his
relation to being as a whole. This "thinking" involves man's
ownership of his own relation to being. For in the same way that
being discloses itself in man "being what he is," an authentic
interpretation discloses and reveals the possibilities still present in
the words and thoughts of the past (though perhaps forgotten)
through man owning his relation to being as a continuous whole. A
misinterpretation, then, is an interpretation which forgets to call
man--the interpretei— into the question of being. Heidegger's
return, therefore, to historical tradition can be seen as an attempt to
re-interpret Western tradition in the light of man's relation to being
as a whole.
A translation, consequently, is already an interpretation.*
Similarly, then, an authentic translation, or what Heidegger terms a
"thoughtful translation" (denkende Ubersetzung ), does not refer to a
translation that is literal any more than authentic history refers to a
history that is factual. For Heidegger, a literal translation is no
translation at all. A literal translation makes the same mis-take as an
historiographical accounting of the past in that it "takes only the
*The word "translate" is the German Ubersetzen , meaning "to
interpret, to change from one language to another."
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facts or deeds of the words, and forgets the being -act underlying all
facts, deeds, and words. A thoughtful translation, on the other
hand, tries to "think" out of man's relation to being as a whole.
That is, a thoughtful translation acknowledges the movement of being
present in all deeds and facts.
The place of etymology in Heidegger's translations and inter-
pretations can be viewed against this background. Heidegger enlists
etymology in the same way that he enlists history and tradition: as an
aid, but always with an eye for more than the merely informational.
No more than authentic history can be uncovered by turning to mere
historiographical data and facts can the authentic meanings and
possibilities inherent in words be uncovered simply by quoting root
words from a dictionary. Etymological meanings "act as a hint or
indication (Hinweis )" which serves to give the philosopher a
direction, but are, by no means, the whole story. Etymology, like
history and tradition, works authentically when "thought" out of its
relation to being as a whole.
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CHAPTER I V
EARLY GREEK THOUGHT
In the circle the beginning and the end are common.
Heraclitus
With the pivotal groundwork set forth in Chapter III, this
chapter turns to Heidegger's exegesis of early Greek thought. Like
the exegesis of the existentialia of Dasein
,
the exegesis of the
pre-Socratic thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides was undertaken by
Heidegger with his questions concerning being firmly in mind.
Heidegger, therefore, turns to Western man's first known
philosophical utterings in an effort to unearth the roots of Western
man's present historical tradition, a tradition characterized by
Heidegger as "the forgetting of being." Heidegger turns back to the
past, then, in the hope of resurrecting being for the future.
It is important for the reader to view this "turning back" to
the pre-Socratics through Heidegger's interpretation of history as
historicity. That is, Heidegger does not simply interpret the words
and works of the early philosophers by following historiographical
data. Rather, Heidegger's research is an attempt to "re-think"
historical tradition down to its roots through thinking out of man's
relation to being as a whole.
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Being
The unity of things as Heraclitus understands it is a
subtle and hidden sort of unity, not at all such as could be
expressed by either a monistic or a dualistic philosophy. The
oneness of things, or rather their mutual attunement, cannot
exist or even be conceived apart from their manyness and
discord. The wisdom that steers all things through all things
(overtone: 'the wisdom by which all things steer themselves
through all things') is something that cannot be expressed
without paradox.
Philip Wheelwright
To give the reader an undertanding of what Heidegger intends
by the word "being," a brief summary of Heidegger's interpretation of
the early Greek words for being are described, along with a
description of the etymological roots of the word "being."
Being, for the early Greeks, was expressed by the word
physis
,
a word derived, Heidegger believes, from the Greek ^ VOi^.
The word physis expresses the phenomenon of emergence: that which
rises out (from the sea) and issues forth. Physis denotes the realm
of a-rising; the "self-blossoming emergence (e.g., the blossoming of a
rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such
unfolding and perseveres and endures in it; in short, the realm of
things that emerge and linger on."^ Physis describes the bringing
forth of the unconcealed ( Unverborgenheit ) from out of the concealed
(Verborgenheit ). Essentially, it is "being-brought-forth"
(Her-vor-bringen ): all that is "brought forth" into form; all that
"comes to stand. Being as physis is, thus, the "coming to
stand
(zum Stand kommen) in which all things-that-are begin to be: the
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planets, the winds and seas, the plants and animals, and man.
Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for
itself. Consequently a fundamental characteristic of the
essent is to telos
,
which means not aim or purpose but end.
Here 'end' is not meant in a negative sense, as though there
were something about it that did not continue, that failed or
ceased. End is ending in the sense of fulfillment
(Vollendung ) . Limit and end are that wherewith the essent
begins to . . That which places itself in its limit,
completing it, and so stands, has form, morphe . For as the
Greeks understood it derives its essence from an emerging
placing-itself-in-the-limit.'^
This understanding of end or limit as "coming to fulfillment and
being" coincides with the Greek concept of boundary or peras . "A
boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks
recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins
its presencing . . . Accordingly, spaces receive their being from
locations and not from 'space'
.
(Remember here also that Heidegger
describes "death" as the end whereby man becomes whole.)
Physis
,
as the realm of emerging and standing forth into limits,
is at the same time, for Heidegger, "a shining appearing" (das
scheinende Erscheinen ). "The radicals phy and pha name the same
thing. Phyein
,
self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai , to flare up,
to show itself, to appear." Thus, for the Greeks, physis as standing
forth means concurrently standing-in-the-light or "coming forth into
the light" (ins Licht aufgehende ). Such appearing, then, "is not
something subsequent that sometimes happens to being. Appearing is
the very essence of being." Being as physis for the Greeks
constitutes a "standing presence" (standige Anwesenheit ) that
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includes presencing (Anwesen ) and appearance (Erscheinen ).* "...
for the Greeks standing-in-itself was nothing other than standing-
there, standing-in-the-light. Being means appearing."^
It is this unity of being and appearance in early Greek
thought, says Heidegger, that "punctures" the traditional
interpretation of Greek philosophy as a "realistic" philosophy
stressing objective being. For Heidegger, not only did the early
Greeks not use such terms as "realistic" and "idealistic," "objective"
and "subjective," but moreover, they did not "think being" through
such terms, in that all being was conceived as a manifold unity, in
which presencing and appearing were one and the same thing.
In turning to the various etymological roots of the word
"being," we find the notion of a unity between presence and
appearance further confirmed.
According to Heidegger, the range of meanings inherent in the
word "being" is determined by three different stems. The oldest
stem is es, Sanskrit asus
,
meaning "life, the living, that which from
out of itself stands and which moves and rests in itself: the self-
standing ( Eigenstandig )
.
^Another early Greek word Heidegger uses in order to help him
understand the early Greek notion of being is rrcL^ovoia.
which Heidegger translates by the German word Anwesen meaning
"presence." George Seidel notes also that the word Anwesen refers
to "a piece of property, something solid, connoting roots in the soil,
a piece of land held for generations in the same family, which notion
must also be kept in the back of one's mind in understanding
Heidegger's Anwesen . It represents a certain solid 'thereness, a
'presencing,' a sticking (with roots firmly in the earth) around for a
while.
"
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The second root of being is the Indo-European bhu, bheu
(derivatives include the Latin perfect fm, fuo and the German bin
,
bist
,
birn
,
birt ) to which belongs the Greek phu5
,
meaning "to
emerge, to be powerful, of itself to come to stand and remain
standing," whose emerging and standing includes presence and
appearance. The more traditional understanding of this root phuo
,
and its derivatives physis and phyein
,
is as nature and "to grow."
However, the more recent exegesis of early Greek philosophy, says
Heidegger, shows the "growing" to be an "emerging." For the early
Greeks, there was no division between "being" and "becoming," nor
between "essence" and "existence." The sense of phuo
,
therefore, as
"nature" is most likely a derivative meaning, appearing later in Greek
philosophy. Recently, the root phy-
,
states Heidegger, has been
connected with pha-phainesthai
,
wherein physis receives its sense of
emerging into the light, and phyein means, accordingly, to give
light, to shine, and therefore to appear. Similarly, the Greek
phainomenon is a derivative of the verb phainesthai meaning "to show
itself." Phaino means "to bring to daylight, to place in brightness."
The phenomena of being are those things which stand forth into light
from out of darkness; those things which burst forth into uncon-
cealment from out of concealment.
The third stem is related to the German "sein": v^; Sanskrit:
vasami; Germanic: wesan , meaning to dwell, to sojourn; to
belong. Heidegger says the participle wesend in German is preserved
in an-wesend (present) and ab-wesend (absent). The substantive
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Wesen originally meant "enduring as presence, presence and
absence," and not the more common "whatness" or "essence" that
Wesen later comes to mean. The early understanding of Wesen
originally included both the "sense" of presence and absence.
However, the unified double sense of sens is lost in the Latin
prae-sens and ab-sens. setting up a seeming polemic in which
presence and absence. essence and existence. presencing and
appearing, start to be divorced.
In that Heidegger uses the word "dwell" extensively, especially
in his later writings, it might serve to look a little more closely at
the word here. For Heidegger, "to dwell" means to stand in place,
to belong (gehbren ) . The etymological roots of dwelling denote
"wandering, tarrying, going about, straying, erring." The Old
English and High German word for "building" is buan , which means
"to dwell." Bauen
,
buan are themselves variations of bhu , beo ,
bheu
,
and bjjn, the Indo-European roots of being. When bauen still
retains this original sense of being, bauen tells man how he man
dwells . Thus, ich ^ bist (bin the root of being) means: I
dwell, you dwell. In this original sense, dwelling is not an activity
man performs additionally to being, as in "working here and dwelling
there." Dwelling is being.
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we
humans are on the earth, is Buan , dwelling. To be a human
being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to
dwell. The old word bauen , which says that man is insofar
as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the same
time to cherish and protect, to preserve care
tor,
specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine.
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In looking at the roots of the word "being," three meanings
have come forth: 1) to live; 2) to emerge, to come into the light; and
3) to dwell, to sojourn, to belong. These meanings underscore the
early Greek understanding of being as physis
,
and physis as
appearing or emerging presence--an understanding which reflects the
early Greek unity of presence and appearance. For the early
Greeks, then, there was no distinction between being and becoming
nor between appearance and presence (i.e. between appearance and
reality), and, subsequently, no distinction between essence and
existence.
T ruth
The God of Delphi, who always spoke the truth, never
gave a straight answer, in the upright Protestant way; he
always spoke in riddles, in parables; ambiguities, tempta-
tions; that hearing they might hear and not understand. To
teach is not to tell; is not-to-tell; like Heraclitus, the obscure
The god knew how to lie; and so did not deceive his
countrymen. The real deceivers are the literalists, who say,
I cannot tell a lie, or, hypotheses non fingo . . . . The truth
is in the error. We slip out from under the reality-principle,
into the truth; when the control breaks down. By great
good fortune, gratis, by grace; and not by our own work or
will
.
Norman O. Brown
For the early Greeks, being was conceived as physis , the word
used to describe the bringing forth of the unconcealed from out of
the concealed. The Greek word for unconcealment is aletheia
(kXyjOiCoi ). kx-jOeC cK is translated as "unconcealment" or
'revealment" to denote un-covering. It means "throwing back the
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veil, i.e. un-veiling, re-vealing. Therefore, for the early Greeks,
when being "comes to stand" as physis
,
being simultaneously "comes
to stand" in unconcealment or aletheia . This overlapping meaning of
physis and aletheia grounds the Greek understanding of truth:
things that are, beings, are true insofar as they are.
For the Greek essence of truth is possible only in one with
the Greek essence of being as physis . On the strength of
the unique and essential relationship between physis and
aletheia the Greeks would have said: The essent is true
insofar as it is. The true as such is essent. This means:
The power that manifests itself stands in unconcealment. In
showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand.
Truth as un-concealment is not an appendagj^ to being.
. . . Truth is inherent in the essence of being.
In coming to stand (physis ), beings come into unconcealment, which
is to say that beings simultaneously come into truth as aletheia .
Being as physis
,
then, is at once truth as aletheia . Thus, the Greek
understanding of truth refers to that which is inherent in the
appearing presence of things-that-are; it is the emerging
unconcealment which beings are.
Already the reader familiar with philosophy can see that this
early Greek understanding of truth is far removed from the more
traditional concept of truth which Western man has been handed, and
thus calling aletheia as unconcealment "truth" places us on dangerous
ground. Therefore, before explicating further Heideggers
understanding of authentic truth as grounded in the early Greek
word aletheia
,
this discussion turns briefly to the conventional idea
of
truth as "propositional truth," or what is commonly
called "the
' Propositional truth states essen-correspondence theory of truth.'
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tially that "truth is the approximation of thing (object) to perception"
or "the approximation of perception to thing (object)." (In Latin,
veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus
. ) This conventional under-
standing of truth as veritas implies a "rightness" (Richtigkeit ) or a
"putting oneself right by" (sich richten nach ) with regard to some
pre-ordained and established criteria. That is, truth as veritas
implies objective truth. "... objective truth always implies
conformity of the object in question with the essential or 'rational'
14
idea of it."
The impression is given--wrongly--that this definition of the
essence of truth is independent of the explanation of the
essential nature of all that 'is,' of its very being (Sein alles
Seienden )--which explanation always involves a corresponding
explanation of the essential nature of man as the vehicle and
perfecter of the intellectus . Thus the formula for the
essence of truth (veritas' est adaequatio intellectus et rei )
acquires a universal validity evident at once to everyone.
Dominated by the self-evident nature of this concept of truth,
the essentials of which remain for the most part unperceived,
we take it as equally self-evident that truth has an opposite
and that there is such a thing as untruth. Propositional
untruth (incorrectness) is the non-conformity of statement
with thing.
Propositional truth, then, becomes merely "the likeness or agreement
( Uebereinstimmung : Q
M
OLO^Q ) of a statement ( AoyOg ) to or with
a given thing (jrpay/AOL )." The concept of truth, then, becomes
basically an agreement (between subject and object), i.e. an
agreement between man's understanding and that which is understood.
Subsequently, the failure to agree constitutes objective untruth, and
thus entails an assumed exclusion (for the one who fails to agree)
from the nature and essence of truth according to an externally
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established objective standard. Truth so conceived divorces truth
from being by assuming that something can be understood apart from
man s understanding
^
an assumption that was not present in the early
Greek understanding of truth as aletheia
. For the early Greeks,
apprehension (and, therefore, unconcealment) happens along with
being. "To think is the same as the thought that It is;" says the
early Greek philosopher Parmenides. In the same way that man
does not "have" understanding, neither does man "have" truth. Man
js understanding, [s thinking, js truth. In other words, insofar as
being "has" man, truth "has" man as well. As such, being and
truth, being and thinking, as the early Greeks conceived them, are
inseparable. Consequently, truth cannot be separated from being
without veiling both being and truth, for to separate the essence of
being--truth or uncealment--from being itself is to obfuscate both
essence and existence as the inseparable unity that they are.
For Heidegger, once truth is conceived as separate from being,
rather than that which happens along with being, truth becomes cast
as "that which is attainable," and attainable specifically through
determination and will. That is, truth is "assigned" to things outside
man at will . Truth becomes "the objective," i.e. the static. Truth
is then spoken of as the truth of something, the "of" merely denoting
the lost relationship "between being as truth." Understanding
becomes an understanding or knowledge of. Placed within the Hei-
deggerian framework, the separation of truth from being is, once
again, the result of man's attempt to flee his own relational movement
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truth. The concept of objective truth, then, is an expression of
man's objection to the motion of being as truth. It is in this
rendering of truth that relationships, for Heidegger, are recast as
brute facts placed over and against man. And for Heidegger, facts
are those things whose meaning--and that means relational motion
because for Heidegger meaning is grounded in motion--has become
obscured. In an essay entitled "The Search for Meaning," Karsten
Harries states Heidegger's intent clearly:
Take a statement such as "Vaduz is the capital of Liechten-
stein. In some sense it is certainly true: Vaduz really is the
capital of Liechtenstein. But what is the meaning of this
statement? Is it indeed meaningful, if we remember that
meaning is discovered only in response to a claim? For most
of us a statement such as this is little more than a repetition
of something we have heard elsewhere. It is not the
expression of an experience. It does not reveal being in its
being. To be sure, it does exhibit a fact. But a fact is
precisely something which no longer has a place in a living
context of care and concern. Heidegger calls such statements
'certain.' Certainty (Gewissheit) is truth which has become
meaningless .* The demand for 'the truth' about an object is a
demand for certainty. Certainty does not yield meanings, but
facts. The object is reduced to a brute given confronting
man, in its muteness defying meaningful understanding. This
disengaged way of understanding is not mor^gfundamental
than one which is engaged, but derived from it.
In objective truth, for Heidegger, truth and being are "disengaged,"
and in this disengagement, meaning is obscured. This disengage-
ment, however, points to a prior engagement: the Greek marriage of
*The English words "certain, certainty" are closely related to
the Greek KOLv^
L
if ("to decide, to separate"). In the Latin, the
root of "decide" is decidere meaning "to cut off or from." To decide
is "to determine, to settle." Certainty involves a decision, a 'cutting
off," and for Heidegger, certainty specifically "cuts off" man from the
motion of relational being.
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truth and being. Once again, then, in Heidegger's thought, present
separations simply point to prior bonds. In following Heidegger's
path back to prior bonds, this discussion returns to an elaboration of
the early Greek notion of aletheia
,
in which "things-that-are are true
insofar as they are,"
The early Greek notion of aletheia as unconcealment is grounded
in things“that-are showing themselves as they are. Man participates
in unconcealment, then, by letting "that which shows itself be seen
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself."
Therefore, for Heidegger, "the essence of truth is freedom.
Freedom lets each thing be what it is, and as such, freedom denotes
preserving and safeguarding, sparing. As Heidegger says, freedom
as sparing takes place "... when we leave something beforehand in
its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we
20*
'free' it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace."
The essence of truth, then for Heidegger, is freedom or "letting-be.
"
The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at
the moment ^ what it is. Freedom reveals itself as the
'letting-be' of what-is. ... To let what-is ^ what it is
*There are some interesting etymological connections here. In
commenting on the essence of being as dwelling, Heidegger says: "Let
us listen once more to what language says to us. The Old Saxon
wuon, the Gothic wunian
,
like the old word bauen
,
mean to remain,
to stay in place. But the Gothic wunian says more distinctly how
this remaining is experienced. Wunian means: to be at peace, to be
brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, Friede ,
means the free, das Frye
,
and fry means: preserved from harm and
danger, preserv^jd from something, safeguarded. To free really
means to spare."
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means participating in something overt and its overtness in
which everything that 'is' takes up its position and which
entails such overtness.
. . . Participation in the revealed
nature of what-is
. . . develops into a retirement befjore it so
that what-is may reveal itself as what and how it is.^^
The overtness is none other than the "coming to show itself" or the
"coming into unconcealment" that is being as physis
. Man
participates in unconcealment, then, to the extent he lets or spares
(in the sense of safeguarding) what-is to show itself as that which it
is. This letting-be is "a participation in the revealment of what-
is-as-such (das Seiende als ein solches )," in which things-that-are
P'3
are spared as what they are.
The "letting-be of what-is" refers specifically to "letting-be the
unconcealed," and the unconcealed is at once physis and aletheia . In
letting-be, therefore, man "lets-be" being as truth. Man "lets"
what-is be.
Letting-be, in the Heideggerian sense, does not denote
indifference and neglect, nor does it denote granting permission. As
Heidegger says, "To let something be (Seinlassen ) is in fact to have
24
something to do with it (sich einlassen auf) ." Letting-be as
safeguarding and sparing is to be understood as the active
watchfulness and guardianship through which man, as "the shepherd
of being," participates in being. Letting-be, then, does not imply
passivity, if by passivity we mean the absence of motion. On the
contrary, letting-be refers to "doing in the highest sense," which is
in the Greek sense of thesis. Thesis means "a setting up in the
unconcealed." Albert Hofstadter reminds the reader that the Greek
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S6tting m6ans placing, and that thssis as "setting up" refers to "a
letting lie forth."*
Placing and laying have the sense of bringing here into the
unconcealed, bringing forth into what is present, that is,
letting or causing to lie forth. Setting and placing here
never mean the modern concept of the summoning pOf things to
be placed over against the self (the ego-subject)
This "letting lie forth" is working (or more appropriately stated,
"being at work" with "being" employed as both a noun and a verb),
in the Greek sense of ergon . "... this work's 'being' is energeia
,
which gathers infinitely more movement within itself than do the
modern 'energies'," because it is a "working" and "willing" that
characterizes an "existing human being's entrance in the compliance
with the unconcealedness of Being."
Working as letting-be, therefore, involves a motion and move-
ment of the highest order. Letting-be does the work of thesis
,
the
work of "setting up in the unconcealed" whereby each thing comes to
show itself in its own way. It is work that frees each thing into its
own essential nature. It is work, then, that spares, and in sparing,
builds . "Building" here does not mean erecting an edifice, but
rather sparing something, letting something dwell. This kind of
"building" takes place "when we leave something beforehand in its
.27
own nature, when we return it specifically to its being." Man
*ln a translator's note, Albert Hofstadter states that the
German Ti^, "doing," means "laying forth, placing here, bringing
here and bringing forth--'working,' in the sense either of something
bringing itself forth out of itself into presence or of man performing
the bringing here and bringing forth of some^ing. Both are a way
in which something that is present presences."
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builds, then, insofar as he dwells. Thus, Heidegger says that those
who venture into the unconcealed must be more daring ("more daring
by a breath" says the German poet Rilke) and will more strongly,
because such venturing involves participating in what one inherently
is. This participation involves the incredible "work" of owning the
relation to being that one is. It is through this "work" that each
thing is "spared" as it is.
Freedom, so understood as the letting-be of what-is, fulfils
and perfects the nature of truth in the sense that truth is
the unconcealment and revealment of what-is. 'Truth' is not
the mark of some correct proposition made by a human
'subject' in respect to an 'object' and which then--in precisely
what sphere we do not know--counts as 'true'; truth is
rather the revelation of what-is, a revelation through which
something 'overt' comes into force. All human behaviour is
an exposition ir^ that overtness. Hence man is in virtue of
his ex-sistence.
In summary, then, Heidegger's understanding of authentic
truth, as grounded in the early Greek notion of aletheia or
unconcealment, advances truth as the uncovering or unveiling of
what-is whereby being is "let-be" as it is. Beings, then, "stand in
truth" insofar as they are.
Before presenting Heidegger's thinking on authentic untruth,
this discussion turns to Heidegger's understanding of knowing and
willing, for it is upon the essence of unconcealment as letting-be that
Heidegger's thoughts concerning knowing and willing also lie
grounded
.
In that truth for Heidegger is the unconcealment of being, it is
not surprising that knowing is expressed as man's ability to stand out
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into this unconcealment, "to endure (bestehen) it." Knowing, or
more appropriately said, the willing to know, is "the ability to stand
in the truth." It is the ability to stand out into the unconcealment
and revealment of what-is, where things-that-are reveal themselves as
they are. In "willing to know," man stands out into his relation to
being; man encounters, participates, questions. "To know," there-
fore for Heidegger is not to have statements "ready at hand."
"Merely to have information, however abundant, is not to know."^^
Even if curricula and examination requirements concentrate
this information into what is of the greatest practical
importance, it still does not amount to knowledge. Even if
this information, pruned down to the most indispensable
needs, is 'close to life,' its possession is not knowledge. The
man who possesses such information and has learned a few
practical tricks, will still be perplexed in the presence of real
reality, which is always different from what the philistine
means by down-to-earth; he will always be a bungler. Why?
Because he has no knowledge, for to know means to be
able to learn .
In the common-sense view, to be sure, knowledge belongs
to the man who has no further need to learn because he has
finished learning. No, only that man is knowing who under-
stands that he must keep learning over and over again and
who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has
attained to the point where he is always able to le^n .* This
is much more difficult than to possess information.
This understanding of "knowing" corresponds with the early Greek
Noein which, translated, expresses a "taking in" (aufnehmen ), but
not a "taking in" in the sense of clutching. Rather, Noein as "taking
in" means "to pay careful attention to something, to 'be-wary' of it
(In-die-Acht-nehmen). Authentic Noein becomes a-ware (ver-nimmt )
*The English word "learn" is derived from the Gothic full-nan
("to become full"), and-bund-nan ("to become unbound"), af-lif-nan
("to be left remaining" ) , qa-hail-nan ("to become whole^, and
qa-wak-nan ("to become awake").
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beforehand of that which it be-wares of (in die Acht nimmt ). This
wariness (Acht ) is the watch (Wacht) which takes that which lies
before it in truth." The early Greek sense of knowing, therefore,
is always careful not to harm things-that-are in knowing them. It is
a "taking in" which is careful to preserve, spare, and safeguard
what-is as it is in the process of "taking it in." This "taking in,"
then, like letting-be, is active in the highest sense, which is in the
sense of "sparing" or "freeing." Willing to know watches over things
in their being, in their form, so that what-is can show itself as what
it is. Willing to know is a-ware, i.e. wary, of not harming or
damaging a thing in the process of knowing it.*
In "willing to know," Heidegger says that man is resolved .
This brings us to a discussion of Heidegger's notion of "will as
resolve" ( Entschlossenheit )
.
[The root of the word "resolve" is the
Greek XT)-
€
L V ("to set free, release"). Resolve refers to "setting
free again."] With regard to the relation between knowing and
willing, Heidegger says:
To question is to will to know. He who wills, he who puts
his whole existence into a will, i_s resolved. ... To will is
to be resolved. [The essence of willing is here carried back
to determination ( Ent-schlossenheit, unclosedness). But the
essence of resolve lies in the opening, the coming-out-of-
*The etymological connections here are numerous. "To watch"
means not only "to guard," but in the Anglo-Saxon, "to wake."
"Wary, ware" have several meanings: "caution, aware, watch, regard,
respect, dread." The root for "wary, ware" in the Greek is opA co
meaning "I perceive, look out for, observe." Both words denote a
"guarding against deception and danger."
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cover (Ent-borgenheit) of human being-there into the clearing
of bei jig
^22
3 rid not in a storing up of energy for 'action.'
The word "action," as employed in the above quote, refers to
the conventional understanding of action as "decision to act." Thus
Heidegger says that "re-solve is no mere decision to act, but the
crucial beginning of action that anticipates and reaches through all
34
action." Will as resolve involves action in the highest sense, then,
which is in the sense of "letting-be, " rather than in the sense of
decision. As "letting-be," will as resolve is, therefore, essentially a
resolution to not decide . It is a resolution to "stand open" out into
the unconcealment of being. It is "willing" of this nature that, for
Heidegger, sets free and "releases again" (the Gk. root meaning of
resolve) things-that-are to be what they are.
It may help the reader to understand Heidegger's intention by
looking at the etymological roots of the two words "decide" and
"choose." This discussion has already noted that the word "decide"
is derived from the Latin decfdere meaning "to cut off or from." The
word "choose" is derived from the Greek word yev o yu <l t meaning
"I taste." All the etymological roots of the word "will" denote
choosing. To will in the sense of "to choose" implies "tasting."
Therefore, will as resolve, will as "letting-be" or not deciding , does
not imply not choosing. Rather, it implies not settling upon or
determining rigid bounds that obscure and "cut off" man from the
motion of relational being as a whole.
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Will understood as a "decision to act" is what Heidegger calls
will as purposeful self-assertion
. In this rendering of will, man
assumes that he must "act" in order to "attain" truth, knowledge,
being, understanding, etc. In viewing will in this manner, not only
does man forget that being [s action, but he also elevates himself
above the whole by imagining that the part is greater than the whole,
i.e. by imagining that truth and being are dependent upon the will of
man. Once the nature and essence of being is advanced as that
which is determined by the purposeful self-assertion of the being we
call "man," truth, knowledge, thought (which is to say, being itself)
become the goals and purposes of "the will," i.e. the "objects" of the
will
.
The previous discussion of the early Greek understanding of
"work, working," ergon
,
introduced the reader to the Greek sense of
working and willing, to the energeia of "being at work" that is
characteristic of the working and willing involved in man's entrance
into the unconcealedness of being. The Greek word energeia is also
related to the Greek en-telecheia or "being at end." As Heidegger
notes, "end" or "limit" for the early Greeks expressed "that through
which presencing or being begins." Man is "being at end." When
man flees his essence as "being at end" (i.e. his being and
non-being), as he does in will as purposeful self-assertion (through
willing without regard for the nature of being as a whole), the motion
between "ending" and "beginning," between "ending" and 'being is
lost. All things, then, become "ends in themselves." For once the
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motion of being, with its multiples essences, becomes dependent on
the will of man, truth and knowing become goals or "ends in
themselves." An interesting etymological "hint" here is provided by
the word "goal." Coming from the Middle English ("a limit"), the
dictionary says that "goal" may also be derived from the Anglo-Saxon
gal ("barrier, impediment"), g^lan ("to impede"), and a-gaelan ("to
delay"). In this etymological light, we might say that once truth and
being become goals or "ends in themselves," they, in turn, impede
man's knowing (owning) himself as truth and being in that they
present truth and being as those things which stand ahead of man,
as if truth and being were other than what man is.
Confirming this, Heidegger replies to his own question "What is
it that remains blocked off, withdrawn from us by ourselves in our
ordinary willing to objectify the world?" by answering "nothing other
than death. Objectification is man's objection to death . Objectifi-
cation is the constant negation of death, in which death, thus
negated, becomes something negative and excluded, while the objects
of objectification (truth, knowledge, and even being itself) become
something positive, and thus something to be "attained." Thus, in
the same way man's objection to his being as truth spawns the
concept (Begriff ) of objective truth, man's objection to his "being at
end" transforms being into "an end in itself."
For the early Greeks and for Heidegger, death is not a
negative, if by negative we mean something undesirable. Death is
the space or "negative" which brings color to life. In closing
off
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death, therefore, man's relation to being, to life itself, is
simultaneously blocked off, for in a refusal to acknowledge death,
being itself remains undisclosed. Moreover, once death is negated,
the world is divided into "positive" and "negative," into black and
white. Being's shades of color are veiled. Not only is the relation
of being and not being veiled, but also the relation of man as being
and the interrelations of all things to one another. Heidegger calls
this "the parting against the Open."* The organization of this
parting, for Heidegger, is technological production, or the organ-
ization of the objectification of the world.
What is deadly Is not the much-discussed atomic bomb as
this particular death-dealing machine. What has long since
been threatening man with death, and indeed with the death
of his own nature, is the unconditional character of mere
willing in the sense of purposeful self-assertion in
everything. What threatens man in his very nature is the
willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation,
storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature,
could render the human condition, man's being, tolerable for
everybody and happy in all respects. But the peace of this
peacefulness is merely the undisturbed continuing relent-
lessness of the fury of self-assertion which is resolutely
self-reliant. What threatens man in his very nature is the
view that this imposition of production can be ventured
without any danger, as long as other interests besides--such
as, perhaps, the interests of a faith--retain their currency.
As though it were still possible for that essential relation to
the whole of beings in which man is placed by the
technological exercise of his will to find a separate abode in
*The "Open" for Heidegger refers to "something that does not
block off, and it does not block off because it does not set bounds.
It does not set bounds because it is in itself without ^1 bounds. The
Open is the great whole of all that is unbounded." The Open as
such admits things-that-are (in their bounds) as they are. That is
to say, the Open admits or "lets-be" being's innate fit, proportion,
and order.
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some side-structure which would offer more than a temporary
escape into those self-deceptions among which we must count
also the flight of the Greek gods! What threatens man in his
very nature is the view that technological production puts the
world in order, while in fact this ordering is precisely what
levels every ordo
,
every rank, down to the uniformity of
production, and thus from the outset destroys the r^lm from
which any rank and recognition could possible arise. ^
That is, in will as purposeful self-assertion, man orders without
regard for the inherent order, fit, and proportion (Fug ) of being as
a whole. (In the German, the word Fug means order, fit,
proportion, and the word Unfug means disorder, disproportion,
chaos.) In willing without regard for the inherent order and fit of
being, Heidegger says "the wholesome and sound withdraws." The
38
world, then, "becomes without healing, unholy."
Man's affirmation of himself is only partial; indeed it cannot
be more than partial until the meaning of his own being is
transpar^t to him. Lacking the whole, man is essentially
heil-los .
In man's failure to "own" his whole being as "being at end," man not
only forgets his own relation to being, but simultaneously man loses
sight of the whole, i.e. the interrelationships of all things-that-are to
one another. As Heidegger says, man loses sight of "the dimension
of the holy;" he loses sight of "the whole thing." Man, then, no
longer affirms or "spares" things-that-are, including himself, to be
what they are--whole, holy, wholesome, healthy--for he no longer
"hears" what things are. And when man no longer hears nor sees
the inherent order of being as a whole, he wills more strongly
to
create the order he no longer finds, only serving to spawn chaos
and
disorder more quickly. As Heidegger asks, "How can man
at the
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present stage in world history ask at all seriously and rigorously
whether the god nears or withdraws, when he has above all neglected
to think into the dimension in which alone that question can be
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asked?" And that dimension, for Heidegger, is "the dimension of
the holy," the dimension of the whole.
What is perhaps most remarkable about our era is that the
dimension of the holy (des Heilea )i- is closed. This alone is
perhaps what is unholy TUnheil ).^
It is here that, for Heidegger, man stands unprotected, or
"unshielded," against the disorder that accompanies purposeful
self-assertion. That is, in the realm of the unholy, man stands
"unshielded" against his own "willing self" that, in desperation,
"orders and fits" without regard for the inherent order, fit, and
proportion of being as a whole.
Ironically, then, it is precisely man's ordering and fitting
without regard for the inherent order and fit of being as a whole that
is the root of man's present state of disorder and confusion. Will as
purposeful self-assertion, through which truth, knowledge, and even
being itself have become viewed as "attainable goals," has brought
man face to face with what he initially set out to avoid in elevating
the willing self: death. Ironically, man's flight from his own
*ln a translator's note, Maurice Friedman states that
"Des Heilen is a genitive of das Heile (the whole, the intact) but, in
thii context, one is reminded of the origin it shares with HeM
(salvation, holy, good fortune). Heidegger here telescopes all these
meanings and also makes us see in the word Unheil the^^eaning of
'unholy' in addition to its current meaning of misfortune.
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nothingness has brought him face to face with nihilism, a deathlike
existence, and with possible annihilation; man's flight from his own
being at end has placed him at the brink of "being's end." For it
is specifically, for Heidegger, man's failure to own his own finiteness,
his own limits and boundaries, through converting the relational
movement (that begins in limits) into stationary "objects" that seem to
not be moving, which has created the more rigid barriers that now
bind man. Swallowed in the fragmented and disconnected, man now
faces an earlier and more constricting death than the primal one he
had hoped to postpone.
That the man-made death is tightening its hold on man is
reflected, for Heidegger, in "the nihilistic will," which is will as
purposeful self-assertion in its final stages: "the will to will," where
man wills now for the mere sake of willing. For as the deathlike
grasp of the fragmented becomes more pervasive, man wills more
furiously, now unaware that willing without regard for the inherent
order of being is the root of nihilism. As the disorder this "willing"
creates increases, man orders and wills even harder, creating more
disorder.
Self-willing man everywhere reckons with things and men as
objects. What is so reckoned becomes merchandise.
Everything is constantly changed about into new
orders. . . . Thus ventured into the unshielded, man moves
within the medium of 'businesses' and 'exchanges.'
Self-assertive man lives by staking his will. He lives
essentially by risking his nature in the vibration of money
and the currency of values. As this constant trader and
middle-man, man is the 'merchant.' He weighs and measures
constantly, yet does not know the real weight of things. Nor
does he ever know what in himself is truly weighty and
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preponderant. In one of his late poems (Spate Gedichte,
p. 21f
. ) Rilke says:
Alas, who knows what in himself prevails.
Mildness? Terror? Glances, voices, books?^'^
One of the last things to come under the dominion of will, one
of the last things to become "merchandise," for Heidegger, is being
itself. That is, in the final stages of "the forgetting of being,"
being itself is resurrected as an object, is cast as something
"attainable through will," in man's final desperate attempt to prove to
himself that being is not dead. Being itself becomes "displayed" in
an effort to demonstrate that being is not forgotten. Being is recast
as something utilitarian and cultural; it is made into a "holiday
ornament" cultivated along with other object-things. Cast as a tool,
being becomes "subject to conscious cultivation and planning" (i.e.
subject to will as purposeful self-assertion), and "split into
branches," each branch setting up standards called "values," which
are preserved by restriction: art for art's sake, science for science's
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sake, etc.
One of the more evident signs pointing to the merchandizing of
being is man's current preoccupation with the "ornament" of love.
This preoccupation with the "value love," for Heidegger, primarily
signals a lack of "liking," a lack of love, for love belongs to death
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and death is missing, so how can love be present? This
understanding echoes an often-quoted saying by the German writer
Bertolt Brecht: "When the leaders speak of peace, common people
know war is coming." The need to "sell" a thing most often reflects
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man's coveted suspicions as to its unexpressed presence. Moreover,
for Heidegger, to love, to like, is "to take care of or care for a
'thing' or a 'person' in their essence." To like, then, is to let
something "sell" or "speak" for itself. "Such liking means in a more
primary sense to endow with essence. For Mdgen is the true essence
of Vermogen
,
which not merely can achieve one thing or another but
can let something 'realize itself true to its origin and as it comes
46*towards us, that is, to let it be.
"
Having looked at Heidegger's interpretation of truth in light of
the early Greek word aletheia
,
and also at the ancillary concerns of
knowing and willing, this discussion turns to Heidegger's under-
standing of "authentic untruth," or mystery.
Mystery
The truth of being as unconcealment is that it conceals and
reveals at the same time. Being is always simultaneously
coming-to-be and passing-away ; it always is and is not. It
simultaneously tells the truth and lies. Unlike the man-made
opinion of objective truth that says "two opposing things
cannot be equally true," the truth of being says "two things
are always equally true." This is the mystery of being.
Martin Heidegger
*Maurice Friedman points out the interconnections present in
Heidegger's choice of the German word Mbgen for "like." "Heidegger
uses as equivalent for 'like' German Mogen , which has the same root
as English 'may,' 'might (v.),' and 'might (n.).'
therefore, the meaning implied here is not only that of liking but
also that of 'possibility,' 'potential,' 'permission,' and 'power --as
still
evident in the deri^tive Macht (might, power) and Vermog^ (might,
power, potential)."
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In the preceeding discussion of aletheia as unconcealment,
authentic truth was advanced as "that which 'had' man" by virtue of
man coming into being or unconcealment. In that truth understood as
aletheia is not the "property" or "possession" of man, but rather man
is the "property" of truth, it then follows, for Heidegger, that
untruth is not the "property" of man either, and thus, no more than
truth can come about through efforts of attainment or decision, can
untruth come about through the "negligence of man."
If the essence of truth is not fully displayed in the rightness
of a statement, then nei^er can untruth be equated with the
wrongness of an opinion.
With this statement, what does Heidegger intend? The essence of
truth, for Heidegger, has been stated as freedom, or "letting-be
what-is." Freedom expresses man's participation in the unconcealment
of being as physis . As with truth, so too with freedom: freedom
"has" man; man does not "have" freedom. That is, truth and
freedom have man raised, or to use Heidegger's word, "attuned"
(abgestimmt ) to being, whether man consents or not . Man is
"attuned" to his relation to being as a whole, whether he "owns" this
relationship or not. Being as a whole [what Heidegger calls in his
essay, "On the Essence of Truth," what~is~in totality (das Seiende
im Ganzem)] does not depend upon recognition or consent for its
being and truth . As Heidegger says, being determines beings, while
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remaining something indeterminate and indeterminable. That is,
man's being as relation prevails whether recognized by man or not.
This determining nature of being is precisely why those essences of
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being that man fails to own and acknowledge still come to "own" man,
as, for example, in man's failure to own the non-being aspect of
being as a whole, the non-being of nihilism comes to own man.
Let's look a little more closely at what it means to say "the
indeterminable--being--determines beings." At first, this statement
would seem to be a contradiction. In truth, however, it is a
paradox. The word "paradox" is the Greek word ~dip
.
It
is TT a.pi ("beside") and ("a notion, an opinion"), meaning
"beside an opinion."* A paradox is "that which is contrary to
received opinion or to what seems; strange but true." When man
stands in paradox, says Heidegger, his "stand" is more real than just
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about anything else man can call real.
It is here, however, that man, feeling the "weight" of the
paradoxical whole, turns being as a whole into an "object"--into
something that is easily "attained" and "passed on." It is here that
the truth of being as paradox is recast as contradiction. (The word
"contradict" comes from the Latin contradictus meaning "against to
*The word "opinion" is derived from the Latin opTnarT meaning
"to suppose." An opinion is "a suppose," a supposition, an
assumption. Suppose means "to assume as true," and comes from
Latin, French, and Greek words that mean in each case "to lay
under, put under, hence to substitute, forge, counterfeit.^
Supposition is from the Latin suppositionem and means a
substitution." An opinion is a substitution that is counterfeit in that
it has no relation to the essential nature of the thing itself. An
opinion substitutes an assumption about the truth of being for the
truth of being. To assume comes from the Greek dechesthai meaning
"to take for granted, to take to one's self." In this etymological
light, Heidegger's historical exegesis can be seen as an attempt to
pull back the veils of assumptions, substitutions, and opinions which
the truth of being has been "placed under."
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speak." Contradiction "speaks against" what-is.) As stated
previously, in the traditional concept of truth as "propositional
truth," where truth depends upon agreement or consent, the failure
to agree or consent entails an assumed exclusion from truth for the
one who fails to agree. This rendering of truth, therefore, gives
rise to "truths" that supposedly contradict one another. It gives rise
to the belief that "two opposing things cannot be equally true." For
the early Greeks, however, the truth of being did not depend upon
agreement or consent, and therefore no "thing" within being could be
excluded from truth. That Is, being as a whole determines the
essence of "things" within being; the whole determines the essence of
the parts. Therefore, the essence of being cannot be determined by
man, by a part, for it is determined by being as a whole. This is
what is meant by saying "being determines beings." This statement
expresses what physics has always known: the whole determines the
essence of the parts.
What does it mean, then, to say that being, the determiner, is
at once the indeterminate and indeterminable? This question brings
us to a discussion of what Heidegger calls "authentic untruth.
Essentially, the notion of "authentic untruth" is Heidegger's attempt
to give words to the mystery of being. It is an attempt at
expressing the simultaneous coming-to-be and passing-away that is
being. Such an attempt involves Heidegger in trying to express the
inexpressable. It involves an expression of paradox.
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Already being as physis has been expressed as "bringing forth
the unconcealed from out of the concealed." This coming into uncon-
cealment, however, does not accordingly mean that concealment is, so
to speak, "left behind." As Heidegger expresses it, unconcealment is
concealment "brought forth." The "concealed" is what is brought
forth into the unconcealed. In that unconcealment is none other than
concealment brought forth, unconcealment (i.e. being) conceals and
unconceals at the same time. That is, being hides and discloses
simultaneously . Unconcealment is at once a concealment (Verbergen )
.
In concealment coming into unconcealment, there is accomplished what
Heidegger calls "a dissimulation" of being [the dissimulation of
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the dissimulated (die Verbergung des Verborgenen )]
.
There is hardly any difference between the German words
Verbergung (dissimulation) and Verbergen (concealment); conse-
quently, they are used interchangeably. To dissimulate means "to
feign or pretend apart; to make like apart." The dissimulation of
being, for Heidegger, then, is a setting-apart or dissembling that is
feigning or pretending in that the setting-apart is not the final word
or whole story concerning the essence of being. Dissimulation or
concealment, therefore, is that which "makes like apart." Dissimula-
tion or concealment, then, can be said to "lie forth," the word lie
being employed in its varied senses, one of which is "not telling the
whole truth." Similarly, the word concealment means "to hide to-
gether; to disguise wholly." The word "together" means "to gather."
The setting-apart of concealment hides to gather. (Remember here
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that the early Greek understanding of "limit" or "end" was "that
through which something begins its presencing.") This is the intent
here as well. Dissimulation or concealment is the "hiding" that begins
binding together; it "disguises wholly." That is, concealment or
dissimulation masks being as a whole by pretending, feigning, and
making like apart, by making like unwhole. Concealment makes like
separate by setting-apart. However, to mis-take this setting-apart as
the final word is to assume something that is not true, for
setting-apart is only the disguise of binding-together.
In coming into unconcealment, then, being as physis achieves a
limit, a concealment, as separate things-that-are, as separate parts
and portions. Being as a whole coming ^ parts simultaneously
conceals and unconceals. Being shows and hides. It is this
"concealment in unconcealment of the concealed" that Heidegger calls
"authentic untruth ." Thus, in the same way that "the unconcealment
of the concealed" is called authentic truth, so too, "the concealment
of the concealed" is called authentic untruth. The essence of truth
as "letting-be," then, refers to letting the unconcealment (physis as
aletheia, being as truth) that arises forth from concealment come to
stand in its unconcealment (authentic truth) and its concealment
(authentic untruth). Man, therefore, "lets" things show themselves
as they are by letting things stand in unconcealment, whose very
standing is simultaneously a revealing (unconcealing) and a hiding
(concealing)
.
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Letting things be in totality--a process which reveals and
conceals at the same time--brings it about that dissimulation
appears as the initial thing dissimulated. Da-sein
,
insofar as
it ex-sists, reaffirms the fir^and most extreme non-revela-
tion of all: authentic untruth.
Authentic untruth, for Heidegger, is therefore "anterior to all revela-
tion of this or that actuality." As a non-revelation, authentic
untruth is mystery. Man, then, reveals mystery insofar as he stands
out into his relation to being. In standing out into his relation to
being, man lets what-is show itself as that which it is, which is to
say, man lets being disclose its essence and truth as that which
reveals and conceals at the same time. Man "lets" mystery.
Not an isolated mystery concerning this thing or that, but
the single fact that absolute mystery, mystery as such (the
dissimul^on of the dissimulated) pervades the whole of man's
Da-sein
.
Man himself, as a particular being which is there and standing
forth in unconcealment, simultaneously reveals and conceals being.
This constitutes for man what Heidegger calls "proximity to the
source." "... the essence of proximity seems to consist in bringing
near the Near, while keeping it at a distance. Proximity to the
source is a mystery. As relation, man is the closeness or
"proximity" of mystery; man is "being-close." Man is nearness and
distance, unconcealment and concealment, setting-apart and
*The word "mystery"
who is initiated") and ixx>€Ly
Gk. /X.0 , a slight sound with closed lips")
which"^ hidden, inexplicable,
the word "close" are varied:
with
comes from the Greek u^orns ("one
("to close the eyes; suggested by the
Mystery refers to that
secret, and close. The meanings of
"to bring together, to unite," "near.
very little space between," and "secret, hidden.
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binding-together. This constitutes the twofold or relational essence
of man.
Relating (the word relate means "to bring or bear back"), for
Heidegger, re-turns man to the source; relating "bears and brings
man back" to the mystery of being. Heidegger likens the mystery of
being to the "homeland," and calls man's "return" again and again to
the source "homecoming." "Homecoming is the return into the
proximity of the source." In homecoming, man "comes to relate to
that in which he is ultimately and totally related." Homecoming is the
"ownership" whereby man becomes a home-owner; it is the ownership
whereby man becomes a dweller in the house of being. Heidegger
adds: "What is joy? The original essence of joy is the process of
55becoming at home in proximity to the source."
But such a return is only possible for one who has pre-
viously, and perhaps for a long time now, borne on his
shoulders as the wanderer the burden of the voyage, and has
gone over into the source, so that he could there experience
what the nature of the Sought-For might be, angg then be
able to come back more experienced, as the Seeker.^
That is, once man encounters the nature of the Sought-For, which is
being as mystery, man comes back a Seeker, a questioner.
However, for Heidegger, man is erratic (irrig ): man comes home
and forgets to come home. Man draws near and moves away. This
understanding aligns itself with the early Greek statement of Hera-
clitus': "The way up and the way down are one and the same."^^
Philip Wheelwright, in his book on Heraclitus, elaborates:
The upward and downward ways are simultaneously active in
every soul, although to different degrees, and every soul
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is in some state of tension between upward and downward
pulls.
. . . Fire (here, a metaphor for being).
. . consumes
all things, but it may do so in either of two ways. It may
burn the individual to a cinder or it may assimilate him to its
own being. Perhaps, in some way that eludes our schematic
understanding, it will operate upon us in both respects at
once; for every person's soul is divided, and to some degree
everyone is groping toward the light and sinking into
earthiness at the same time. . . . The two destinies
represent the eternally warring factions of the human soul,
with its simultaneous yearning for the light and propensity
for mud. ... To become flame or to become cinder is the
inescapable and constant dilemma to which every moving being
must anggdoes make his small contributory response at every
moment.
The choice is "fire or fire" says T.S. Eliot: either man is consumed
by the fire of intense being, or he is consumed by the fire of
annihilation. Man is capable of both for man is^ both: he is
simultaneously coming-to-be and passing-away . He is being and
nothingness. Man is flame and cinder. As this twofold or relational
being, man "yearns for light" and "sinks into mud." In Heidegger's
words, man "owns" that which he is and does not "own" that which
he is. Man remembers and he forgets.
Although man is all the time related to what-is, he almost
alv^^s acquiesces in this or that particular manifestation of
What Heidegger is saying here is that man "chooses the downward
way" in acquiescing to this or that particular manifestation of being,
i.e. in mis-taking "a-part" as the whole story. Man forgets that
setting-apart does not nullify the unity of being; on the contrary,
setting-apart constitutes the unity of being. Man forgets that
setting-apart inaugurates relationship ("lying-down-together ).
Mis-taking "a-part" as the whole story, then, is "the essence
of the
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the downward way."
The essence of the downward way, in what may be called
(descriptively, not melodramatically) the catastrophic perspec-
tive, is to become a victim of the Event through attac^ent to
the temporal things and attitudes that it will destroy.
For the early Greeks, and for Heidegger, temporal things are
not to be taken as "ends in themselves," but rather as those things
through which the motion of being begins. In setting-apart or
separation (to separate means "to provide or arrange apart"), a world
of togethering comes into being. Separation, therefore, does not
"split" unity, much less destroy unity. "It constitutes unity, it is a
61 *binding-together, logos . Polemos and logos are the same."
( Logos
,
the early Greek word for "the primal gathering principle," is
discussed in the following section.) Heidegger quotes Heraclitus as
saying: "eidenai de chre ton polemon eonta xynon kai dike erin . 'It is
necessary to bear in mind setting-apart (Aus-einander-Setzung) as
essentially bringing-together, and order (Fug) as contending.'
. .
This is the paradoxical mystery of being: setting-apart [s
binding-together. Setting-apart ^ binding-together comprises the
innate order, fit, and proportion inherent in being.
Moreover, Heraclitus says: "physis kryptesthai philei , 'Being
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(emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to self-concealment.
*The word "pole" comes from the Greek words iCoyoc ("a
pivot, an axis, a hinge") and ("to be in motion"). Poles
are the pivots and hinges that are themselves in motion . Setting-
apart is a pivot that not only sets things in motion, but is itself in
motion. That which seems stationary is, nonetheless, in motion, even
if the naked eye cannot see the motion.
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Heidegger comments further:
Since being means emerging appearing, to issue forth from
concealment--concealment, its origin in concealment, belongs
to it essentially. This origin lies in the essence of being, of
the manifest as such. Being inclines back toward it, both in
great silence and mystery and in banal distortion and
occultation. The close relation between physis and
kryptesthai discloses the intimate bond and conflict between
being and appearance.
Heidegger also says in Poetry, Language, Thought :
This concealment is dissembling. If one being did not
simulate another, we could not make mistakes or act
mistakenly in regard to beings; we could not go astray and
transgress, and especially could never overreach ourselves.
That a being should be able to deceive as semblance is t|gg
condition for our being able to be deceived, not conversely.
As the early Greeks expressed it, the mystery loves to hide. "Nature
fifi
loves to hide." Being cloaks and disguises itself by feigning like
apart; in Heidegger's words, being is both concealment and
unconcealment. It is, therefore, through the nature of being itself
that man can be deceived, and mis-take setting-apart or concealment
as the final word regarding being. The possibility of man "being
deceived" constitutes, for Heidegger, the realm of illusion and error
'(J_rre)
.
Wherever the dissimulation of what-is in totality is admitted
only by the way, as a boundary which occasionally impinges,
dissimulajipn as the ground-phenomenon of Da-sein is lost in
oblivion
.
That is to say, when man mis-takes separation, dissimulation,
concealment as an "impairment" or "impingement," rather than as the
setting-apart through which all things come together, the mystery of
relational being is lost to the world of "this" and that. The
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essence of being as that which reveals (unconceals) and conceals at
the same time is veiled. It is here that ground gives way to fore-
ground, and man comes to ask after the being of things rather than
the being of things. When separation is mistaken as the whole story,
participation gives way to fragmentation. The relation between thing
and thing is fractured. (The words fracture, fraction, fragment,
and fragmentation are derived from the Latin frangere meaning "to
break. ")
This is not to say that the mystery of being is obviated in
man's mistaking separation as the final word, any more than man's
relation to being is obviated in man's failure to "own" that relation.
Being, the indeterminable, still determines everything. Therefore,
the mystery of being is not obviated in being forgotten, for no more
than truth depends upon consent does the mystery of being
(authentic untruth) buckle from negligence. The forgetting, as
Heidegger states, merely takes up "a presence of its own," although
it is a presence of deception. Deception or illusion for Heidegger "is
only one among the modes according to which man moves" as
68*
being -in -the-world
.
*For Heidegger, psychology and epistemology fail to recognize
illusion and error as dynamic modes of being, and in so doing, m^i^
no longer can experience illusion and error as the powers they are.
To recognize or let-be illusion and error as dynamic modes of being
would be to exercise will as resolve; it would be to let-be what-is.
That is, will as resolve acknowledges or lets be will as purposeful
self-assertion. Will as purposeful self-assertion becomes subsumed
within a wider rendering that views what-is in relation to being as-^g
whole, so as not to give "a negative reading to that which is.
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But the forgotten mystery of Da-sein is not obviated by
being forgotten; on the contrary, forgetting gives the
apparent disappearance of the forgotten a presence of its
own. Inasmuch as the mystery denies itself in and for the
sake of forgetfulness, it leaves historical man to rely on his
own resources in the realm of the practicable. Abandoned
thus, humanity builds up its 'world' out of whatever
intentions and needs happen to be the most immediate, filling
it out with projects and plans. From these in their turn
man, having forgotten what-is-in-totality
,
adopts his
measures. He insists (beharrt ) on them and continually pro-
vides himself with new ones, without giving a thought to the
reasons for taking measures or the nature of measurement.*
Despite his advance towards new measures and goals he mis-
takes their essential genuineness. He is the more mistaken
the more exclusively he takes himself as the measure of all
things.
With that measureless and presumptuous (vermessen ) for-
getfulness of his he clings to the certainties of selfhood, to
whatever happens to be immediately accessible.** This
insistence (Beharren ) is--unknown to him--supported by the
circumstance that his Da-sein not only ex-sists but in-sists at
the same time, i.e. obstinately holds fast to (besteht auf )
that which actuality (das Seiende ), as though open of and in
itself, offers him.
As ex-sistent, Da-sein is in-sistent . But the mystery
dwells also in in-sistent existence, though here the mystet^y
is the forgotten essence of truth, now become 'inessential.'
*This phrase reads: ohne noch den Grund der Maass-nahme
selbst und das Wesen der Maassgabe zu bedenken , and is translated
"without considering the ground (basis) of measure-taking itself and
the nature of measure^iving . " Maassgabe means "proportion," "that
which gives measure." Measuring here, then, does not have to do
with number and quantity, but with proportion and relation. (For
further discussion of Heidegger's thought on "measuring," refer to
Chapter VII, "... Poetically Man Dwells ..." in the book,
Poetry, Language, Thought .
)
**"Selfhood" here refers to man taking himself as the measure of
all things, as he who must order all things. In viewing himself as
"he who must order things," rather than acknowledging being as
"that which provides order," man "measures" and "orders without
regard for the measure-giving of what-is-in-totality, without regard
for the inherent order and proportion of being as "setting-apart \5
binding-together." This "selfhood" spawns opinions and assumptions.
As this section has already noted, "to assume" is the__
Greek
dechesthai meaning "to take to one's self, to take for granted.
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For Heidegger, then, being-forgotten--deception and
illusion--comes about through man's in-sistence (i.e. through will as
purposeful self-assertion). In in-sisting, man "takes himself as the
measure of all things," and in so doing, measures without regard for
the innate measure, order, and proportion inherent in relational
being, without regard for the inherent binding-together of
setting-apart. In-sistent existence (existence used here in the
vernacular) is the realm of "taking things for granted," the realm of
opinion and assumption, where man measures without understanding
the nature of measurement.
The German word Maassgabe means "proportion, that which
gives measure." In in-sistent existence, for Heidegger, man's
measure-taking bears no relation to the measure-giving (proportion,
order, fit) inherent in being, and therefore man measures mistakenly.
He takes concealment or setting-apart as a boundary which infringes,
rather than the proportion or measure-giving that binds all things
together. It is this mis-measuring that, for Heidegger, brings about
the disorder and disproportion (Unfug ) that has finally led to the
nihilism of the day. It is err-ing through in-sisting, err-ing through
will as purposeful self-assertion, that constitutes for Heidegger "the
counter-essence of the original essence of truth." It is man taking
himself as "the measure of all things" that spawns disorder and
chaos.
The irony here, as we have already noted, is that man, sensing
disorder and chaos (but not sensing that it is precisely his ordering
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that has given rise to disorder), sets about frantically measuring and
ordering all the more urgently in an effort to curb disorder. To the
extent man fails to recognize, however, his ordering and measuring
without regard for the order of relational being as a whole ^ the
source of disorder
,
man's frantic ordering only pushes him further
into the abyss. Being as a whole is only that more deeply veiled
from man's view.
Man's measure-taking, then, needs to be in accord with the
essential measure-giving of being. This measure-taking is the kind
of "taking" "which does not consist in a clutching or any kind of
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grasping, but rather in a letting come of what has been dealt out."
This measuring is a "taking in" which pays careful attention to the
"order" of things as they are. It is a "taking in" that is wary and
watchful of the part each part plays in the order and fit of things.
It is this "taking in" that acknowledges the mystery dwelling
also in in-sistent existence, "though here the mystery is the
forgotten essence of truth." That is, the essence of truth as being
encompasses and subsumes all relationships and modes of being, and
thus truth "holds way" whether man recognizes the mystery as such
or not. The early Greeks understood this. Heraclitus says: "Even
sleepers are workers and collaborators in what goes on in the
universe. Sleepers are only those who are un-a-ware (not
watchful) of their part . They are workers who are not a-wake, but
they are workers nonetheless, for being works through all beings.
Therefore, for Heidegger, it is man's turning towards (home-
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coming) and turning away (homelessness), waking and sleeping,
ex-sisting and in-sisting, which constitutes the err-atic (irrig )
rhythm of the man who dwells: Da-sein . As the being who dwells in
"being-there, " man wanders, goes astray, tarries, lingers, and errs.
Man yearns for the light and sinks into the mud. Man is flame and
cinder. For Heidegger, "they are one and the same thing."
Man's drifting from the mystery to the practicable and from
one practicability to the next, always missing the mystery, is
erring (das Irren ).
Man errs. He does not merely fall into error, he lives in
error always because, by ex-sisting, he in-sists and is thus
already in error. The error in which he lives is not just
something that runs along beside him like a ditch, something
he occasionally falls into. No, error is part of the inner
structure of Da-sein
,
in which historical man is involved.
Error is the theatre for that variable mode of being (Wende )
where in-sistent existence, turning^gand turning about,
perpetually forgets and mistakes itself.
Man "lives in error" in that his ex-sisting includes and involves
"in-sisting," and therefore error, for Heidegger, is one of man's
modes of being-in-the-world . It is the temporal and finite essence of
man which incorporates the possibility of "going astray" ( I rre ) , and
with "possibility," man's being-in-the-world involves going astray.
In this light, then, "error is the space in which history unfolds.
Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to
destiny: there would be no history.
Error is, then, of the very essence of history, for authentic
history is primarily Dasein's , and Dasein as a^^inite being has
error In the very constitution of his Da-sein .
Man is always turning, turning towards and turning away
from
the mystery of being. This is the history of man,
a history which
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Norman O. Brown calls "a creative misunderstanding."
In that all creating, all venturing forth, risks disorder and
disproportion, all creating for Heidegger is violent (Gewalt-tatigkeit =
violence)
.
The sapient man sails into the very middle of the dominant
order (Fug); he tears it open and violently carries being into
the essent; yet he can never master the overpowering.
Hence he is tossed back and forth between structure and the
structureless, order and mischief (Fug and Un-fug), between
the evil and the noble. Every violent curbing of the
powerful is either victory or defeat. Both, each in its
different way, unfold the dangerousness of achieved or lost
being. Both, in different ways, are menaced by danger.
The violent one
,
the creative man, who sets forth into the
un-said, who breaks into the un-thought, compels the
unhappened to happen and makes the unseen appear--the
violent one stands at all times in venture (tolma ) . In
venturing to master being, he must risk the assault of the
nonessent, me kalon
,
he must risk dispersion, in-stability,
disorder, mischief. The higher the summit of historical
being-there, the deeper will be the abyss, the more abrupt
the fall into the unhistorical
,
whi(^^merely thrashes around in
issueless and placeless confusion.
It is often, therefore, that the creative man, faced with the
knowledge that his works inevitably risk disorder, thereby becoming
sarma (a dunghill), "leaves the overpowering to its order," and
remains silent. Faced with the knowledge that his works risk dis-
order, man comes face to face with the knowledge that "things both
can and cannot be," to use W. B. Yeats phrase, and that all his
works both set apart and bring together.
But there's another knowledge that my heart destroys.
As the fox in the old fable destroyed the Spartan boy s.
*The root of "violence" means "full of might." Might is derived
from "able," whose root meanings are numerous; activity, easy
to
handle, to have, to hold, power, potential, possibility.
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Because it proves that things both can and cannot be;
That the swordsmen and the ladies can still keep company,
Can pay the poet for a verse and hear the fiddle sound,
That I am still their servant though all are underground
O what of that, O what ol^that,
What is there left to say? °^
Through the knowledge that "things both can and cannot be," man
comes to understand that all venturing forth is violent and filled with
fear. For when man "leaves the overpowering to its order," man
specifically leaves the overpowering to its order ^ chaos, and this is
always frightening. In fear, man ventures forth, and this venturing
forth is violent for it is simultaneously a leaving behind. "Art is
built around violence, around death; at its base is fear," says Joyce
Carol Oates. Art as creating always involves a simultaneous
destruction, a death. All venturing forth, therefore, is violent
because what is coming-to-be is also passing-away
.
Nothing can come from nothing, no energy from a bodiless
spirit; thus, there can be no violence out of a sense of
nothing, for violence is always an affirmation. . . . The
absolute dream, if dreamed, must deal with death, and the
only way toward death we understand is the way of
violence. . . . The music of paradise is 'the continual
clashing of swords.' Nothing must be allowed to come to
rest, to reach fruition. The only fruition honored is that of
death, which produces an ecstasy that comes from a sudden
enlargement of vision--the breaking-down of the dykes that
separate man from man--so that personality is finally lost,
annihilated by violence. The changing of one's shape is both
dreaded and desired, f<^tj this magical transformation signals
the ultimate loss of self.
Desired and dreaded, the changing of one's shape is inevitable, for,
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as Heraclitus says, "it is in changing that things find repose."
It
is in changing, in relational motion, in "the continual
clashing of
swords," where things "can and cannot be," that the
barriers which
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have built up between man and man are broken down. It is here also
that the mystery of order ^ chaos acts, as Joyce Carol Oates says,
as "the antithesis to various deceits of humanism." For Joyce Carol
Oates, as for Heidegger, "nihilism is overcome by the breaking-down
of the dykes between human beings." For both, these dykes or
barriers include those perpetuated in "selfhood" (false separation)
and "uniformity" (false unity). These are discussed in the section
that follows.
Logos
Once men touch one another, then the modern industrial
form of machine civilization will melt away
and universalism and cosmopolitanism will cease;
the great movement of centralising into oneness
will stop
and there will be a vivid recoil into separateness;
many vivid small states, like a kaleidoscope,
all colours
and all the differences given expression.
D. H. Lawrence, "Future States"
Heidegger searches the various roots and meanings of the Greek
word logos ( ApyoS ) and unearths the meaning "to gather, to
collect," rather than the more traditional interpretation of logos
as
having to do with discourse.
Logos means the word, discourse, and legein means to speak,
as in dia-logue and mono-logue. But originally lo^os did
not
mean speech, discourse. Its fundamental meaning stands
in
no direct relation to language. Lego , legejn, Latin le^er^,
is
the same as the German word Mesen' (to gather,
collect,
read): to gather wood, the vintage, the cream of ^he
crop),
ein Buch lesen' (to read a book) is only a variant of
lesen
in the strict sense, which is: to put one thing
with another.
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to bring together, in short, to gather; but at the same time
the one is mared off against the other.
. . . long after the
noun logos had come to mean discourse and statement it
retained its original meaning in the sense of 'relation of the
one to the other.'
For Heidegger, then, the basic meaning of logos is a gathering or a
collecting; more essentially, a collecting collectedness, a gathering
gatheredness (conveying the lack of distinction between noun and
verb for the early Greeks). That is, logos is the gathering motion
present in what is already gathered; it is a "gathering
gatheredness." Logos as gathering refers, then, to the gathering of
what is already together. (Etymologically, the word "together" is
from to-gaedere and means "to gather, to collect.") This sense is
further confirmed for Heidegger by the Greek word for legen
,
liegen
,
which is CO Bck l
,
meaning "to lie before." Logos collects or
gathers by letting what-is lie before as gathered. For Heidegger,
then, logos refers to the primal gathering principle.
In order to reveal the early Greek understanding of logos as
gathering, and also to demonstrate the intimate connection that exists
between logos and physis , Heidegger turns to the sayings of the
early Greek philosopher Heraclitus, whose philsophical utterances are
some of the few surviving samples of Western man's early thought.
Heidegger begins his discussion of the word logos , as employed
in Heraclitus' thought, by recalling Fragments 1 and 2.
Fragment 1: Although this Logos is eternally valid, yet men
are unable to understand it--not only before hearing it, but
even after they have heard it for the first time. That is
to
say, although all things come to pass in accordance with
this
Logos, men seem to be guite without any experience of
it--at
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least if they are judged in the light of such words and deeds
as I am here setting forth. My own method is to distinguish
each thing according to its nature, and to specify how it
behaves; other men, on the contrary, are as forgetful and
heedless in their waking moments of what is going on around
and within them as they are during sleep.
Fragment 2 : We should let ourselves be guided by what is
common to all. Yet, although the Logos is common to all,
most mer^^^ve as if each of them had a private intelligence of
his own.
Heidegger says that these first two fragments tell us: 1) permanence
and endurance belong to the logos ; 2) the logos is common to all, or,
as Heidegger expresses it, logos is the togetherness (to-gather-ness)
of all things-that-are; and 3) all that happens, everything that comes
into being stands into this permanent, enduring togetherness. These
fragments, for Heidegger, express logos as gathering in the sense of
"lying before as gathered."
Heidegger then proceeds to clarify the implication in Fragment 1
that the logos is audible, and as "audible," expresses logos as
discourse or spoken words (epea ) . To explore this, Heidegger turns
to Heraclitus' Fragment 50, where the word "hearing" is used even
more directly than in Fragment 1. "If you have heard not me but
*The above translations of Fragments 1 and 2 are taken from
the book, Heraclitus, by Philip Wheelwright. I have chosen the
translations from this well-respected book, rather than the
translations in Heidegger's An Introduction to Metaphysics because in
the latter, the translation intentionally leaves the word logos out of
the fragments, so that the reader may derive the meaning from the
text itself. In that this presentation is a very brief one, I
have
chosen the Wheelwright book, where the word logos is present, so
that the use of the word is readily apparent to the reader.
Regarding other fragments by Heraclitus quoted in this
have, where indicated, quoted both renderings, so that the
reader
may have the benefit of both.
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the logos
,
then it is wise to say accordingly: all is one."^^* This
direct reference to "hearing," says Heidegger, would seem to indicate
that logos denotes discourse.
To show that Heraclitus employs the word "hearing" with an
understanding of logos as gathering rather than discourse, Heidegger
returns to the first two fragments quoted earlier, particularly to the
last sentence of Fragment 2, which says "most men live as if each of
them had a private intelligence of his own." What Heraclitus is
saying here, says Heidegger, is that even though most men try to
penetrate the logos with intelligence (i.e. with words and discourse),
they cannot. Here, then, for Heraclitus, intelligence as discourse is
juxtaposed to logos . Confirming this, Heraclitus says explicitly in
Fragment 1 that most men, even though hearing, do not comprehend
the logos . That is to say, comprehension does not have to do with
mere hearing.
Men have hearing, they hear words, but in this hearing,
they cannot 'heed,' i.e. follow what is not audible like words,
what is not a discourse , a speaking , but indeed the
logos. . . . Correspondingly, the hearing that is a following
(Ho^rig-sein) is contrasted with mere hearing. Mere hearing
scatters and diffuses itself in what is commonly believed and
said, in hearsay, . . . True hearing has nothing to do with
ear and mouth, but means: to follow the logos and what it is,
namely the collectedness of the essent itself. We can hear
truly only if we are followers. But this has nothing to do
with the lobes of our ears. . . . Those who merely hear by
listening around and assembling rumors are and remain the
axynetoi, the uncomprehending. They are described in
Fragment 34: 'Those who do not bring together the permanent
*The corresponding fragment in Wheelright is Fragment 118,
which reads: "Listening not to me ^^t to the Logos, it is
wise to
acknowledge that all things are one."
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togetherness hear but resemble the deaf.' They hear words
and spea(^es but they are closed to what they should give
heed to.
Fragment 50, therefore, is saying; do not attach importance to the
mere hearing of words, but to the hearing of the logos . The
authentic hearing of the logos is a following (Horig-sein ) that stands
in contrast to the mere hearing of spoken words, or hearsay, which
is only a semblance (doxa ) of a true hearing.* Therefore, Heraclitus'
phrase in Fragment 2, "most men live as if each of them had a
private intelligence of his own," refers to men who do not listen to
the logos . Heraclitus, on the other hand, says that he "tries to
distinguish each thing according to its nature," i.e. according to its
inherent measure-giving. Listening to the logos
,
then, means
listening to more than mere words. It means "hearing" the innate
measure-giving of being, for it is through such hearing, listening,
and following that the logos is manifest. To say that the logos is
manifest is to say that the gathering of what is common to all is let
lie, so that what-is shows itself as that which it is; the permanently
together.
Men who comprehend (syniemi ) the logos , therefore, compre-
hend the logos as gathering. The word "comprehend" (meaning "to
*George Seidel says that Heidegger often plays upon the
German words gehbren ("to belong") and horen ("to hear"). We
have truly heard (gehort) only when we truly belong (gehoren ) to
that which is spoken. . . . The true hearing (Horen ) truly belongs
(gehort) to the Logos." Therefore, when man "truly comes to belorig
to that with which he has come to be in tune; then^^ggindeed, do
things really happen, for then does history truly begin.
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bring together") is one that Heraclitus uses frequently to denote
"laying hold of together." Men who comprehend are those who
understand the logos as gathering, and in this understanding, let
what is together show itself as together. Men who comprehend, then,
understand that setting-apart is not the final word regarding the
nature of being, but simply the parting of to-gathering. They are
those who "hear belonging."
On the other hand, the uncomprehending (axynetoi ) are those
who hear but do not hear because they do not "hear belonging."
The uncomprehending do not comprehend the logos as gathering
precisely because they mis-interpret the logos as something that can
be heard with ears and mouth. They misinterpret the logos as
meaning verbal and visual word only. The uncomprehending take
setting-apart as the whole story. Therefore, they "are those who do
not bring together . . . what do they not bring together? the logos
,
that which is permanently together
,
collectedness. . . . and this
89
regardless of whether or not they have heard it." The uncompre-
hending hear but resemble the deaf. They are "present yet absent."
Why? Heraclitus answers: "For what they associate with most closely,
the logos
,
to it they turn their back; and what they encounter every
day seems strange to them." Hearing, the uncomprehending do
*The corresponding fragment in Wheelwright, Fragment 64,
reads: "Although intimately connected with the Logos, men keep
setting themselves against it." Similarly, Fragment 57 states: "Most
people do not take heed of the things they encounter, nor do they
grasp them even ^hen they have learned about them, although they
suppose they do."
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not hear; belonging, the uncomprehending do not belong. Related,
they do not relate to that in which they are intimately related.
Therefore, for Heraclitus, as he states in Fragment 2, men
need to "let themselves be guided by what is common to all." What is
"common to all" for Heraclitus is the logos
,
or, as he sometimes calls
it, the law, which is "the counsel of one." (Fragment 83; "Law
92involves obeying the counsel of one." )
Upon this ground of "commonality," Heraclitus expressed his
thoughts on the nature of rationality and thinking. Fragment 80 and
81 state respectively: "Thinking is common to all." and "Men should
speak with rational awareness and thereby hold on strongly to that
which is shared in common--as a city holds on to its law, and even
more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by the one divine
law, which prevails as far as it wishes, suffices for all things, and
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yet is something more than they."
When Heraclitus speaks of rational awareness, he is not
speaking about the reason of private intelligence, for as we have
discussed, men who act and speak as if they had a private
intelligence of their own (i.e. as if they were the "measure" of all
things) are the uncomprehending (axynetoi ) . Rather, here, the term
"rational awareness" is to be understood in the early Greek sense of
rationality as "the relation and ratio of one part to another.
Heidegger says that this is how the early Greek mathematicians
used
the word logos : "to put one thing with another, but at the
same time
one thing is marked off against the other. This was
the essence
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of measurement. Similarly, Heraclitus states in Fragment 29;
This universe, which is the same for all, has not been
made by any god or man, but it always has been, is, and will
be--an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures
and going out by regular measures.
Ratio-nality, in the early Greek sense, refers to the "measure" or
proportionate fit of one thing with another. When this original sense
of rationality is lost, rationality is reinterpreted as merely the faculty
of intelligence or reason which man "possesses." Once interpreted as
the faculty man "has," rather than as the ratio-nality which "has"
man, rationality becomes a tool. Measurement becomes a device.
It is evident that Heraclitus understands "rational awareness"
as an a-ware-ness of the relation or ratio, the measure-giving, the
parting, which is common to all. Relationship (etymolgically meaning
"lying-down-together") is the original rationality. This "rationality"
is the basis of truth for Heraclitus. Commenting on this, the early
Greek writer Sextus states: "So Heraclitus asserts that the common
and divine Logos, by participation in which we become rational, is the
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criterion of truth." Wheelwright elaborates:
What does Heraclitus mean by describing the truth as
'common'? The meaning is put accurately by Kirk and Raven,
who write: 'The great majority fail to recognize this truth,
which is 'common'--that is, both valid for all things and
accessible for all men, if only they use their observation and
their understanding ^d do not fabricate a private and
deceptive intelligence.
No more than logos refers to a private intelligence derived from the
mere "hearing" of spoken words (epea ) , does truth depend upon
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statement or correction of apprehension. Truth, for Heraclitus, as
for Norman O. Brown, is gratis in that truth as rationality "has"
man. Truth is common.* Truth, therefore, shows itself says
Heraclitus in Fragment 19, when man "expects the unexpected."^®
Truth cannot be "captured" through private intelligence, i.e. through
in-sistent existence, because private intelligence does not "hear" that
it "belongs" to being ^ truth. Private intelligence does not hear
that truth is common.
They thrash about amid the essents, always supposing that
what is most tangible is what they must grasp, and thus each
man grasps what is closest to him. The one holds to this,
the other to that, each man's opinion (Sinn) hinges on his
own (eigen); it is opinionatedness (Eigen-sinn). This
opinionatedness, this obstinacy, prevents them from reaching
out to what is gathered together in itself, makes it impossible
for them to be followers (Horige) and to hear (horen) accor-
dingly. . . . The opinionatedness, idia phronesis
,
for which
the logos is sealed, attaches Itself only to the one or thg
other side and supposes that it has captured the truth.
In opinionatedness, each man creates his own truth and meaning,
without regard for being as truth and meaning. Each man "measures"
and "orders" without regard for the Innate measure-giving of ratio-
nality. Thus Heraclitus says in Fragment 15: "The waking have one
*Wheelwright offers an interesting note to Heraclitus' use of
"rational awareness" and "common": "The accidental fact that the
Greek word for 'common,' current in Heraclitus' day, and an
expression meaning 'with mind' sounded so nearly alike as to enable
him to connect them in a repeated pun, evidently struck Heraclitus as
significant. . . . What the pun succeeds in stressing is the natural
connection between thinking 'with rational awareness' and allowing
one's thoughts to be guided by 'what is common'--that is, to be
guided by the divine Logos which is present in all things and
discoverable by all observers if only theyQQwill open their eyes and
their minds to the fullest possible extent."
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world in common; sleepers have each a private world of his own."^®^
The opinionatedness of private intelligence, in which "a-part" is
supposed for the whole, constitutes a failure to see physis ^ logos ,
i.e. setting-apart as binding-together. Thus Heidegger says, "To
1 n?the opinionated life is only life; death is only death."
For the early Greeks, however, "life's being is also death."
Physis [s logos
,
for in coming to be, all beings are set in a
togethering or to-gathering motion. Heidegger quotes Fragment 80 by
Heraclitus: "It is necessary to bear in mind setting-apart
(Aus-einander-Setzung) as essentially bringing-together and order
103(Fug) as contending ..." A number of other fragments reflect
a similar understanding.
108 . The way up and the way down are one and the same.
109 . In the circle the beginning and the end are common.
112. The bones connected by joints are at once a unitary
whole and not a unitary whole. To be in agreement is to
differ; the concordant is the discordant. From out of all the
many particulars com^^^oneness, and out of oneness comes all
the many particulars.
This polemos constitutes the early Greek understanding of being as
physis
,
where things-that-are come to stand "together" through
setting-apart. Being as physis refers to the original unfolding, the
primal polemos where, as Heidegger says, "rest and motion are
opened out of original unity." Physis is the "setting in motion. It
is not surprising, then, to find that being, for Heraclitus, is
expressed through metaphors of motion: flux, contention, war, strife.
and conflict.
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War is both father and king of all; some he has shown
forth as gods and others as men, some he has made slaves
and others free.
26. It should be understood that war is the common condi-
tion, that strife is justice, and that all things come to pass
through the compulsion of strife.
(27 . Homer was wrong in saying, 'Would that strife might
perish from amongst gods and men.' For.^tf that were to
occur, then all things would cease to exist.)
It is important here to understand Heraclitus' notion of conflict and
contending, war and strife, for it is not the traditional notion of
conflict as quarreling and wrangling between dissimilar opponents. It
is not "discord and dispute." As Heidegger says;
The polemos named here is a conflict that prevailed prior
to everything divine and human, not a war in the human
sense. This conflict, as Heraclitus thought it, first caused
the realm of being to separate into opposites; it first gave
rise to position and order and rank. In such separation
cleavages, intervals, distances, and joints opened. In the
conflict (Aus-einandersetzung
,
setting-apart) a world comes
into being. (Conflict does not split, much less destroy
unity. It constitutes unity, it is a binding-together, logos .
Polemos and logos are the same.)
The struggle meant here is the original struggle, for it
gives rise to the contenders as such; it is not a mere assault
on something already there. It is this conflict that first
projects and develops^Q\^hat had hitherto been unheard of,
unsaid and unthought.
Conflict, for Heraclitus, constitutes unity, constitutes the binding-
together of logos . Conflict spawns the interplay and contest between
one thing and the other; conflict sets relationship into motion.*
*Conflict, etymologically, means "to strike together," and "to
strike" is "to stroke." Conflict is "a stroking to-gather." Similarly,
"contest, contend" mean "to bear witness together, to stretch
wholly." A contest stretches and disguises wholly and bears witness
together. When man contends, he bears witness to-gathering.
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Without strife, "all things would cease to exist." "... we are two
opposites (lion and unicorn)," says D. H. Lawrence, "which exist by
virtue of our inter-opposition. Remove the opposition and there is a
collapse, a sudden crumbling into universal darkness.
Western man has come to view the word "opposites" as refering
to "those things that have nothing to do with one another." When this
view is advanced, says Heidegger, "authentic conflict ceases,
1 08
converted into mere polemics." Polemos gives way to polemics,
which is a veiling of inherent motion. This, for Heidegger, is when
"the decline sets in."
For the early Greeks, however, the word "opposites" referred
to those things which moved within one another. Listen again to
Heraclitus: "Opposites move back and forth, the one to the other;
109from out of themselves they gather themselves." For Heraclitus,
opposites are those things which rely on each other for their very
existence
,
in that each (opposite) is the other, and as such, includes
the other by the fact of Its own existence. Joyce Carol Oates
expresses this awareness today: "... it is not the presence of a
restraining or alien 'enemy' that destroys man; it is the removal of
this enemy."
"Opposites" make like apart what is together. Therefore,
Heidegger says, "The conflict of the opposites is a gathering, rooted
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in togetherness, it is logos."
Opposites, therefore, are not things which are uninvolved with
one another, but precisely the reverse: opposites are things which
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are involved with one another because they are one another.
"Opposites," then, is a metaphor for the swings of movement which
take place within being as a whole. "Opposites" expresses the
continual movement of one thing within the other. For Heraclitus and
the early Greeks, it is the motion between and within opposites that
brings things into their own .
The opposition of world and earth is striving. But we
would surely all too easily falsify its nature if we were to
confound striving with discord and dispute, and thus see it
only as disorder and destruction. In essential striving,
rather, the opponents raise each other in the self-assertion of
their natures. Self-assertion of nature, however, is never a
rigid insistence upon some contingent state, but surrender to
the concealed originality of the source of one's own being.
In the struggle, each opponent carries the other beyond
itself. Thus the striving becomes ever.|.|^ore intense as
striving, and more authentically what it is.
In conflict, "opponents let themselves go into the intimacy of simple
belonging to one another." It is through opposition, then, that
things come to stand as they are; through opposition things "assert"
their essential natures. Physis discloses itself as logos when "strife
remains strife." Strife discloses one as the other.
In that setting-apart is binding-together, it is the difference of
opposites that initiates gathering. "What unites opposites is the rift,
the Riss that has become the dif-ference, the pain of the threshold
that joins." Difference is "the single difference" that "holds apart
the middle in and through which world and things are one with each
The conflict is not a rift (Riss ) as a mere cleft is ripped
open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents belong
to each other. The rift carries the opponents into the source
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of their unity by virtue of their common ground.
. . . This
rift does not let the opponents break apart; it brings the
opposition, of measure and boundary into their common
outline.
The mystery is that opponents are intimate. They are "innermost,"
which is the etymological meaning of the word "intimacy."
For world and things do not subsist alongside one another.
They penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a middle.
In it, they are at one. Thus at one they are intimate. The
middle of the two is intimacy--in Latin, inter . The corres-
ponding German word is unter, the English inter- . The
intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains
only where the intimate--world and thing--divides itself
cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in
the between of world thing, in their inter
,
division
prevails: a dif-ference .
Therefore, if we say that motion is the opposite of rest and
repose, we are saying that motion is the opposite of rest and repose
insofar as it includes or is "intimate with" rest and repose.* Only
what is in motion can be said to have the capacity to not be in
motion, i.e. the capacity of rest, and that which has the capacity or
possibility of rest, lias rest. In repose there is still motion (as
*Many philosophers juxtapose Parmenides and Heraclitus by
labeling the former "the philosopher of permanence" and the latter
"the philosopher of flux." Understood through early Greek lenses,
however, the metaphors of permanence and motion, as used by
Parmenides and Heraclitus, would seem to always be taking into
consideration "the motion as permanence" and "the permanence as
motion." As Heidegger states, both Parmenides and Heraclitus share
a common understanding as to the nature of being. "Parmenides
stood on the same ground as Heraclitus. Where indeed would we
expect these two Greek thinkers, the inaugurators of all philosophy,
to stand if not in the being of the essent? For Parmenides,
too,
being was hen, syneches , holding together in itself; mounon,
unique
and unifying; houlon, complete and fully-standing--the permanently
manifested power through.^ ^hich shines perpetually the appearance
of
the one-and-many-sided .
"
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physics has long since showed man), for the cessation of motion
totally would eliminate repose. Rest includes motion as part of its
essential being, as cold includes heat. One could not exist without
the other. "Cool things become warm, the warm grows cool; the
moist dries, the parched becomes moist," says Heraclitus in
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Fragment 22.
Therefore, it is only when "opponents" recognize their
"belonging-together," their each as each, that they come into their
"own." It is only when "opponents" recognize their "sameness" that
they come into their "difference." This "coming into one's own
difference" is not the separateness of an isolated selfhood, but rather
the separateness of self-assertion that comes through a recognition of
mutual belonging. Loss of the "other," then, would entail loss of the
self. "When the Other is obliterated, the individual is also
obliterated
.
The early Greek interpretation of "opposites," then, always
involves recognizing the sameness inherent in difference: all things
are different from one another yet are the same. This interpretation
of opposites acknowledges physis as logos , i.e. dispersion as
gathering, difference as sameness.
113. It is one and the same thing to be living or dead,
awake or asleep, young or old. The former aspect in each
case becomes the latter, andj^^e latter again the former, by
sudden unexpected reversal.
Having looked at the word "opposites," and, therefore, closely
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at the essence of difference, this paper now takes a closer look at
the essence of sameness. The word "same" (OMOS ), for Heraclitus
and the early Greeks, means "like, together," and refers to "the
belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of
the difference." Same refers to the "like or together motion" within
being as physis . It refers to the gathering motion of logos .
Gathering is never a mere driving-together and
heaping-up. It maintains in a common bond the conflicting
and that which tends apart. It does not let them fall into
haphazard dispersion. In thus maintaining a bond, the logos
has the character of permeating power, of physis . It does
not let what it holds in its power dissolve into an empty
freedom from opposition, but by unitin^^o^*^® opposites
maintains the full sharpness of their tension.
The word "same," then, is not to be understood to mean "equal."
The word "equal" means "level, even, on a par." The "equal" leaves
behind the dimension of difference by attempting to assign to things
an even or identical rank and order within being. The "equal"
forgets that things-that-are have an inherent order, proportion, part,
measure. In the forgetting, the "equal" succeeds in leveling "the
difference in sameness" into the indifference of uniformity . The
"indifference of uniformity" says "all things are equal," i.e. even and
identical, while the difference of sameness says "all things are not
equal," i.e. all things have an inherent measure, proportion, part.
order, fit, ratio.
The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the
empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical. The
equal or identical always moves toward the absence
of
difference, so that everything may be reduced to a common
denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging
together of what differs, through a gathering by way ot
the
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difference. We can only say 'the same' if we think
difference. It is in the carrying out and settling of
differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes to
light. The same banishes all zeal always to level what is
different into the equal or identical. The same gathers what
is distinct into an original being-at-one. The equal, on the
contrary, ..disperses them into the dull unity of mere
uniformity.
For Heidegger, therefore, any "makeshift" or "fabricated" unity, any
unifying without regard for differing, is "the root of all evil."
Heidegger quotes from an epigram entitled "Root of All Evil" by the
German poet Friedrich Holderlin:
Being at one is godlike and good; whence, then,
this craze among men that thj^^ should exist only
One, why should all be one?
Any claims to a simple uniformity, to an easy answer that leaves
behind the motion of difference, is but another way of "forgetting the
essence of being" for Heidegger. "Any salvation by makeshift, how-
ever well-intentioned, remains for the duration of his destiny an
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insubstantial illusion for man, ..."
Therefore, for Heidegger, as for the early Greeks, the loss of
the dimension of differing in saming advances belonging as
uniformity, as the identical and the even. So, too, the loss of the
dimension of saming in differing advances conflict as wrangling and
dispute. Moreover, once "the same" is miscast as "the equal," the
dimension of difference is lost, and man becomes in-different . And,
as Joyce Carol Oates has so aptly pointed out, boredom or
indifference (which is the representative form of violence in the
theater of the absurd, in theater representative of a nihilistic age) is
136
a substitute for violence, for the original violence of difference
Similarly, once "conflict" is miscast as "dispute and discord," the
dimension of sameness is lost, and man becomes dis-similar
. That is,
man becomes fragmented and disconected, and then needs to
manufacture a false unity which is a substitute for primal saming.
The false unities born of fragmentation, born of feeling disconnected
from the motion of being, however, usually only mirror the isolated
ego. In critiquing the anthropomorphic gods of his predecessors, the
early Greek philosopher Xenophanes is quoted in Wheelwright's book
on Heraclitus as having said: "If horses could draw . . . they would
portray their gods in the shape of horses, and oxen in the shape of
1
oxen." We might say the same of man when he unites and divides
without regard for the inherent saming as differing essence of being:
he creates a "world order" that "is in fact only a projection of
self."^^^
However, as Heidegger notes, man by nature, is a gatherer.
"Logos is a need . . . the ground of being-human ... the decisive
definition of man's essence . . . to be a man means to take gathering
upon oneself . . . As a gatherer, man is always gathering, he
is always unearthing connections, joining, forming relationships.
Thus, the "joining" that comes by way of in-sistent existence is a
gathering of sorts, but a gathering of the wrong ("twisted") kind
when it does not "gather" in align with the "measure-giving"
of
to-gathering. For when man no longer recognizes the essence
of
being (difference is saming), man then "orders and fits"
without
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regard for the inherent order and fit of being. Man then creates
"idols of the tribe," to use Francis Bacon's expression. Idols are
words born of idleness, spawned from lack of motion. As such, they
fail to acknowledge that all "statements about the universe are
half-truths--true and false at the same time, as Heraclitus likes to
say . . . "'29
Subsequently, the task of man, as a gatherer, is to let
gathering remain gathering, to let strife remain strife, to let the
motion of being reveal its motion, to let being show itself as it is,
rather than falsely presenting a rigid fixing in either "this" or
"that." "... for the moving world can only be known by what is in
1 30
motion." Subsequently, for the early Greeks, logos speaks and is
heard when the conflict of opposites is unveiled as gathering.
It is not surprising then to find that the early Greeks spoke of
beauty (and, therefore, art) as restraint . Here, restraint is not to
be understood as "a holding back" in the sense of "putting on the
brakes." Restraint, for the early Greeks, means to stretch or draw
tightly back in the sense of binding back together that which tends
apart. Consequently, beauty (as restraint) expresses the gathering
of the conflict through which being shows itself as that which is
permanently together. For the early Greeks, therefore, beauty
and art intimate being; they do not imitate being. Beauty and art
unveil that which is permanently together as it is: together. They
unveil the harmony amongst opposites : the being in beings.
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What the Greeks meant by 'beauty' was restraint. The
gathering of the supreme antagonism is polemos
,
struggle in
the sense of setting apart (Aus-einandersetzung). For us
moderns, on the contrary, the beautiful is what reposes and
relaxes; it is intended for enjoyment and art is a matter of
pastry cooks. . .
.
(but) the logos as gathering and
harmony, is not easily accessible and not accessible to all in
the same form; unlike the harmony that is mere compromise,
destruction of tension, flattening, it is hidden; harmonie
aphanes phaneres kreitton
,
'the harmony that does not
(immediately and easily) show itself is mightier than that
which is (at all times) manifest' (Fragment 54).
Because being is logos
,
alethel^
^
^hysis
,
phainesthai
,
it
does not show itself as one pleases.
What is hidden is harmony. It is the intimate ("innermost") secret.
The word "harmony" is derived from the Greek words, apM ovia,
("a joint, joining, proportion") and apety
,
to Ke lv ("to fit,
join together"). Harmony expresses the togethering motion of logos .
For the early Greeks, then, harmony does not in any way denote
compromise, a flattening or lessening of tension.** (Etymologically,
the word "tension" means "stretching apart." "To stretch" is the
*Neither does "balance," for Heidegger, denote moderation, but
rather hazard and risk. The German word for balance, die Wage ,
means "situations in which matters may turn out one way or the
other." Wage comes from wagen , wegen , meaning "to make a way, to
go, to be in motion." Be-wagen means "to cause to be on the way
and so to bring into motion; to shake or rock, wiegen .
"
"What rocks
is said to do so because it is able to bring the balance. Wage , into
the play of movement, this way or that. What rocks the balance
weighs down; it has weight. To weigh or throw in the balance, as m
the sense of wager, means to bring into the movement of the game, to
throw into^The scales, to release into risk." All things "hang in the
balance.
*The corresponding Wheelwright translation is Fragment
"The hidden harmony is better than the obvious." And Fragment 117
states' "People do not understand how that which is at variance
with
itself agrees with itself. There is a t^^^mony in the bending
back, as
in the case of the bow and the lyre.
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Greek word orficLyyoq
,
meaning "drawing tight that which is
related," which is also the meaning of "restraint.") Harmony does
not nullify separation or obscure difference; rather, harmony is the
proportionate joining and fit of difference. "Opposition brings
concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony," says Heraclitus
135
in Fragment 98.
Heraclitus may perhaps be regarded as having taken the
Pythagorean idea of harmony and added to it an observation
of his own. Harmony, he adds, can exist only where there is
contrast. There is no harmony of a single note, there is
significant harmony only where there are 'opposing tones'
which are resolved. Musical harmony involves the over-
coming, but without the eliminating, of some musical opposi-
tion. And in the larger sphere of human existence the same
situation is found to occur. Harmonies and attunements
between person and person, or between person and circum-
stance, are brought into existence out of diversity and
potential strife.
For Heraclitus, "harmony" or logos (gathering) is the metaphor used
to express the mystery of existence.
No word or image or idea can do it (the ultimate order of
things) justice; but one of the least inadequate ways of
symbolizing it, indicating as it does both its interrelating
power and its elusiveness, is the phra,^^ that Heraclitus
employs in Fr. 116 -- Hne hidden harmony .
Repeatedly, the early Greeks tried to express being through
metaphors that acknowledged the elusive and interrelating power of
being. The early Greek words physis , logos , aletheia , polemos ,
harmonia
,
and phainesthai are essentially metaphoric variations on one
theme: the onefoldedness of the manifold.
In approaching the next chapter on the "devolution" of this
ground-view, it is important for the reader to keep in mind the
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intimate interconnectedness of all these early Greek words. Due to
their interconnectedness, a misinterpretation of one becomes a
simultaneous misinterpretation of another, so that one falsification
leads to another falsification. For example, if man misinterprets the
early Greek notion of truth, he misinterprets the early Greek notion
of being as well. For Fleidegger, it is the intimate interconnectedness
of all their expressions for being that make the early Greek ground-
view truly great. Subsequently, it is the loss of this sense of
intereconnectedness in all things which accounts for the acceleration
and pervasiveness of "the forgetting of being."
141
References
1
Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics
,
trans. by
Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1961;
Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 11-12.
2George Joseph Seidel, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics
(Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. 35.
3
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
pp. 49-50.
4
Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought
,
trans., with an
Introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York; Harper & Row, 1971),
p. 154.
^Heidegger, Metaphysics
, pp. 85-86.
^Ibid., p. 86.
^Ibid., p. 59.
o
Seidel, Pre-Socratics
,
p. 36.
Q
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 59.
1
1
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 147.
^^Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being , with an Introduction
by Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Gateway, 1949),
pp. 306 & 366.
^^Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
pp. 86-87.
^^Heidegger, Existence and Being , pp. 295-297.
''^Ibid., pp. 297-298.
''^Ibid., p. 298.
^^Seidel, Pre-Socratics , p. 26.
^^Karsten Harries, "Martin Heidegger: The Search for Meaning,"
in Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty, ed.
George
Alfred Schrader, Jr. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 179.
^^Heidegger, Existence and Being , p. 303.
$142
20 .
Heidegger, Poetry
, p. 149.
^^Ibid., pp. 148-149.
22
Heidegger, Existence and Being
, pp. 305-306.
^^Ibid., p. 307.
^"^Ibid., p. 306.
25
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 82.
^^Ibid., pp. 83-84.
^^Ibid., p. 149.
po
Ibid., p. 83.
29
Heidegger, Existence and Being
,
p. 309.
30
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 17.
^^Ibid., pp. 17-18.
32
Seidel, Pre-Socratics
,
p. 81.
33
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 17.
34,. ..
Ibid.
35
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 126.
^^Ibid., pp. 106-107.
^^Ibid., pp. 116-117.
^^Ibid., p. 117.
39
Karsten Harries, "Search for Meaning," p. 195.
"^^Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," trans. by Frank A.
Capuzzi in collaboration with J. Glenn Gray, in Basic Writings , ed.,
ith a General Introduction by David Farell Krell (New York; Harper
Row, 1977), p. 230.
^^Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in The Worlds of
Existentialism, ed., with an Introduction and Conclusion by Maurice
Friedman (New York; Random House, 1964), p. 263.
143
42
43
Maurice Friedman, in Worlds of Existentialism
,
p. 263,
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 135.
44
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
pp. 38-40.
45
46
47
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 97.
Heidegger, "Letter," in Worlds of Existentialism
,
p,
Maurice Friedman, in Worlds of Existentialism
,
p. 185.
48.. .
Heidegger, Existence and Being
,
p. 310.
^^Ibid., pp. 311-312.
50
51
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
pp. 65-66.
Heidegger, Existence and Being
,
p. 312.
^^Ibid., p. 313
53
Ibid.
‘^4
^^Ibid., p. 259.
^^Ibid., pp. 258-261
56
bid., pp. 258-259.
^^Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus (New York: Princeton
sity Press, Atheneum, 1971), p. 90.
^^Ibid., pp. 80-82.
59
60
61
62
Heidegger, Existence and Being , p. 315.
Wheelwright, Heraclitus , p. 82.
Heidegger, Metaphysics , p. 51.
Ibid., p. 139.
^^Ibid., p. 96.
e^ibid.
65Heidegger, Poetry , p. 54,
185.
Univer-
144
66
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
, Fragment 17, p. 20.
67
Heidegger, Existence and Being
, p. 315.
68
Heidegger, Metaphysics
, p. 92.
69. ...
Ibid.
^^Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 125.
71
Heidegger, Existence and Being
, pp. 315-316.
^^Ibid., p. 367.
^^Ibid., p. 317.
74
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 224.
^^Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
Fragment 124, p. 102.
76
Heidegger, Existence and Being
,
p. 317.
^^Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking
,
trans. by Dayid
Farrell Krell and Frank H. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975),
p. 26.
^^Ibid., p. 25.
79
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 135.
80
W. B. Yeats, "The Curse of Cromwell," in Collected Poems
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1956), p. 302.
81
Joyce Carol Oates, The Edge Of Impossibility (Greenwich,
Ct.
;
Fawcett Publications, 1972), pp. 11 & 139.
op
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
Fragment 23, p. 29.
^^Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
pp. 104-105.
^Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 19.
^^Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 108.
^Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 102.
^^Heidegger, Metaphysics , p. 109.
^^Seidel, Pre-Socratics, pp. 95-97.
145
89
Heidegger, Metaphysics
, p. 109.
90
Ibid., p. 110.
91
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
, pp. 58 & 68.
92
^Ibid., p. 83.
93.
.
..
Ibid
.
94
Heidegger, Metaphysics
, p. 105.
95
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 37.
96.. ..
Ibid., p. 71.
97
Ibid., p. 24.
^^Ibid., p. 20.
99
Heidegger, Metaphysics
, pp. 110-111.
^^^Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 24.
101 ,..,
Ibid., p. 20.
102
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 111.
103
"^'^Ibid., p. 139.
104
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 90.
105,,
.,
Ibid., p. 29.
1 06
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 51.
1 07
Joyce Carol Oates, New Heayen, New Earth (New
Fawcett Crest Books, a unit of CBS Publications, 1^74), p. 72.
1 08
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 52.
109
'^^Ibid., p. 111.
110
Oates, New Heaven
,
p. 70.
112
Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 49.
^^^Ibid.
,
pp. xiii & 202.
York
146
114
^Ibid., p. 63.
115
'^Ibid., p. 202.
116
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 115.
117
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 29.
118
Oates, New Heaven
,
p. 70.
119
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
, pp. 90-91.
120
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 113.
121
Heidegger, Poetry
,
pp. 218-219.
122
Ibid., p. 219.
123
'^'^Ibid., p. 118.
124
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 117.
125
Oates, Impossibility
,
p. 11.
1
Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 7.
1 27
Oates, New Heaven
,
p. 75.
1 28
Heidegger, Metaphysics
,
p. 146.
^^^Wheelwright, Heraclitus
,
p. 73.
^^^Ibid., Fragment 34, p. 58.
1 31
Heidegger, Metaphysics , p. 111.
^^^Ibid., pp. 111-112.
^^^Heidegger, Poetry
,
p. 103.
^^\heelwright, Heraclitus , p. 102.
^^^Ibid., p. 90.
'’^^Ibid., p. 108.
^^^Ibid., p. 110.
CHAPTER V
DEVOLUTION
Men perish because they cannot join the beginning with the
end
,
Alcmaeon of Crotona
The intent of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the
direction Heidegger takes in exploring the "devolution" of the early
Greek ground-view discussed in the preceeding chapter.
For Heidegger, the early Greek ground-view is not just another
philosophy among philosophies, but, for the Western world, the
beginning of philosophy as such, and consequently, one of the truly
outstanding achievements of man. However, this early beginning
very quickly becomes "covered," and covered specifically for
Heidegger through a thinking that captures the idea of the "two,"
but leaves behind the motion of the "twofold" (Zwiefalt ) . For
Heidegger, then, linguistic devolution begins when the early Greek
"twofold essence of being" (i.e. coming-to-be is passing-away,
setting-apart is binding-together, physis is logos ) is cast as a
divided "two." And the "twofold" is cast as a "two" when the motion
through which the onefoldedness of the manifold is manifest becomes
linguistically veiled. Once motion is veiled, the early Greek polemos
gives way to polemics; setting-apart is taken as the whole story
regarding the essence of being.
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This transformation, says Heidegger, begins with the early
Greeks themselves.
. . . one sees that the tragic flaw which was later to
manifest itself in an almost total forgetting of being was
already there in germ in the thinking of the great pre-
Socratics. There was the ambiguity of the 'twofold,' the
presencing of the present, which later turned into simply 'the
present'; and there was the factor of inevitable translation,
as the attempt was made to put being over into truth, instead
of thinking being from out of its truth as 'unconcealedness,'
What Heidegger is saying is that the early Greeks themselves often
failed to make clear linguistically their sense of the motion of being,
"the presencing of the present," and subsequently to make clear what
Heidegger calls "the ontological difference" (Refer to p. 166 of this
section.) between being and thing. This "ambiguity of the twofold"
reaches its complete transformation into the "two" in Plato and
Aristotle. Thus, Heidegger states, "fated was the twofold."
What begins great can only end great, adds Heidegger. "The
great begins great, maintains itself only through the free recurrence
of greatness within it, and if it is great ends also in greatness. So
it is with the philosophy of the Greeks. It ended in greatness with
Aristotle."^ What lingers on, for those following the thinking of Plato
and Aristotle, then, is a Western tradition that follows on the "back"
of a great ending, for it is with Plato and Aristotle that, for
Heidegger, the great beginning of early Greek thought has a great
ending. The effects of such a great ending are still with us, under
the heading "Western metaphysics."
In order to understand what Heidegger means by stating that
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the end of philosophy "begins its ending" with Plato and Aristotle, we
need to listen to Heidegger speak about "the end of philosophy."
What is meant by the talk about the end of philosopy?
We understand the end of something all too easily in the
negative sense as a mere stopping, as the lack of
continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In
contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the
completion of metaphysics. However, completion does not
mean perfection as a consequence of which philosophy would
have to have attained the highest perfection at its end. Not
only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to
evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as
compared with any other epoch, the right to this kind of
evaluation does not exist. Plato's thinking is no more perfect
than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than
Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. We
simply have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the
way it is. . . .
The old meaning of the word 'end' means the same as
place: 'from one end to the other' means from one place to
the other. The end of philosophy is the place, that place in
which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its
most extreme possibility. End as completion means this
gathering
.
When Heidegger speaks about "the end of philosophy," he is speaking
about the completion of the possibilities that exist within the
frameworks that have been set up. "As a completion, an end is the
gathering into the most extreme possibilities. We think in too limited
a fashion as long as we expect only a development of recent
4
philosophies of the previous style."
It is important for the reader to carry this Heideggerian sense
of "ending" into the following discussion of "devolution" as extended
in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger spent years
exploring the thought of both Plato and Aristotle, and as students of
Heidegger's such as Hannah Arendt and Hans-Georg Gadamer have
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noted, he explored their thinking in a most original way.
Hannah Arendt noted that it was of decisive importance that
Heidegger avoided general talk about Plato and spent an
entire semester closely examining just one of the Dialogues.
'Today this sounds quite familiar, because nowadays so many
proceed in this way; but no one did so before Heidegger.'
In this way Plato's theory of Ideas shook off the burden of
traditional interpretations that doctrines inevitably accumulate
and became a problem for the present.^
Listen also to Hans-Georg Gadamer reflect on Heidegger's impassioned
style of thinking:
With him, lecturing as such became something altogether new;
it was no longer a 'course of instruction' from a professor
who devoted his real energies to research and publication.
With Heidegger, book-length monologues lost their usual pre-
eminence. What he gave was more. It was the full concen-
tration of all the powers--powers of genius--in a
revolutionary thinker who actually seemed himself to be
startled by the intensity of the questions growing more and
more radical in him. The passion of thinking was so complete
in him that it communicated itself to ghis listeners, whose
fascination nothing could disturb. . . .
I quote these comments so that the reader will not infer that the
following brief capsule of Heidegger's direction in thought with regard
to Plato and Aristotle reflects a similar brevity in Heidegger's
thinking on these two great thinkers. Only extensive reading on
Heidegger's thought in these areas can do justice to the depth,
originality, and detail not only of Heidegger's thinking but of Plato s
and Aristotle's as well. With this understanding, this chapter should
be viewed as an attempt to introduce the reader to direction
Heidegger takes in trying to explore the origins of the present-day
nihilism afflicting modern man, and not as a summary and adequate
reflection of that work.
Being and Appearance
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Before Plato told the great lie of ideals
men slimly went like fishes, and didn't care.
They had long hair, like Samson,
and clean as arrows they sped at the mark
when the bow-cord twanged.
They knew it was no use knowing
their own nothingness:
for they were not nothing.
D. H. Lawrence
This section looks at the transformation of being as appearance
into being and appearance.
For the early Greeks, such as Heraclitus and Parmenides, being
as physis expressed the power of emergence, the "coming into the
unconcealed," the "appearing on the scene." Physis expressed a
"presencing appearing" and an "appearing presencing," i.e. the unity
of appearing as being. So, too, for the early Greeks, things that
"appear on the scene," things that "come into unconcealment," also
come into truth.
In contrast to this early Greek understanding of being ^
appearance, modern man is all too familiar with the division between
being and appearance to which he has become heir, "another of the
many worn-out coins that we pass unexamined from hand to hand in
an everyday life that has grown flat."^
How did the early Greek sense of being as appearance become
the traditional separation between being and appearance that Western
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man has been handed?
For Heidegger, two major events advance this transformation;
1) the transmutation of early Greek words in Roman thought; and 2)
the failure of Plato to understand appearance as being.
In the transmission of Greek expressions into Latin thought,
many early Greek words take on altered meanings. Foremost among
these reinterpretations is the early Greek word for being, physis . In
the Latin, physis most often gets translated as natura
,
narrowing the
Greek sense of physis to mean the material world, nature. Natura
properly means "to be born," "birth." When the expression is used
to refer to the material world, however, natura comes to mean "to
grow," and in this sense, loses the essence of growing as specifically
an emerging and coming forth. With this later translation of physis
as "nature," not only does the force of the original Greek word
become lost, for Heidegger, but more importantly, the early Greek
ground-view that the Greek word physis tried to reflect is now
obscured
This kind of transformation takes place in the reinterpretation
of many Greek expressions in Latin thought. For example, ;to
hupokeimenon was the early Greek word for "the core of things,
which was "something lying at the ground of the thing, something
always already there." And ta sumbebekota referred to "that which
has always turned up already along with the given core and occurs
along with it." For Heidegger, such expressions mirrored the
Greek
ground-view of appearing ^ presencing. In Latin thought,
however.
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hupokeimenon becomes subjectum
; hupostasis becomes substantia ; and
sumbebekos becomes accidens
. Once the distinction starts to be made
between "the core of things," now called substance or substantia
,
and
"the characteristics of the core of things," now called accidents or
accidens
,
the separation between being and appearance is well on its
way.
. . . this translation of Greek names into Latin is in no way
the innocent process it is considered to this day. Beneath
the seemingly literal and thus faithful translation there is
concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a
different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the
Greek words without a corresponding, equally authentic ex-
perience of what they say, without the Greek word . The
g
rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.
Elsewhere, Heidegger states:
What happened in this translation from the Greek into the
Latin is not accidental and harmless; it marks the first stage
in the process by which we cut ourselves off and alienated
ourselves from the original essence of Greek philosophy. The
Roman translation was later taken over by Christianity and
the Christian Middle Ages. And the Christian Middle Ages
were prolonged in modern philosophy, which, moving in the
conceptual world of the Middle Ages, coined those
representations and terms by means of which we still try to
understand the beginnings of Western philosophy. These
beginnings are regarded as something that present-day
philosophers |^ve supposedly transcended and long since left
behind them.
For Heidegger, the effects of these beginnings are far from left
behind. They are everywhere present, manifested in the division
between being and appearance that man still wrestles with today.
For with the translation of physis as natura , the original
meaning of appearance as "that which stands forth and comes to ^
1
1
is reinterpreted as "the mere appearance or the look of a
thing."
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Appearance comes to mean the "accidents" that happen along with
"substance," i.e. the surface or front, as over and against
"something else." Appearance becomes "the showing up of a copy."
It is here that, for Heidegger, the grand sense of appearance as
being itself becomes reinterpreted as mere appearance. It is here
that the early Greek understanding of being ^ "appearing on the
scene," whose very being lies in offering a number of appearances
which not only serve to conceal and reveal at the same time, but also
constitute the gathering together of being as logos
,
is obscured from
view.
Compounding the linguistic devolution of Greek thinking in
Latin thought, for Heidegger, is Plato's failure to understand the
early Greek physis as a "standing and appearing presence."
Appearance, for Plato, is not the emerging power that it was
for his predecessors, but "the look or view that matters presents"
(i.e. "the showing up of a copy"), and what is other than a look or
a view is being, or, as Plato called it, eidon ( ( ), or idea . In
this rendering, appearance ^ being is reinterpreted as mere
appearance (or semblance), while being becomes something "other"
than appearance and is reinterpreted as idea .
From the standpoint of space, the difference between ap-
pearing and appearing is this: appearing in the first and
authentic sense as bringing-itself-to-stand in togetherness
involves space, which it first conquers; as it stands there, it
creates space for itself; it produces space and everything
pertaining to it; it is not copied. Appearing in the second
sense emerges from an already finished space; it is situated
in the rigid measures of this space, and we see it by looking
toward it. The vision makes the thing. Now this vision be-
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cornes dscisive, instead of the thing itself. Appearing in the
first sense opens up space. Appearing in the second sense
merely circurn^ribes and measures the space that has already
been opened.
In conceiving appearance as the look that matter or nature presents,
Plato does not comprehend the early Greek understanding of
appearance as being, and that ^ being, the early Greek
"appearance" reveals the essence of being as that which conceals and
reveals simultaneously. Therefore, for Heidegger, when Plato
reinterprets appearance as a copy or cover, over and against being
as idea
,
Plato forgets the revealing aspect of being as appearance,
and in so doing, takes the concealing aspect of being (the
setting-apart) as the whole story regarding the essence of
appearance. In advancing this interpretation of appearance, then,
Plao does not comprehend that appearing, as his predecessors tried to
express, constitutes and manifests being because it [s being, i.e.
setting-apart js binding-together.
Here, Heraclitus would say that Plato is "uncomprehending": he
has eyes and ears, but he does not see nor hear. That is, if a man
looks only with his eyes, a man sees that things are separate and
that things are joined. However, for the early Greeks, the nature of
being is such that all things are simultaneously parted and joined
because all things could not be joined unless they were parted. In
the early Greek ground-view, each constitutes the other.
Comprehending this essence of being, therefore, does not only
involve a man with eyes and ears; it also involves a man with
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listening" to the "not always visible, yet always present" motion of
appearing 3^ being. As the early Greeks would say, it involves a
man in hearing what is being spoken though unsaid, and in seeing
what is being shown though invisible. True seeing and hearing
involves the motion of being: the "presencing" that begins through
the ends (the limits, the boundaries) of "appearing."
Subsequently, for Heidegger, the Platonic reinterpretation of
appearance as "the look matter presents" is not the minor alteration
in thinking and expression one might initially suppose. For one
thing, the Platonic interpretation of appearance as "the look matter
presents" inaugurates philosophies of "seeing," which is a radical
shift in emphasis from what might be characterized as the philosophy
of "hearing" common to the early Greeks.
By this it should not be understood, of course, that
Heidegger completely repudiates a 'seeing' in favor of a
'hearing' type of thinking. It is largely a question of
emphasis. The emphasis, however, seems to be very much
away from what one might call the 'seeing' or the 'intuiting'
aspect of thinking, and much more in the direction of the
'hearing' aspect, particularly as regards the way In which one
is authentically to grasp being. . . . This intellectual 'seeing'
involves two elements: it implies that there is one that sees;
It implies that there is something that is seen. And the
metaphysics of seeing thereby gains the position of subject
and object. It sets up that which is for Heidegger the
insupportable dichotomy that Is the theory of knowledge or
epistemology, or, if one wishes to callj^the spade a spade in
Heideggerian terminology, metaphysics.
Moreover, then, this shift in emphasis, for Heidegger, radically alters
man's "view" of things . Previously, for the early Greeks, "things"
brought being to stand. Heidegger notes that the meaning of the Old
German words thing and dine is "a gathering." In scanning various
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etymologies, we unearth also that "thing" means "an assembly, a
meeting, a council," also "to prosper, to thrive," and allied to the
Gothic word theihs
,
"thing" denotes "season, time (hence, time for
meeting)." In Heidegger's words, a thing gathers or assembles being
into place. It is a "gathering" which bears on and concerns men.^"^
However, with the Platonic reinterpretation of appearance as
"an outward look other than being," and the emphasis shifting to the
seer and the seen, "things" are in the process of undergoing a very
definite change. For Heidegger, "things" are in the process of
becoming "objects"; those outward "looks" that stand between man,
the seer, and being as idea .
That is why Plato, who conceives of the presence of what is
present in terms of the outward appearance, had no more
understanding of the nature of the thing than did Aristotle
and all subsequent thinkers. Rather, -^flato experienced
everything present as an object of making.
George Joseph Seidel adds:
Metaphysics for Heidegger is simply subjectivism in that it
represents the reduction of being to the object side of a
merely subjective subject-object distinction. It is Descartes,
for Heidegger, who represents the beginning of the end of
this metaphysical tradition in the West, because the
subjectivism in which man becomes a mere subject was first
made explicit by Descartes. However, this subjectivism is
true of the metaphysical tradition as a whole from Plato on.
Metaphysics for Heidegger is simply the ontology of knowledge
COntologie der Erkenntiji^s '), and as such represents nothing
more than subjectivism.
That is, for Heidegger, the Platonic shifts in interpretation, in
advancing a new "view" of being and appearance, advance a new
approach to being and things. These Platonic "shifts"
advance a
specific epistemology or “way of knowing." This particular
"way
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of knowing" may reach its explicitness and extension in Descartes,
but for Heidegger this direction begins with Plato.
With Plato, knowing is increasingly aligned with the visual
(and, therefore, with the written word, with the alphabet), whereas
for the early Greeks, man did not "know" a thing by only looking at
its outward or visual appearance, but by also listening to what each
thing "spoke," or as Heidegger would say, by letting each thing
speak for itself.
In the 'Republic,' Plato vigorously attacked the oral,
poetized form as a vehicle for communicating knowledge. He
pleaded for a more precise method of communication and
classification ('The Ideas'), one which would favor the
investigation of facts, principles of reality, human nature,
and conduct. What the Greeks meant by 'poetry' was
radically different from what mean by poetry. Their
expression was a product of a collective psyche and mind.
The mimetic form, a technique that exploited rhythm, meter,
and music, achieved the desired psychological response in the
listener. Listeners could memorize with greater ease what
was sung than what was said. Plato attacked this method
because it discouraged disputation and argument. It was in
his opinion the chief obstacle to abstract, speculative
reasonin^--he called it 'a poison, and an enemy of the
people.
'
Interestingly, Plato's teacher, Socrates, recognized the direction that
learning would take once the visual aspect of knowing was
emphasized
.
'The discovery of the alphabet will create forgetfulness in
the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories;
they will trust to the exter^^l written characters and not re-
member of themselves. . . '
As Socrates prophesized, an overemphasis on the visual aspect of
knowing, and therefore on things which can be seen , places a greater
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emphasis upon thoughts that come via the alphabet, i.e. upon
thoughts that appear in lines, in linear structures.
Western history was shaped for some three thousand
years by the introduction of the phonetic alephbet, a medium
that depends solely on the eye for comprehension. The
alphabet is a construct of fragmented bits and parts which
have no semantic meaning in themselves, and which must be
strung together in a line, bead-like, and in a prescribed
order. Its use fostered and encouraged the habit of
perceiving all environment in visual and spatial terms--parti-
cularly in terms of a space and of a time that are uniform,
c,o,n,t,i,n,u,o,u,s
and
c-o-n-n-e-c-t-e-d
.
The line, the continuum
--this sentence is a prime example--
became the organizing principle of life. 'As we begin, so
shall we go.' 'Rationality' and logic came to depend on the
presentation of connected and sequential facts or
concepts. . . .
Rationality and visuality have long been interchangeable
terms,jg^ut we do not live in a primarily visual world any
more.
This quote from Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore's widely-read
book. The Medium is the Massage (1967), takes this present dis-
cussion beyond its intended parameters, but I have included it here
to signal the reader as to the far-reaching effects that an epistemo-
logy based on the visual aspect of learning has had on Western
thought over the last three thousand years.
*lf man, as McLuhan and Fiore note, does "not live in a pri-
marily visual world any more," but in a world moving "at the high
speeds of electric communication," and yet he is trying to comprehend
what is no longer visible through a process of learning based on the
visual, man is ripe for experiencing the "visual discontinuity
that
Rudolph Arnheim speaks of. (See "Statement of the Problem,
p. 9.) Visual discontinuity, however, only leads to
personal
discontinuity and fragmentation in a culture that has stressed visi
e
and visual continuity.
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Having outlined the direction that the early Greek notion of
"appearance" takes in Plato's thought, the discussion now turns to
the direction that the early Greek notion of "being" takes in Plato's
thought,
Plato tells us clearly what direction "being" is to take in his
thought: being will be idea . How different is this conception of
being from that of the early Greeks? In exploring this question,
Heidegger states:
Actually it cannot be denied that the interpretation of
being as idea results from the basic experience of being as
physis . It is, as we say, a necessary consequence of the
essence of beng as emerging Scheinen (seeming, appearing,
radiance). And herein there is no departure, not to mention
a falling-off, from the beginning. No, that is true.
But if the essential consequence is exalted to the level of
the essence itself and takes the place of the essence, what
then? Then we have a falling-off, which must in turn
produce strange consequences. And that is what happened.
The crux of the matter is not that physis should have been
characterized as idea but that the idea should have become
the sole and decisive interpretation of being.
We can easily appraise the distance between the two
interpretations if we consider the difference between the
perspectives in which these two definitions of being, physis
and idea move, Physis is the emerging power, the
standing-there-in-itself
,
stability. Idea
,
appearance as what
is seen, is a determination o|q the stable insofar and only
insofar as it encounters vision,
Plato's rendering of being as idea , therefore, loses the early Greek
sense of being ^ the ambiguous appearing that means both "that
which gathers itself, which brings-itself-to-stand in its togetherness
and so stands" and also "that which, already standing-there,
ii21
presents a front, a surface, offers an appearance to be looked at.
Once appearance comes to mean "the look matter presents, i,e, a
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mere semblance of being as idea
,
appearance and being are placed in
separate places. Appearance as semblance is reduced in stature, and
being as idea is elevated . As Heidegger states, once cast as idea,
being becomes "exalted to a suprasensory realm," becoming more or
less an ideal, a model. For once appearing is placed within the realm
of vision, the realm of the senses, being, as divorced from
appearing, becomes equated with what is other that that which can be
observed only with the senses. This "other" constitutes being as
idea
,
and forms the basis of Plato's "theory of ideas."
Being as idea is exalted, it becomes true being, while being
itself, previously dominant, is degraded to what Plato calls me
on
,
what really should not be and really is not, because in
the realization it always deforms the idea, the pure appear-
ance, by incorporating it in matter. The idea now becomes a
paradeigma
,
a model. At the same time, the idea necessarily
becomes an ideal. The copy actually 'is' not; it merely
partakes of being, it is a methexis . The chorismos , the
cleft, has opened between the idea as what really is, the
prototype and the archetype, and what is not, the copy and
image.
From the standpoint of the idea, appearing now takes on
a new meaning. What appears--the phenomenon--is no longer
physis
,
the emerging power, nor is it the self-manifestation
of the appearance; no, appearing is now the emergence of the
copy. Since the copy never equals its prototype, what
appears is mere appearance, actually an illusion, a deficiency.
Now the on becomes distinct from the phainomenon . And this
development brings with it still another vital consequence.
Because the actual repository of being is the idea and this is
the prototype, all disclosure of being must aim at assimilation
to the model, accommodation to idea. The truth of physis ,
aletheia as the unconcealment that is the essence of the
emerging power, now becomes homoiSsis and mimesis , assimila
tion and accommodation, orientation by . . . / it becomes a
correctness of vision, of apprehension as representatic^
.
Once we fully understand all this, it becomes undeniable
that the interpretation of being as idea is a far cry from the
original beginning. Yet when we speak of a decline it shoum
be noted that this decline remains lofty; it does not sink
\nlo
baseness. . . . The basic concepts idea , paradeigma , homoio_2
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sis
,
and mimesis foreshadow the metaphysics of classicism.
... In itself the transformation of being from physis to idea
gave rise to one of the essential j^ovements in the history of
the West, and not only of its art.^
For Heidegger, then, Plato's distinction between being and appearance
underlies almost every "essential movement" common to Western man.
A chasm, chorismos, was created between the merely apparent
essent here below and real being somewhere on high. In that
chasm Christianity settled down, at the same time
reinterpreting the lower as the created and the higher as the
creator. These refashioned weapons it turned against
antiquity (as paganism) and so disfigured it. Nietzsche was
right
^
saying that Christianity is Platonism for the
people.
The impact of Plato's reinterpretation of being as idea cannot be
underestimated, for that interpretation becomes the linguistic framing
through which Western man's subsequent thought is born and
directed. "... the interpretation of being as idea has dominated
all Western thinking throughout the history of its transformations
24down to the present day."
Once being as appearance becomes being and appearance, the
early Greek ground-view of "the rift" as the setting-apart and
appearing on the scene wherein all things come together becomes
a secondary rift . The primary rift of joining becomes cast as a
chasm or cleft (chorismos ) of dividing which sets being and
appearance up as a polemic. Being as appearance, being ^ golemos,
is linguistically recast as being ^ appearance, i.e. as a polemic.
The underlying motion of each ^ is forgotten. In this
chasm,
the "idea" of the two is preserved, while the motion of the
twofold is
obscured. Plato's "theory of ideas," therefore, is born of
a distin-
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guishing which does not acknowledge an underlying togethering, and
as such, this linguistic framing "drives a permanent wedge between
these two aspects of being, that which was in Parmenides and
Heraclitus the peculiar 'togetherness' of Physis and Logos, Logos and
Physis; . .
In the reinterpretation of being as idea
,
then, lies not only the
fate of physis
,
but also the fate of truth as aletheia and the fate of
logos as "the peculiar 'togetherness' " of being. Why? Because for
the early Greeks, being as unconcealment, appearing, setting-apart is
truth. As set forth previously, truth is the essence of being, and
cannot be spoken of apart from being. So, too, being as appearing
and setting-apart is coming-together, [s logos . For the early Greeks,
then, physis is aletheia is logos .
Therefore, a wedge into physis as appearing presence becomes
simultaneously a wedge into truth as appearing unconcealment, as well
as a wedge into logos as gathering. Accordingly, in the fateful
separation between being and appearance, truth, rather than being
understood as the very essence of being, comes to mean correctness
of apprehension.
. . .
as Heidegger explains in his study on Plato's allegory
of the cave, when 'substance' becomes 'idea,' truth is no
more as unconcealedness the principal feature of being itself;
rather, as subservient to idea, it becomes mere correctness,
henceforward to be the mere marking out ( Auszeichnung ) of
our knowledge of things. . . . (truth) comes to mean a mere
declaration or statement; and from the various ways in^ which
things can be declared are the c^Jegories ( jcocrrjy op^L-v ,
'to accuse') of Aristotle created.
This rendering of truth subseguently alters the meaning of
|o^os.
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The original and authentic meaning of Logos was collection
(Sammiung ) , the happening of uncovering, of revelation, of
truth. As Heidegger says, originally the Logos was grounded
in this truth and served it, whereas now Logos has come to
mean statement (Aussage ) in the sense of correctness or
rightness ( Richtigkeit ) , the exact opposite of the place of
truth. . . . with Plato's basically different view of Physis as
Idea, the Logos can only come to be the tailor-made
straitjacket of discourse. . . . Sl^ement has come to be the
arbiter over the being of things.
Heidegger outlines the transmutation as follows:
. . . logos becomes the essential determinant of discourse.
Language--what is uttered and said and can be said again--is
the custodian of the disclosed essent. What has once been
said can be repeated and passed on. The truth preserved in
it spreads, and in the process the essent originally gathered
and disclosed is not each time experienced for itself. In the
transmission the truth detaches itself as it were from the
essent. This can go so far that the repetition becomes a
mere babbling by rote, a glossa . Statement is always
exposed to this danger.
. . . Logos in the sense of discourse and utterance be-
comes the realm and the scene of decision concerning the
truth, i.e. originally, the unconcealment of the essent and
hence its being. Initially the logos as gathering \s the event
of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving it.
Now logos as statement becomes the abode of truth in the
sense of correctness. And this process culminates in Aris-
totle's proposition to the effect that logos as statement is that
which can be true or false. Truth that was originally uncon-
cealment, a happening of the dominant essent itself, governed
by gathering, now becomes an attribute of the logos. In
becoming an attribute of statement, the truth not only shifts
its abode; it changes its essence as well. From the
standpoint of statement, the truth is achieved if discourse
adheres to what it speaks of; if the statement follows the
essent. The truth becomes the correctness of the logos.
With this the logos has departed from its original inclusion in
the happening of unconcealment, so that the decision
concerning the truth and hence concerning the essent is made
on the basis of, and with a view to, the logos, and ^^is
applies to the decision not only concerning the essent but
even and above all concerning being. Logos is now
leaein ti kata tinos, to say something about something. What
is spoken of is what in every case underlies the statemerU,
what is set before it ready made (das ihm Vorliegende),
hvpokeimenon (subjectum ). From the standpoint of the logos
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as independent statement, being becomes this being-set-
before.
For Heidegger, then, the transmutation of physis to idea accomplishes
the transformation of truth as unconcealment to truth as mere
"correctness", and the transformation of the logos as gathering and
collection to logos as statement and discourse, i.e. as "logic." Being
now is set forth as "datum" and arrives "ready-made;" the revelation
and unconcealment of being is "set aside in favor of the correct."
(The subsequent transformation of the logos to "logic" is outlined in
the following section entitled "Being and Thinking.")
For Heidegger, then, Plato's "putting" being and appearance
"in separate places" inaugurates an "across the boards"
transmutation, where each reinterpretation only changes further the
essence of the composite early Greek ground-view. As Heidegger
states, Plato's "theory of ideas" forms "the insupportable dichotomy"
that becomes the basis of all theories of knowledge and epistemology,
and of every metaphysics itself. "... western philosophy is simply
Platonism: and metaphysics, idealism, and Platonism all mean the same
29
thing.
It Is this conceptual base then that, for Heidegger, inaugurates
a history of nihilism--a history in which being is no longer encoun-
tered, but arrives "ready-made" as "datum." For in the separation
between being and appearance, both being and appearance become
object-things. That is, for Heidegger, things (i.e. all things that
the scene, all setting-apart)come to stand, all things that appear on
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are recast as object-things when their inherent being is forgotten,
i.e. when their appearing is no longer seen as simultaneously being.
And nihilism, for Heidegger, is nothing other than man's
preoccupation with things (as objects) to the total exclusion of being.
As Heidegger says in his work on thinking, Plato drove a
wedge between things and being, between things and their
being.
. . . When we say being, he says, we really mean the
being of things; when we say things we mean things with
reference to their being. We constantly speak from out of
this 'twofold' (Zwiefalt ) . Plato, however, gave an
interpretation of this twofold which was absolutely crucial for
western metaphysics. He put each one of the 'twofold' in a
different place, apd then proceeded to concern himself with
the 'other place.'
Plato "drove a wedge between being and things" by failing to note
what Heidegger calls the "ontological difference" between being and
things. This is a failure "to take into account 'the not' (das Nicht )
between things (Seiende ) and being (Sein ) . " That is, being is
not just another thing, not just another "thing among things;" being
encompasses all things, and in encompassing all things, being is
"ontologically different" than things. (As Heidegger notes elsewhere,
"being determines while remaining something indeterminate.")
Therefore, for Heidegger, when being is conceived as a thing,
for example when being is cast as "idea," the essence of being as
*Heidegger also notes that in the Greek, the word for things
(Seiendes ) is Eon , and that as a participle, "it is able to have the
meaning of both a noun and a verb." In fact, for the early Greeks,
there was no distinction between noun and verb. For Heidegger, the
distinction between noun and verb "arrives" through the concep-
tualizations advanced in Plato. "The distinction between noun and
verb did not, however, first come ^^t of grammar, nor did it first
appear in logic. It came with Plato."
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that which is simultaneously determinate and indeterminate, i.e. the
essence of being ^ no-thing, is on its way to being lost. In failing
to note the "ontological difference"--the no-thing of being--being
itself becomes "a thing among other things."
... if being is taken after the manner of a thing (seiend ),
it is thought back into i1^ essence (Wesen ), and being imme-
diately goes up in smoke.
It is here that the being of things, whose being is not a thing, is
also forgotten. As Heidegger states, a "wedge" is driven between
things and their being. For when things are no longer "thought out
of" their relation to being as a whole (i.e. being ^ no-thingness),
both being and things become object-things; things whose being ^
no-thingness is forgotten.
Therefore, for Heidegger, the failure to note the "ontological
difference" between being and thing, i.e. the failure to recognize the
no-thing of being, turns both things and being into object-things.
Expressed in more familiar terms, failure to note the "ontological
difference" subordinates the whole (w-hole) to the part.
This is the sense in which Heidegger can speak of the whole
tradition of western metaphysics as nihilistic. It represents a
forgetting of being in the failure to make the fundamental
distinction between being and things, and in interesting itself
in things rather than in being itself. The importance of this
the 'ontological difference' between things and being cannot
be overestimated in studying Heidegg^^. As he says, it is
this distinction which sustains history.
The failure to note the "ontological difference," then, is for
Heidegger the beginning of the forgetting of being in
Western
metaphysics, in which thought begins to interest itself in
things.
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including being itself, as object-things, rather than in the being of
things.
Interest in being now takes the form of an "also" or ancillary
interest in being, i.e. an interest in being as an idea, an ideal, a
model, a prototype, which is to say, an interest in being as an
object-thing
. Being now is seen as something that arrives
"ready-made" and, therefore, can be "grasped." Therefore, Western
metaphysics progresses with its interest in object-things under the
claim and guise that there is still an interest in being.
Where struggle ceases, the essent does not vanish, but the
world turns away. The essent is no longer asserted (i.e.
preserved as such). Now it is merely found ready-made; it
is datum. The end result is no longer that which is
impressed into limits (i.e. placed in its form); it is merely
finished and as such available to everyone, already-there, no
longer embodying any world--now man does as he pleases with
what is available. The essent becomes an object, either to be
beheld (view, image) or to be acted upon (product and
calculation). The original world-making power, physis
,
degenerates into a prototype to be copied and imitated.
Nature becomes a special field, differentiated from art and
everything that can be fashioned according to plan. The
original emergence and standing of energies, the phainesthai ,
or appearance in the great sense of a world epiphany,
becomes a visibility of things that are already-there and can
be pointed out. The eye, the vision, which originally
projected the project into potency, becomes a mere looking at
or looking over or gaping at. Vision has degenerated into
mere optics (Schopenhauer's 'world eye'--pure
cognition . . .).
True, there are still essents. There are more of them,
and they make more of a stir than ever. But being has gone
out of them. The essent has been made into an 'object' of
endless and variegated busy-ness, and §gly thereby has it
retained an appearance of its permanence.
That is, claims to an "also" interest in being, in which being is cast
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as an object-thing
,
is not an interest in being at all. It is an
interest in just another thing among things. And ".
. .to concern
oneself with things (das Seiende ) to the total ignoring of being
(Sein ) : that is nihilism.
But where is nihilism really at work? Where men cling to
familiar essents and suppose that it suffices to go on taking
essents as essents, since after all that is what they are. But
with this they reject the question of being and treat being
like a nothing (nihil ) which in a certain sense it is, insofar
as it has an essence. To forget being and cultivate only the
essent--that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the
ground of the nihilism which Nietzsche exposed in the first
book of The Will to Power .
By contrast
,
to press inquiry into being explicitly to the
limits of nothingness, to draw nothingness into the question
of being--this is the first ^t^d only fruitful step toward a
true transcending of nihilism.
For Heidegger, the forgetting of the "ontological distinction" between
being and thing, the forgetting of the no-thingness of being,
whereby being is "set forth" as a prototype and an ideal, is the
"event" of Western metaphysics. The nihilism of the day, then, is
simply an extension of the essential possibilities present in a thinking
which casts being as idea .
Moreover, once being is cast as idea , being as idea becomes the
"object" of "logic." This gives rise to the metaphysical distinction
between being and thinking.
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Being and Thinking
If we wish to combat intellectualism seriously, we must know
our adversary, i.e. we must know that intellectualism is only
an impoverished modern offshoot of a development long in the
making, namely the position of priority gained by thought
with the help of Western metaphysics. ... To surpass the
traditional logic does not mean elimination of thought and the
domination of sheer feeling; it means more radical, stricter
thinking, a thinking that is part and parcel of being.
. . . If the separation between being and thinking was an
essential, necessary separation, it must have been rooted in
an original bond between them. Hence our inguiry into the
origin of the separation is first and foremost an inguiry into
the essential beond between thinking and being.
Martin Heidegger
A critique of the intellect, for Heidegger, does not involve
thinking a-logically or irrationally. On the contrary, a critique of
the intellect involves man in thinking even more deeply and more
originally than before if he is to uncover the primal bond that existed
between being and thinking before the separation between them took
place. That is, for Heidegger, in the same way that irrationality
inadvertently confirms and augments the notion of rationality as mind,
intellect, reason, so too, a-logical thinking would only confirm the
incomplete notion of the logos as merely "logic."
This discussion, therefore, looks even more closely at the bond
between physis and logos in an attempt to outline Heidegger s
"rethinking" of the relationship between being and thinking. For
Heidegger, the eventual transformation of the early Greek logos
into
"logic" as reason and intellect (the Latin intelligere , "to think")
is
171
only an offshoot of the original bond and gradual division between
being and thinking. In an attempt to unearth this original bond
between being and thinking and the process of transmutation whereby
logos -thinking becomes logic-thinking, i.e. the faculty of the
intellect, Heidegger turns to Heraclitus' contemporary, Parmenides,
and the early thoughts he advanced on the nature of the relationship
between being and thinking.
Heidegger begins his "rethinking" by recalling Parmenides' most
famous maxim. Fragment 5 (referred to as Fragment 3 in most other
references), which reads; to gar auto noein estin te kai einai { To
CLfi <xx>To voety ^or LTJ 'T'e KcLL tivcLt ). Long-standing Western
tradition most often translates this maxim as follows; "Thinking
38*
(noein ) and being (einai ) are the same." For Heidegger, this
translation is totally "un-Greek" (Ungriechische ), yet it has become
"the basic theme for the whole collective history of western European
thought." As George Joseph Seidel states, this famous maxim is the
"pedal point" that "sets the key for the intellectual variations of
39
western thinking."
All philosophy after Parmenides had to be played in this key.
However, this decisive pre-Socratic thinker is also the 'key'
to western philosophy in another sense. He also represents
the key which not only opens the door to the understanding
of the whole western tradition of philosophy, but also opens a
*For the interested reader, George Joseph Seidel lists several
of the historical readings given Parmenides' famous maxim in a
footnote found on pp. 60-61 of his book, Martin Heidegger an d
the Pre-Socratics (Lincoln, Neb.; University of Nebraska Press,
1964).
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door beh^d which the future possibilities of Dasein may be
revealed.
That is, Parmenides' famous maxim has not only been the "key" to
what h^ happened in Western thinking, but is also the "key" to what
could happen in Western thinking once the saying is "rethought" from
out of the early Greek ground-view.
What has happened with regard to Parmenides, states
Heidegger, is that he has repeatedly been misinterpreted. In the
traditional translation, for example, noein is interpreted as "thinking,
an activity of the subject."* In such a translation, "the thinking of
the subject determines what being is." Here, then, there is nothing
else for being to do but become "the object of thinking, that which is
thought.
But since thinking remains a subjective activity, and since
thinking and being are supposed to be the same according to
ParmenWes, everything becomes subjective. Nothing is in
itself.^
Once noein is cast as "an activity of the subject," and Parmenides'
saying is translated "thinking and being are the same," everything
becomes subjective. With this traditional interpretation in mind,
historians often call Parmenides the first subjectivist, and point to his
famous fragment as his attempt to set forth a primitive theory of
knowledge. However, for Heidegger, to interpret Parmenides through
*ln support of Heidegger's view that the rendering of noein as
"thinking, the activity of the subject" is totally unacceptable, George
Joseph Seidel quotes John Burnet in Early Greek Philosophy (New
York: Meridian, 1957) as saying: "No rendering is admissible which
makes 7JO€ Z (noein ) the subj^t of the sentence; for the bare
infinitive is never so used ..."
173
later categories of thought, such as idealist or realist, objectivist or
subjectivist, acts to obsure the early Greek ground-view which
preceeds and "anticipates" such interpretations.
The anachronism lies in the fact that in reading back into
Parmenides terms or meanings from later philosophies we
forget that it is with Parmenides that history really begins.
Since it is with Parmenides that history begins, Heidegger
explores the words in Parmenides' famous maxim, to gar auto noein
estin te kai einai
,
through a "rethinking" that tries to take into
account and "think from out of" the early Greek ground-view of
being
.
The early Greek understanding of einai or being has already
been discussed at length. As noted on p. 132, Parmenides under-
stood being in much the same way as did Heraclitus, which was as
"the permanently manifested power through which shines perpetually
the appearance of the one-and-many-sided .
"
In "rethinking" the Greek word noein
,
Heidegger states that,
although It is traditionally translated as "thinking, an activity of the
subject," noein for the early Greeks more truly means "to appre-
hend .
"
Noein means vernehmen (to apprehend), nous means
Vernehmung (apprehension), this in two senses that belong
together. To apprehend means to accept, to let something
(namely that which shows itself, which appears) come to one.
Vernehmen means also to hear a witness, to question him and
so determine the facts, to establish how a matter stands. To
apprehend (Vernehmen ) in this twofold sense means to let
something come to one, not merely accepting it, however, but
taking a receptive attitude toward that vyhich shows
itself. . . . This receptive bringing-to-stand is meant in
noein. It is th^’^ apprehension that Parmenides says to be the
same as being.
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It is important to understand here that Heidegger is not so much
advancing one metaphor "over" another, i.e. apprehending "over"
thinking, as he is advancing an interpreting which acknowledges the
"twofold" essence of all things, for that is the essence in which being
(as appearing) was understood and advanced by the early Greeks.
Therefore, it is important for Heidegger that the interpreter of early
Greek words, in translating a maxim like Parmenides', acknowledge
the early Greek gound-view of the "twofold" essence of being as it is
present in words themselves.
Consequently, noein and nous
,
meaning "to apprehend" and
"apprehension" respectively, more precisely refer to the "both" sense
in which the one word noein is "an apprehending apprehension."
Heidegger's interpretation flags the absence of a separation between
the early Greek "thing" and its "being," and thus signals the lack of
a division between noun and verb in early Greek language (thereby
also revealing the "un-Greek" rendering of a word like noein in
subject and object terms).*
This brings Heidegger to the expression to auto , meaning "the
same." Understanding Parmenides' intention here, states Heidegger,
*Therefore, although the historical interpretations of Parmen-
ides' maxim, B3, differ from author to author, most translations try
to convey the unity of noun and verb in early Greek writing. Most
attempt to convey that the act of apprehending cannot be divorced
from being itself. For example, Leonard Woodbury's translation
reads; "Thinking must take the form 'it-is,' because the real word is
'expressed' in 'that-which-is, ' and consequently in the thought,
'it-is.' George Joseph Seidel lists other examples on pp. 60-61 in
his book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics .
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requires an understanding of the early Greek sense of "the same."
This "sense" has already been discussed on p. 134 of this paper.
Briefly restated, the unity or onefoldness expressed by "the same"
(to auto ) is not the "empty indifference of uniformity," nor is it "the
mere equivalence of equality." "The same," for Parmenides, as for
his contemporary, Heraclitus, is the "belonging-together of what
tends apart, the belonging-together of that which differs."
Lastly, states Heidegger, the Greek expression te kai means
"one," here again in the Greek sense of "belonging-together." So
far, then, Parmenides' maxim reads as follows: "being and
apprehension (apprehending apprehension) are one and the same."
To understand clearly what this maxim is expressing, Heidegger
says that we need to constantly remember the meaning of being for
the early Greeks as "to stand in the light, to appear, to enter into
unconcealment." For where being appears and prevails, then,
"apprehension prevails and happens with it; the two belong together.
Apprehension is the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically
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permanent that manifests itself." That is, where being comes to
stand, apprehension comes to stand as well.
Here, Heidegger enlists another fragment of Parmenides which
he says expresses the meaning "still more sharply," and this is
Fragment 8, line 34: Tauton d'esti noein te kai houneken esti noema.
("The same is apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehen-
sion occurs. According to Heidegger, then, Parmenides is trying
to express the interdependence of being and apprehension, and that
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apprehension occurs when being comes to stand. There is appre-
hension only where there is coming to stand, appearing, unconceal-
ment, i.e. there is apprehension only where there is being. Refer-
ring to Fragment 8, Heidegger states:
At first sight the statement says nothing about man, still
less about man as subject, and nothing whatever about a
subject which cancels out everything objective, transforming
it into mere subjectivity. The proposition says the opposite
of all this: being dominates, but because and insofar as it
dominates and appears, appearing and with it apprehension
must also occur. But if man is to participate in this
appearing and apprehension, he must himself be, he must
belong to being. But then the essence and the mode of
being-human can only be determined by the essence of being.
But if appearing belongs to being as physis
,
then man as
an essent must belong to this appearing. Since being-human
amid the essent as a whole is evidently a particular mode of
being, the particularity of being-human will grow from the
particularity of its belonging to being as dominant appearing.
And since apprehension--accepting apprehension of what
shows itself--belongs to such appearing, it may be presumed
that th]^^ is precisely what determines the essence of being-
human .
That is, the essence of being-human is determined according to the
essence of being, whose essence has been revealed as physis , i.e. as
appearing presence. Apprehension belongs to such appearing
presence, then, in the particular mode of being that is being-human.
Man, therefore, apprehends to the extent he "lets" that which he
is-“an appearing presence“-be. Man apprehends when he "stands out
into" being. Therefore, states Heidegger, "man's being is determined
by the essential belonging-together of being and apprehension."
Fragment 6 of Parmenides states: Chre to legein te noein t'e^
emmenai. ("Both are needful, the legein as well as the apprehen-
• u • mn50
sion--of the essent in its being. ;
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Apprehension, as Parmenides says, is not a faculty
belonging to a man already defined; apprehension is rather a
process in which man first enters into history as a being, an
essent, i.e. (in the actual sense) comes into being.
Apprehension is not a function that man has as an attri-
bute, but rather the other way around: apprehension is the
happening that has man. That is why Parmenides always
speaks simply of noein
,
of apprehension. What is
accomplished in this maxim is nothing less than the knowing
appearance of man as historical being (as the historical
custodian of being). This, for the West, is the crucial
definition of being-human, and at the same time it embodies
an essential characterization of being. The separation
between being and being-human comes to light in their
togetherness. We can no longer discern this separation
through the pale and empty dichotomy of 'being and thinking'
which lost its roots hundreds of years ago, unless we go
back to its beginnings.
In the same way that the early Greeks understood logos , aletheia ,
and physis as those happenings which "have" man, so too, for
Parmenides, noein is the apprehending apprehension in which man is
totally involved. Therefore, man does not "have" a faculty or
"activity" called thought or thinking, but rather apprehension is the
happening that "has" man. This elucidates the early Greek
understanding of knowing as "standing out into the truth of being."
Once again, the interdependence of all things within the Greek
ground-view is manifest. As Heidegger says, "... for two
thousand years, these ties between logos , aletheia , physis , noein,
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and idea have remained hidden in unintelligibility."
Consequently, in taking into account the interdependence of
each as each which is so representative of the early
Greek
ground-view of being, Heidegger states that Parmendies' famous
maxim reads: "there is a reciprocal bond between apprehension
and
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being," rather than the traditional translation which reads "thinking
53
and being are the same."
For Heidegger, the traditional translation of Parmenides' maxim
initiates a separation in the original bond between being and
apprehending through presenting noein as an "activity" that man
"possesses." This interpretation creates "the gap" in the early Greek
unity and interdependence of noein and physis and comes to reflect
"the fundamental attitude of the Western spirit."
In accordance with this attitude, being is defined from the
standpoint of thinking and reason. This is true even where
the Western spirit shuns the domination of reason by seeking
the 'irrational' and 'alogical.' . . . The mode and direction of
the opposition between being and thinking are so unique
because it is here that man comes face to face with being.
This event marks the knowing emergence of man as the
historical being. It is only after man became known as the
historical-essent that he was 'defined' in a concept, namely as
the zoion logon echon
,
the rational animal. In this definition
of man the logos occurs, ^t in a totally unrecognizable form
and in very odd company.
Here the word logon refers to reasoned discourse and statement.
Man, therefore, is "defined" as the animal of reasoned discourse and
statement. Now the original sense of the logos as "gathering"
gradually gives way to the Latin expression ratio as "reason." Both
logon and ratio refer to the faculty and attribute of discourse as a
possession of man. With the logos completely revised in meaning as
an attribute of the subject, being becomes hardened further as the
"object" man can possess through reasoning. For if the essence of
the logos is veiled when the essence of being as physis is veiled.
similarly, the essence of being as physis is veiled when the essence
of the logos is veiled.
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Man's being-there changes accordingly. The slow end of this
history, the slow end in which we have long been standing,
is the domination of thinking as ratio (in the sense of under-
standing as well as reason) over the being of the essent.
Here begins the contest between 'rationalism and irrationalism'
that has been in progress to this day in every^ conceivable
disguise and under the most contradictory titles.
Logos as ratio becomes posited over and against being. "... the
Logos is forced to vacate the premises it originally shared with being
and comes to mean theoretical knowledge."
For Heidegger the disclosure in the beginning of the
authentic relationship between being and thinking, as it has
reference to being human, might best be formulated in a
Greek manner in this way: (^-vcrc^ = Xoyo^ ocu BpcDTra-L>(being is the Logos which possesses man;. This in
Heidegger's opinion more truly expresses the way in which
man was originally defined and authentically defines himself
from out of his relation to things within the whole. But with
a Logos that has become externalized into a mere faculty of
understanding or of reason, any such statement of the
original but authentic opening up of being to man can only
sound absurd. This is largely because we have totally ceased
to think in terms of an authentic notion of thinking which
opens up the thing (seiend ), but which does so in a 'collec-
ting-taking-in-to-account' manner such that it puts the thing
back into its being (Sein )
.
Thus when the Logos becomes simply reason, and that
which it collects becomes Idea, both being and the being of
man suffer irreparable damage. For man is then no longer
defined, nor is he able to define himself, from out of his
relation to Physis; reason, which is a mere faculty of a
falsified concept of man, comes to define man. Being is no
longer the overwhelming, ^pierging dominance, but becomes
totally subservient to Idea.
Man now begins to speak in all too familiar terms: being and
thinking, rational and irrational, essence and existence, subject and
object, ideal and real, being and becoming, appearance and reality.
Into this definition and framework, not only metaphysics but every
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doctrine of Western man--epistemology
,
psychology, ethics, anthro-
pology-have put their efforts, not realizing, states Heidegger, that
the definitions of man (as the animal of reason), being (as idea ), and
logos (as statement and discourse) from which they take their cue are
themselves a transmutation and falsification of a previous unity and
interdependence where being was lord, and not the faculty of reason.
"And each further misinterpretation of the one only served to falsify
the other, until logic came to dominate over all and being vanished in
a puff of smoke.
Furthermore, as the previous section on "Being and
Appearance" briefly introduced (p. 163), with the degeneration of the
original Greek logos as physis comes also the degeneration of the
original Greek aletheia as physis . For coinciding with the transmu-
tation of being as physis into being as idea and of logos as gathering
into ratio as reason is the transmutation of aletheia as truth into
truth as "the merely correct." That is, once logos becomes the state-
ment of reason, and being as idea becomes the object of statement or
reason, truth comes to refer to "that which can be passed on and
secured." Truth "comes to mean a mere declaration of statement."
Truth is no longer understood as the essence of being, as the
"unconcealment" which being is; rather truth becomes "subservient
to idea." Here, says Heidegger, the way is paved for the categories
( KC(.T ijy o p lQ. ) of Aristotle. To state or to accuse
is
KOL'T'
rjy
OyO f , and from the various ways in which being can
be stated or declared, from the various ways in which being can be
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set forth "ready-made" and truth agreed upon, come the categories of
Aristotle.* Statements are now said to be true or false.
In statement the underlying essent may be represented in
different ways: as having such and such properties, such
and such magnitude, such and such relations. Properties,
magnitude, relations are determinations of being. Because,
as modes of being-said, they are derived from logos--and
because to state is kategorein --the determinations of the
being of the essent are called kategoriai
,
categories. Thus
the doctrine of being and of the determinations of the essent
as such becomes a discipline which searches for the categories
and their order. The goal of all ontology is a doctrine of
categories. It has long been taken for granted that the
essential characteristics of being are categories. But funda-
mentally it is strange and becomes comprehensible only if we
understand not only how the logos as statement broke away
from physis but how it set itself up in opposition to physis as
the decisive domain, the source of all determinations of being.
But logos, phasis
,
speech in the sense of statement, has
become the arbiter over the being of the essent in so
profound a sense that whenever one statement stands against
another, when a contradiction, antiphasis
,
occurs, the
contradictory cannot Conversely, what is not
contradictory has at least the possibility of being. . . .
In the form of statement logos itself became something
already-there. It became something handy that one handles
in order to gain and secure the truth as correctness. The
next, short step was to take this method of acquiring truth
as a tool, organon
,
that had to be handled in the right way.
What made this all the more necessary was that_ with the
change of physis to eidos and of logos to kategoria the
original disclosure of the being of the essent ceased, and
henceforth the true, now interpreted as the correct, merely
spread by way of discussion, teaching, and rules, becoming
steadily broader and flatter. For the benefit of this process
the logo%.cbad to be fashioned into a tool. Logic was about to
be born.^
*George Joseph Seidel adds: "Someone who 'categorized' was one
who stood above { /cam ) the market place {(Xyojxx ) in a seat of
judgement and accused, condemned, declared the crime of so and so
to be such and such. For Heidegger, of course, it is impossible
to
stand over that 0^hich we declare; we are in the market
place of
being ourselves."
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Metaphysics now becomes the science of categorical theories, pursuing
the attainment of truth as the merely correct through the "method" of
logic. The original Greek logos is refashioned into a tool, organon
,
and "logic" is born.
"Logic" is an abbreviation for episteme logike
,
the science of
statement and discourse. Logic, the science of the logos
,
began
states Heidegger "when Greek philosophy was drawing to an end and
becoming an affair of schools, organization, and technique," and
"only after the division between being and thinking had been
61
effected." Once logos becomes "an affair of schools," the attempt
is made to put being "over into truth" (via statement and discourse),
rather than "thinking being from out of its truth." The
transformation of logos to "logic," therefore, begins when being as
idea becomes the "object" of reason, and as the "object" of reason, it
becomes "teachable." Thus, for Heidegger, "logic" arises "in the
curriculum of the Platonic-Aristotelian schools," for it is the product
of schoolteachers, not questioning philosophers. Truth is now
advanced by way of discussion, teaching, and agreement.*
The "err-ing" of "logic," then, as the fitting and ordering of
statement into categories, is in forgetting that the early Greek logos
is the inherent "fit and order" of being as physis . "Logic" forgets
*lt is important to note here that it is not the "birth" of "logic"
which surprises Heidegger so much as it is the dominance of logic.
Heidegger's surprise is over the fact that logic should have come to
overshadow the original logos so completely that it determines totally
for Western man the essence of thinking.
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that for the early Greeks the logos expresses "the belonging-to-
gether" of all that comes to stand and is set apart. In other words,
"logic" forgets that the logos is physis .
Heidegger offers what he believes to be an authentic his-
torical verification to prove that he is on the right track in
this regard. For he notes that ever since Idea and Category
have come into their kingdom, philosophers have had a most
difficult time trying to explain the relation between statement
(thought as the falsified Logos) and being, whereas before
the radical changes which took place in western thinking with
Plato and Aristotle the problem of explaifiing the relation
between statement and being did not exist.
°
Heidegger's own words are as follows:
Ever since idea and category became sovereign, philosophers
have tormented themselves in vain, seeking by every possible
and impossible stratagem to explain the relation between
statement (thinking) and being--in vain, because they never
again carried the question ofg^eing back to its native ground
and soil, thence to unfold it.°
For Heidegger, then, it is the differentiation between being and
thinking, being and appearance, and their subsequent placement "in
separate places" that has come to form the fundamental basis of
Western metaphysics and epistemology. Heidegger calls it "the
breakdown of unconcealment," whereby the original essence of being
as that which conceals (physis , or setting-apart) and unconceals
(logos
,
or bringing-together) at the same time is veiled beneath a
categorizing and distinguishing which fails to acknowledge the
underlying order, fit, and proportion which characterized the early
Greek ground-view of each as each . It is "the breakdown of
unconcealment" which constitutes for Heidegger "the forgetting of
a forgetting which is manifested in the nihilism of the day.being,"
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In speaking of "the forgetting of being," of "devolution," the
Heideggerian sense of "ending" is always to be kept in mind. As
Heidegger states:
Yet the breakdown of unconcealment, as we briefly call
this event, did not spring from a mere deficiency, an
inability to sustain this essence that was entrusted to
historical man. The cause of the breakdown lay first of all in
the greatness of the beginning and in the essence of the
beginning itself. ('Decline' and 'breakdown' are negative
terms only in a superficial sense.) Since it is a beginning,
the beginning must in a sense leave itself behind. ... A
beginning can never directly preserve its full momentum; the
only possible way to preserve its force is to repeat, to draw
once again (wieder-holen) more deeply than ever from its
source. . . . This does not preclude but rather requires
that the historical course of this collapse be as far as
possible elucidated. . . . The only possible step that remains
is to stand on the very ground from which logic arose and to
overturn it (as the dominant perspective for the interpre-
tation of being). . . . Where history is authentic it does not
die by merely ceasing; it does not just stop li\g|ig (ver-
enden) like the animals; it can only die historically .
It is, therefore, that Heidegger's "rethinking" of what has been, his
attempted "elucidation" of the collapse, is always in view of the
future possibilities that still exist for being and man.
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CHAPTER V I
LANGUAGE
In accordance with its historical, history-disclosing essence,
being-human is logos
,
the gathering and apprehending of the
being of the essent: it is the happening of that strangest
essent of all, in whom through violence, through acts of
power (Gewalt-tatigkeit), the overpowering is made manifest
and made to stand. But the chorus from Antigone has told
us: simultaneously with man's departure into being he finds
himself in the word, in language.
. . . And this means that
language can only have arisen from the overpowering, the
strange and terrible, through man's departure into being. In
this departure language was being, embodied in the word:
poetry. Language is the primordial poetry in which a people
speaks being.
Martin Heidegger
The fluid relationship between language and being is manifested
throughout Heidegger's work, and it is hoped that the reciprocity of
that relationship has made itself evident throughout this paper. The
preceeding chapters have explored man's destroyed relation
(zerstorte Bezug ) to being as it has become a simultaneous misrelation
(Missverhaltnis ) to language. Moreover, this misrelation to language,
once accomplished, succeeds in accelerating (while veiling) man's
destroyed relation to being. "Because the destiny of language is
grounded in a nation's relation to being
,
the question of being will
']
involve us deeply in the question of language."
Language, for Heidegger, is the present word for what was
originally the early Greek logos as that word which expressed the
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"gathering essence" of being.
Subsequently, the word "language" could replace the word
"logos" in the previous chapter on "Devolution," and provide the
reader with a fairly accurate account of the degeneration process that
has taken place in man's relationship with language.
This chapter will attempt to make explicit much of what is
implicit throughout this paper with regard to the nature of the rela-
tionship between being and language, unveiling man's relation to
language as none other than the relationship of man to the logos .
That is, language, like the early Greek logos
,
"has" man; man does
not "have" language.
Man's dwelling in the world is essentially a dwelling in lan-
guage. Heidegger thus likens language to a house in which
man lives; walking through this house he discovers the
world. This house, however, is not owned by man--language
is the house of Being.
The devolution of the logos to "logic," however, linguistically
reverses the essence of the man/language relationship so that man
comes to think that he "has" reason, thought, intellect, which is to
say, man comes to think he "has" language. This is no mere
"playing with words." For in man's destroyed relation to being,
whereby man comes to think he can "grasp" or "have" being as idea,
as datum "ready-made," man comes to think that he, rather than
being, is the measure (and measurer) of all things and that language
is merely the tool (organon ) with which he measures. Once set forth
as a tool, language is reduced to an information medium or "means of
expression." That is, it is the inversion of ownership in the relation-
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ship between man and being that simultaneously constitutes an
inversion of ownership in the relationship between man and language.
In Heidegger's words, man's destroyed relation to being becomes
misrelation to language. And it is man's misrelation to language
that further hides the now-destroyed relationship between man and
being
.
Against nearly any other obstacle man can protect himself;
but the confusion of language annihilates man's reason com-
pletely, for it is only through language that one is to be
distinguished from the beasts.
As with being, however, so too with language: man's failure to
recognize the nature of the relationship does not render the rela-
tionship inactive. Language, like being, determines the relationship,
whether man acknowledges this or not. Language, like being, is
always the master and mistress of man, even when man reverses the
relationship so that it seems that he is master, and that language is
merely his tool.
It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing,
provided that we respect language's own nature. In the
meantime, to be sure, there rages round the earth an
unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of
spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and
master of language, while in fact language remains the master
of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of this
relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation.
That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to the
good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still
serves us even then only as a means of expression. Among
all the appeals that we human beings, on our part, can help
to be. voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the
first.
^
However, if man is to respect "language's own nature, man must be
exposed to just what "the nature and essence of language" is. For
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Heidegger, this "essence" is "grounded" in the early Greek logos
.
Heidegger says that the early Greeks did not have the word
"language" (Sprache ) because they had a word for language and that
was logos
. "To the Greeks . . . the essence of language was
revealed as Logos."
However, although the Greeks lived with the essence of
language, they did not think on it. This, of course, would
serve to explain why the Greeks had no word for language.
Not even Heraclitus really thought on it. It was, after all,
as Heraclitus had said in B2, common and current (
ymp o KOLi^o^ ). It was so much taken for granted by
the Greeks that it was scarcely thought about, even by such
a great thinker as Heraclitus. For if the Greeks had truly
thought about it, they would have thought the essence of
language from right out of the essence of being. For the
Logos is nothing els^ but the name for the being of things
(Sein des Seienden )
.
For the early Greeks, the logos was "common and current." There-
fore, they did not think about "language" as such. Rather, for
these early philosophers, the logos was encountered and lived,
listened to and followed. Remember here that the logos was the
early Greek expression for unity-the primordial attempt at acknow-
ledging "the belonging-together" of all things. As such, the logos
was not just another "word among words;" it was the Greek word for
ail words. The logos constituted the essence of all that could be
"heard to speak," i.e. the essence of language. And what is "heard
to speak," states Heraclitus repeatedly, is "one is everything." "The
logos speaks: 'One is everything.' " Similarly, Fragment 50 states;
"If you have heard not me but the logos , then it is wise to say
accordingly: all is one."^ As noted previously, the "hearing"
and
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"speaking" referred to here is not the commonly-held sense of hearing
and speaking as the transmission of statement and discourse.
Rather, speaking for the early Greeks expressed an altogether
different sense of speaking--the sense of "letting the logos speak,"
whose very speaking, as logos
,
always speaks together (to-gather).
In that logos and physis are one in early Greek thought, the logos
speaks out of Its relation to being. This is what George Seidel is
referring to when he states in the preceeding quote on p. 191: "For
if the Greeks had truly thought about it, they would have thought
the essence of language from right out of the essence of being."
For Heidegger, then, speaking o^ of being is speech (as
primordial Sagen ) . It is "saying" which lets the together (the logos )
which is being (physis ) appear as that which it is: the permanently
together. Language, as primary saying, lets "what-is" speak "that
which it is." Primary saying lets being (as setting-apart) reveal
itself through language as logos as that which is "gathered-together .
"
. . . there is a saying that really engages in saying, yet
without reflecting upon language, which would make even
language into one more object. To be involved in saying is
the mark of a saying that follows something to be said, solely
in order to say it. What is to be said would then be what by
nature belongs to the province of language. And that,
thought metaphysically, is particular beings as a
whole. . . . The more venturesome are those who say in a
greater degree, in the manner of the singer. Their singing
is turned away from all purposeful self-assertion. ... To
sing, truly to say worldly existence, to say out of the
haleness of the whole pure draft and to say only this, means:
to belong to the precinct of beings themselves. This pre-
cinct, as the very nature of language, is Being itself. To
sing the song means to be present in what is present itself.
It means: Dasein, existence.
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For Heidegger, authentic speech (Sagen ) reflects the interrelationship
between logos and physis . Authentic speech "gathers" with regard to
being when it "lets being speak or show itself as it it." Authentic
speech, therefore, relies upon being; being does not rely upon man's
speech. When the nature of this relationship is inverted, man comes
to think that he can order and fit the world (through "logic") without
regard for the inherent order and fit ( Fug ) of being: physis is
logos. It is this reversal which recasts language as "the tool" with
which man "orders and fits" being. Here, states Heidegger, the
emphasis shifts from the being of things to the being of things .
"Consequently language, speech, is at the same time idle talk, a
concealment rather than disclosure of being, dispersion, disorder and
O
mischief (Unfug) rather than a gathering into structure and order."
For Heidegger, therefore, there is authentic and inauthentic
speech. There is the essential word and the counterfeit word.
There is the authentic saying (Sagen ) described above, the
"being-related speech," in which being as logos is allowed to speak
"to-gether, to-gather." "The authentic saying (Sage ) of the Logos
was that which allowed the showing off of the thing to appear in its
'is-ness' (es-ist ) . " Here, saying "means both the said (Gesagtes )
and also the saying of it (zu-Sagende ), " reflecting once again the
absence of a noun-verb distinction. In this "saying," language
"gathers" with regard for being, and it is this "gathering" which lets
things reveal themselves in their essential natures, i.e. in their being
and truth.
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There is also, however, a language which speaks without
regard for the inherent interrelationship between gathering (logos )
and setting-apart (physis ) . This is language which Heidegger calls
( Rede ) , babbling. The distinction Heidegger draws here
corresponds with the distinction Parmenides makes between logos and
glQssa
. For Heidegger, as for Parmenides, glossa occurs when things
are not allowed to speak "to-gather," i.e. when things are not
"spoken" out of their relation to being as a whole.
It may help here to recall Heidegger's distinction between his-
toricity and historiography. Inauthentic speech, glossa
,
like
historiography, takes things literally. It is speech which settles for
the assumed meanings of words, "meanings which generally tend to
conceal rather than reveal being."
For when the word becomes a mere sign, then language be-
comes a veiling (Verdeckung ) rather than an unveiling
(Eroffnung ) of being. And as soon as the word becomes a
mere sign, the way is prepared for logic and the manipulation
of terms as signs. The true essence of language as the
collecting of the collected of being is come upon, language as
everyday talk (alltaglich Rede ) comes to its truth, only when
speaking and hearing are related to the Logos as the
collected, in the sense of being.
... To speak (sprechen ) a language, Heidegger
insists, is quite other than merely making use (benutzen ) of
a language. And common everyday speech only makes use of
language.
.|Q
This is what makes ordinary, everyday language
ordinary.
In the words of Karsten Harries, inauthentic language "happens"
"wherever grammar swallows the word and its meaning."
All inauthentic modes of existence develop their peculiar
grammars, which provide rules determining how a certain
word should be used and in so doing silence its claim.
Inauthentic existence demands cliches to guard man against
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the shock of having to encounter realityJ^
When man avoids encountering his relationship within being through
cliches and stereotypes, through babbling and rote repetition, lan-
guage becomes a veiling (Verdeckung ) rather than an unveiling
(Erbffnung ) of being, a concealment rather than a disclosure of
being. Glossa occurs, then, when man "uses" words to avoid
encountering being.
But what does language as gl5ssa conceal? It conceals the
essence and truth of being as unconcealment--an unconcealment which
conceals and reveals at the same time. GIdssa fails to let being "show
and speak itself" as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously.
When Heidegger speaks of language which veils, therefore, he is
referring specifically to language which veils the the nature of being
(and therefore the nature of language itself) as that which both veils
and unveils simultaneously.
Here, it is easy to understand why it was difficult for man to
"safeguard" the essence of being and language in their delicate
interdependence of each as each . "This is the case partly because
the very essence of language, as a thing (seiend ) , tends both to
reveal and to conceal at the same time." The German poet Holderlin
calls language "man's most dangerous possession." Heidegger con-
curs, for language, by its very nature, can conceal the essence of
being as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously in that
language, like all things within being, comes to stand and appear on
the scene. That is, language, by its very nature, conceals and
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"sets-apart. " In the early Greek ground-view, however, this is only
"a-part" of a larger story, and that larger story is: setting-apart is
simultaneously binding-together. Physis is logos .
Therefore, states Heidegger, language gives rise to disorder
and mischief (Unfug ) rather than manifesting the innate order and
proportion of physis as logos when man takes the concealing aspect of
language as the whole story regarding the essence and nature of
language. Simply stated, gidssa "errs" in "taking" language as only
static, as only stationary. It "errs" through "using" language to
avoid encountering the inherent motion of being. Glossa is language,
then, that "orders and fits" without regard for the inherent "order
and fit" of physis as logos .
Consequently, the task of man, the specific task of
being-human, states Heidegger, is to "turn away from all mere
heresay, all mouthing and glibness," and undertake the violent
"work" of gathering. "Logos is a need (Not) and intrinsically
requires violence to ward off mouthing and dispersion." It requires
that man "discriminate and decide," always setting before himself
1
3
"gathered in one, the counsel of multiple conflict." It requires that
man undertake the "work" of "unconcealment."
We know from Heraclitus and Parmenides that the uncon-
cealment of being is not simply given. Unconcealment occurs
only when it is achieved by work; the work of the word in
poetry, the work of stone in temple and statue, the work ot
the word in thought, the work of the polis as the historical
place in which all this is grounded and preserved. lln
accordance with what has been said above, work is to
taken here in the Greek sense of er^on, the creation
that
discloses the truth (in die Unverborgenheit herstellen)
of
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something that is present.] The struggle for the unconceal-
ment of the essent and hence for being itself in the work,
this struggle for unconcealment, which even in itself is
continuous conflict, is at the same time, a combat against
concealment, disguise, false appearance.
Appearance, doxa
,
is not something beside being and un-
concealment; it belongs to unconcealment.
. . .
... To be a man means to take gathering upon oneself
,
to undertake a gathering apprehension of the being of the
essent, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work,
and so to administer (verwalten) unconcealment, to preserve
it against cloaking and concealment.
The battle for the undistorted, for truth as unconcealment which both
conceals and reveals simultaneously, is, by its very nature, a battle
against the distorted. Here, however, states Heidegger, "the way to
truth as correctness ( Richtigkeit) also lies open," for unless the
battle for the undistorted is "directed" by being itself, it becomes a
battle directed by man, and it is this latter battle which transforms
the essence of truth from one of unconcealment to one of "mere
correctness.
Because the essence of language is found in the act of
gathering within the togetherness of being, language as
everyday speech comes to its truth only when speaking and
hearing are orjignted toward logos as collectedness in the
sense of being.
For Heidegger, then, it is through speech which is "directed" by
being that things come to show themselves as they are, and that man
comes to apprehend (noein ) . In authentic speech, therefore, man
apprehends ("hears") that he belongs to that in which he is
ultimately related.
Now at last we understand the full context of Parmenides
saying that 'noein * (apprehension) happens for the sake oT
The passage runs (Fragment 8, lines 34-6): 'There is an
198
inherent bond between apprehension and that for the sake of
which apprehension occurs. For not without the essent in
which it (being) is already spoken, will you find (attain)
apprehension.' Its relation to the logos as physis makes
legein into an apprehending gathering, and makes apprehen-
sion a gatherer. Therefore the legein
,
if it is to remain
collected, must turn away from all mere hearsay, all mouthing
and glibness.
It is through being-related language that man apprehends . Noein
depends upon logos : apprehension depends upon "to-gathering." For
Heidegger, then, it is through being-related speech that man under-
takes a gathering apprehension of his relation to being,
understanding and thus preserving language in its essence as "the
apprehending gathering" of being. Being-related speech unveils the
"to-gathering" (the logos ) of all that is set-apart as being or physis .
Subsequently, it is language as glossa which veils not only man's
apprehension of his relationship to being, but also the
interrelationship of all things to one another.
To reveal the truth of being as unconcealment, then, man needs
to continually raise words "to a still more original unfolding; not
merely by applying them and invoking their authority. The original
remains original only if it never loses the possibility of being what it
1
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is: origin as emergence ..."
We do not learn who man is by learned definitions; we learn
it only when man contends with the essent, striving to bring
it into its being, i.e. into limit and form, that is to say when
he projects something new (not yet presen:);^, when he creates
original poetry, when he builds poetically.
It is understandable then that, for Heidegger, when logos as gather-
ing becomes reinterpreted as "logic," and noein as
apprehending
199
apprehension becomes reinterpreted as categories of knowledge, man
tends to forget his essence as an "apprehending gatherer," and comes
to think of himself as "the animal of reason," as the logician, with
language his instrument, tool, and means of expression.
As a tool, language is now "legein ti kata tinos
,
to say some-
thing about something." The degeneration of language as logos is
now so profound, states Heidegger, that "whenever one statement
stands against another, when a contradiction, antiphasis
,
occurs, the
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contradictory cannot ^." In forgetting the original essence of
language being
,
man begins denying being (and truth) ^ being
through language. The nature of being ^ truth, the nature of
setting-apart as binding-together, i.e. the nature of being as
paradox
,
is now veiled beneath the linguistic frame of contradiction .
Inclusion is transformed to exclusion. The "idea" of "two" is
captured, but the motion of the twofold (each as each) is obscured.
It is here, in the language of contradiction, that for Heidegger the
inherent and multiple possibilities of the onefoldedness of the manifold
remain in shadow.
It is in the hope of shedding light on what is still in shadow
that Heidegger addresses his "rethinking" of the past towards the
future possibilities still present within being. This "rethinking"
requires the "work" of man-as-gatherer disclosing "the truth of
something that is present." This "work" requires language
which
"lets what is present speak for itself," and for Heidegger,
as for
Heraclitus and Parmenides, what is present speaks:
setting-apart is
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binding-together, coming-to-be is passing-away
.
It is this "work" that frees language from "the bondage of
grammar," and allows it to unveil its essence as being itself.
. . . Language can do justice to Being only if it is possible
to free it from the bondage of grammar.
. . . The demand to
free language from grammar is a demand to free it for its real
task of revealing meaning. The context in which a word
operates p-^hould not be permitted to obscure its essential
meaning
.
When language is "permitted" its essential meaning, "a people remem-
bers that it belongs to the totality of all that exists," and authentic
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saying unfolds authentic history.
As something of such grave importance, as something so
fundamentally original, language is an event (Ereignis ), a
very important event. When language begins to speak, it is
itself historical. It is an Ereignis in the sense that it opens
man's eyes up ( Er-augen ) to the possibilities of language.
And hence it also opens man's eyes up to the possibilities of
the fateful thinking on being. As Heidegger puts it, the
important event here taking place with language is the
coordination of our being with language, which is nothing else
but man and being joining forces. Thus inasmuch as man and
being are here joined together, since it is here that the
authentic thinking which fatefully thinks on being comes to
language, language (as Logos), as the primordial, historical
place in which man and being are thus ^^ined, becomes an
event of outstanding historical importance.
That is, it is language which allows man to question his own being,
and it is questioning which "opens" man to the total possibilities
inherent in his relation to being. It is language, therefore, which
"makes it possible for Dasein to exist historically."
. . .
language, understood rightly, is the original way in
which beings are brought into the open clearing of truth, in
which world and earth, mortals and gods are bidden to come
to their appointed places of meeting. . . 2*4 into the simple
onefold of their intimate belonging together.
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When man hears, he hears that he belongs to that which is heard.
Man hears relationship. Man hears "lying-down-to-gather . " Man
hears meeting. And it is in speaking from out of this hearing, out of
this listening and following, that man speaks authentically. "We don't
speak a language, as Heidegger has said, we speak from out of (aus)
it." We "let it have its say." Man's task, therefore, is to listen to
the being (as logos ) that is speaking and "con-form" (ent-spricht )
his speaking to it. Thus, says Heidegger, "mortals speak insofar as
they listen.
Language ... is the temple (Bezirk ), i.e., the home of
being. Language belongs primarily to being. It is language
that speaks . . . Man speaks only inasmuch as he hears
(hbrt ), to the extent that he has heard (gehort ) the command
of the silent, i.e., the voice of being which is language.
Man speaks only to the extent that he belongs to (gehort ),
coordinates himself with language. This coordination is
hearing (Horen ) . And this becomes a successful coordinati(^
insofar as it truly belongs to this silent language of being.
Heidegger calls the speaking which conforms itself with being
Dichten or Dichtung
,
in English "poetizing" or "poeting."* Poeting
is authentic speech for Heidegger, born of man's attunement with the
*Albert Hofstadter states in the introduction to Poetry, Lan-
guage. Thought that there is no word in English for what the poet
does, which in the German is dichtet . Using the English word
"poetize" for dichten suggests affectation, says Hofstadter, so he
translates dichten as poetry, but he adds that it is well to remember
the word "poetry" in its sense as a verb as "poeting." As we have
the singing of songs, so too we have the poeting of thoughts. Hof-
stadter goes on to say: "The speech of genuine thinking is by nature
poetic. It need not take the shape of verse; as Heidegger says, the
opposite of the poem is not prose; pure prose is as poetic as any
poetry. The voice of thought must be poetic because poetry is t^g
saying of truth, the saying of the unconcealedness of beings."
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lo^os, "the saying of the unconcealedness of what is." Earlier, the
early Greek word thesis was unveiled as meaning "setting up in the
unconcealed." Poeting, then, is the saying that does the "work" (as
er^on) of ^esis. Poeting, for Heidegger, sets up in the unconcealed
by unveiling the being and truth of things as they are, and as such,
is "the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is."
Poeting reveals the intimate belonging-together of "the fourfold dif-
ference of earth, sky, mortals and gods," where all that is, from the
simplest pair of peasant shoes to a blade of grass, stands unveiled as
they are in their mutual relationality
. In poeting, states Heidegger,
"the measure is taken of all measure, i.e. the basic grasp of
rightness and fitness by which beings belong to one another.
Poeting "bids" all that is "set-apart" "to come to their appointed
places of meeting."
Poeting, therefore, lets the things that "stay the world" come
into their own . House. Tree. Chair. Water. Dog. Man. Spoon.
Through authentic saying, poeting releases each thing into its "own "
through the other. For it is in recognizing one a^ the other that
things come Into their "own." In meeting one's own in the other, one
meets the other in one's own. Both for Heidegger and the early
Greeks, it is through intimacy (the "innermost secret") that things
recognize their interrelationship, their mutual lying-down-to-gather.
It is language as poeting that bids the encounter of each as each .
... to exist as a human being in an authentic relationship
as mortal to other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities
present and absent, to things and plants and animals; it
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means, to let each of these be--to let it presence in
openness, in the full appropriateness of its nature--and tohold oneself open to its being, recognizing it and responding
to It appropriately in one's own being, the way in which one
oneself goes on, lives; and then, perhaps, in this ongoing
hfe one may hear the call of the language that speaks of the
being of all these beings and respond to it in a mortal
language that speaks of what it hears.
Appropriation is what is appropriate. This brings us to a dis-
cussion of Heidegger's "event of appropriation." (Referred to
previously on pp. 58-59.) The word "appropriate" is an expansion of
the word "proper," meaning "of one's own, to make one's own." It
also denotes "that which is fitting;" what is proper is proportion.
For Heidegger, the "event of appropriation" refers to man's
recognizing his "own" fitting in the other. It is the event in which
man acknowledges the belonging-together of all that is set-apart,
thereby coming into his "own." In the "event of appropriation," to
enlist Heidegger's language, the four members of the fourfold--earth,
sky, gods, mortals--mirror each other, each in its own way. "Each
therewith reflects itself, in its own way, into its Eigenes
,
its own,
within the simpleness of the four."
*"Das ereignende Spiegel-Spiel der Einfalt von Erde und Him-
mel ,Gottlichen and Sterblichen
,
'the ereigende mirror-play of the
simple onefold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals,' " is how
Heidegger portrays "world." Albert Hofstadter discusses the multiple
interpretations of ereignis and its derivatives. Eigen means "own,"
thus in this context, ereignen is not the das Ereignis of "event,
happening, occurrence," but rather means "to make one's own, to
appropriate," after the fashion of eigen . Hofstadter also notes that
ereignen was constructed from an earlier verb, eraugnen , meaning "to
place before the eyes, to show," thus enlightening Heidegger's
understanding of truth as unconcealment, or letting-show. "Thus
ereignen comes to mean . . . the joint process by which the four of
the fourfold are able, first, to come out into the light and clearing
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This "ownership" does not in any way denote a "closing in,"
where what is "other" is excluded. On the contrary, ownership as
appropriation denotes an opening out, a standing out, into one's
belonging to being. As Heidegger states, it is through ownership as
appropriation that "a people remembers that it belongs to the totality
of all that exists."
Man is not an isolated substance, a being in isolation, who
accidentally, nobody knows how, establishes relationships with
other equally isolated beings. Rather, being-related-to-
others is constitutive of our own being. As human beings we
are part of a community. This community is not something
which has to be established, but it is given to man as part of
his own being. Thus history and landscape are first of all
structures of communication.
"Building community," for Heidegger, does not lie in the realm of will
as purposeful self-assertion, but rather in the realm of will as
resolve. Community requires the "work" of "letting-be. " It requires
"building" which "sets up in the unconcealed," unveiling things as
of truth, and thus each to exist in its own truthful way, and
secondly, to exist in appropriation of and to each other, belonging
together in the round dance of their being; and what is more, this
mutual appropriation becomes the very process by which the emer-
gence into the light and clearing (of being) occurs, for it happens
through the sublimely simple play of their mutual mirroring. The
mutual lighting-up, reflecting, eraugnen
,
is at the same time the
mutual belonging, appropriating, ereignen ; and conversely, the
happening, das Ereignis
,
by which alone the meaning of Being can be
determined, is this play of eraugnen and ereignen : it is an Eraugn^q
which is an Ereignen and an Ereignen which is an Eraugnen .
"
Moreover, for Heidegger, it is through a recognition of relational
being that the "load" of being ^ truth becomes "lighter" for man to
carry. Man recognizes that the weight of being is conjoint. Here,
Heidegger's earlier view of authenticity or ownership as man's ability
to encounter being in the face of death softens somewhat into an
"ownership" born of mirroring.
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they stand together. Community, therefore, is not something decided
upon; it is something encountered and lived. The word "community"
is a derivative of the word "common," meaning "together duties,
gifts, privileges." Community is "that which is shared in common,"
and what is shared in common are the duties, privileges, and gifts of
to-gather-ing
. What is shared in common is the logos .
Building authentic community, therefore, involves man in
dwelling within the community of being that is. And it is saying
(Sage ) born of this dwelling, it is poeting, that does the "work" of
unconcealment, whereby the community that is is allowed to show
itself as it is. It is language which lets the logos speak for itself
that "accomplishes" community, for when the logos speaks, the logos
speaks: "Each is each; one is everything."
Language makes the connection for us: bauen
,
to build,
connects with buan to dwell, and with biin, bist
,
the words
for be. Language tells us: to be a human being is to be on
the earth as a mortal, to dwell, doing the 'building' that
belongs to dwelling: cultivating growing things, constructing
things that are built, and doing all this in the context of
mortals who, living on earth and cherishing it, look to the
sky and to the gods to find the measure of their dwelling. If
man's being is dwelling, and if man must look to the way the
world fits together to find the measure by which he c^i^
determine his dwelling life, then man must dwell poetically.
In authentic saying, then, man "opens up" for himself and for all
other beings a ground-view of the belonging-together , the inherent
community, that j_s being. For Heidegger, it is this ground-view that
releases man into the manifold possibilities of authentic human
existence, and thus into authentic history.
So poetry-together with the language and thinking that
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belong to it and are identical with it as essential poetry--has
for Heidegger an indispensable function for human life: it is
the creative source of the humanness of the dwelling life of
man
.
Subsequently, for Heidegger, man needs to uncover the original
essence of language as the "gathering essence" that constitutes
being-human. This rediscovery may then unveil "the veil of contra-
diction" under which men become "vicious automata of self-will" as
they strive to "reunite" what they themselves have falsely set apart.
However, the linguistic veil of contradiction is only representative of
a deeper loss: man's destroyed relation to being ^ truth. For when
man comes to think that he can "grasp" being as idea
,
the nature of
the relationship between man and being in which being "has" man is
reversed. Simultaneously, then, there occurs a reversal in the
nature of the relationship between man and language, whereby man
comes to think that he must explain, order, fit, will truth and being
for them to exist. But it is precisely here, in man's thinking that he
is the "master" of being and language, that he becomes a "pawn" in
the hands of his own language. For language, like being, always
determines man, whether man recognizes the nature of this
relationship or not. Therefore, man's inauthentic words, his veil of
contradiction, come to determine his experience of the world. It is
ordering and fitting without regard for the inherent measure-giving
of being, without regard for the order and fit of setting-apart ^
binding-together, that leads to the object-dominated framework that
now impinges on man. It is ordering and fitting without regard for
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the order" of being that leads to disorder and confusion. Disorder
reflects the lost sense of proportion, propriety, appropriation,
between one thing and another, i.e. between being and man. And it
is from this lost sense of proportion that the mystery hides. The
mystery hides from a language which measures without regard for the
nature of measurement. ".
. .we never get to know a mystery by
. . . analysing it; we only get to know it by carefully guarding the
mystery ^ mystery."
This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of
earth and sky, divinities and mortals, we call the world.
The world presences by worlding. That means: the world's
worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can it be
fathomed through anything else. This impossibility does not
lie in the inability of our human thinking to explain and
fathom in this way. Rather, the inexplicable and unfathom-
able character of the world's worlding lies in this, that
causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the world's
worlding. As soon as human cognition here calls for an
explanation, it fails to transcend the world's nature, and falls
short of it. The human will to explain just does not reach to
the simpleness of the simple onefold of worlding. The united
four are already strangled in their essential nature when we
think of them only as separate realities,2ywhich are to be
grounded in and explained by one another."^
The will to explain, i.e. the will of purposeful self-assertion, errs in
that it takes separation as the final word regarding the essence of
being as a whole.
Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it. It
causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn
into a destruction. This destruction may herald itself under
the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the
technical-scientific objectivation of nature, but this mastery
nevertheless remains an impotence of will. The earth appears
openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and pre-
served as that which is by nature undisclosable, that vyhich
shrinks every disclosure and constantly keeps itself
closed up.
208
The "work" of language as poeting and authentic saying, therefore,
is the most difficult work of all. It requires great energy for it
requires that man stand out into the mystery and paradox of being,
letting earth be earth, snow be snow, sky be sky, as they exist
apart yet interrelated in a mysterious whole. Here, language lets
things show and not show. It does the work of unconcealment,
letting things conceal and reveal at the same time, letting things show
themselves as they are in their essential natures, letting things come
into their "own" and speak for themselves. This is the work of
thesis
; this is the work of "setting up in the unconcealed." As
Heidegger states, language "tells us about the nature of a thing,
oq
provided that we respect language's own nature."
But why must this setting forth of the earth happen in
such a way that the work sets itself back into it? What is
the earth that it attains to the unconcealed in just such a
manner? A stone presses downward and manifests its
heaviness. But while this heaviness exerts an opposing
pressure upon us it denies us any penetration into it. If we
attempt such a penetration by breaking open the rock, it still
does not display in its fragments anything inward that has
been disclosed. The stone has instantly withdrawn again into
the same dull pressure and bulk of its fragments. If we try
to lay hold of the stone's heaviness in another way, by
placing the stone on a balance, we merely bring the heaviness
into the form of a calculated weight. This perhaps very
precise determination of the stone remains a number, but the
weight's burden has escaped us. Color shines and wants
only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by
measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It |^ows itself only
when it remains undisclosed and unexplained.
Venturing forth in language, therefore, is "an act of violence," an
act of power and potential, and as such, speech must be approached
with care, which also means with fear and danger, for it is through
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speech that man is shaping his experience of being. But, as
Heidegger adds, words today have become "a masterless means of
communication that may be used as one pleases, as indifferent as a
means of public transport, as a street car which everyone rides in.
Everyone speaks and writes away in the language, without hindrance
41
and above all without danger ."
What we need, therefore, is a "complete opening of the human
spirit--what otherwise gets fragmented into intellect, will, heart, and
senses." We need to let the world "join itself into one in manifold
self-appropriations, letting us find in it a real dwelling place instead
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of the cold, sterile hostelry in which we presently find ourselves."
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PART TWO
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCERNS
The dead letter. The dead metaphor. It is only dead metaphors
that are taken literally, that take us in (the black magic). Language
IS always an old testament, to be made new; rules, to be broken;dead metaphor, to be made alive; literal meaning, to be made symbol-
ical; oldness of letter to be made new by the spirit. The creator
spirit stands in the grave, in the midden heap, the dunghill of
culture (as in Finnegans Wake ); breaking the seal of familiarity;
breaking the cake of custom; rolling the stone from the sepulcher;
giving the dead metaphor new life.
In psychotherapy nothing happens but an exchange of words.
New words for old; a stylistic reformation, renaissance. To be
reborn, words have to pass through death, the silence of the grave.
Admit the void, accept loss forever.
. . . Freedom in the use of
symbolism comes from the capacity to experience loss. Wisdom is
mourning; blessed are they that mourn.
Mourning the absence. Symbolism conveys both absence and
presence. To see three truths with the same mind: things are real,
unreal, and neither real nor unreal.
To redeem words, out of the market place, out of the barking,
into the silence; instead of commodities, symbols.
When silence
Blooms in the house, all the paraphernalia of our existence
Shed the twitterings of value and reappear as heraldic devices.
Verbum infans
,
the infant or ineffable word, is speech and
silence reconciled; is symbolism. 'In a symbol there is concealment
and yet revealment: hence, therefore, by silence and by speech
acting together, comes a double significance.'
Get the nothingness back into words. The aim is words with
nothing to them; words that point beyond themselves rather than to
themselves; transparencies, empty words. Empty words, corres-
ponding to the void in things.
To look not at the text but through it; to see between the lines;
to see language as lace, black on white; or white on black, as in the
sky at night, or in the space on which our dreams are traced.
Norman 0. Brown
CHAPTER V I I
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
As soon as information is acquired, it is very rapidly
replaced by still newer information. Our electrically-con-
figured world has forced us to move from the habit of data
classification to the mode of pattern recognition.
Marshall McLuhan & Quentin Fiore
Part One explored Martin Heidegger's "rethinking" of Western
man's philosophical history in an effort to unearth the possible origins
of the profound disassociation afflicting modern man. In reconsider-
ing the early Greek understanding of being, truth, thinking, and
language, Heidegger unveils a world-view that has been buried for
centuries in the West. It is upon this world-view, upon this pheno-
menological grounding, that the following expistemological discussions
proceed
.
In light of Heidegger's phenomenology, the central concerns of
this paper are addressed: What can be said about the way man
"learns to learn?" (That is, what epistemology can be advanced
based on the phenomenological work of Heidegger?) What are some of
the present linguistic contexts and processes which have evolved out
of the Western metaphysical tradition, through which man attempts to
transmit learning? How do these contexts and processes structure
man's experience of himself and the world? (That is, if we say that
modern man is alienated and disassociated from his surroundings, to
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what extent is man's experience of himself and the world as dis-
associative supported and accelerated by those linguistic contexts
through which he speaks and learns?) Broadly, what are some of the
connections that can be drawn from the preceeding discussions
regarding the relationship between language and learning?
Throughout the following discussions, it is important for the
reader to remember that the process of questioning contexts and
processes is itself a reflection of the epistemology advanced in this
study. For the "core statement" which lies at the heart of Heideg-
ger's thinking on language is that it is man's continuing failure to
reflect upon the language through which he learns to learn that
prevents him from cutting through the profound disassociation of the
day. That is, reflecting on the relationship between man and lan-
guage, by the very nature of the process of questioning, not only
can advance an alternative approach to learning, but also can trans-
port man into questioning the nature of the relationship between
being-human and being as a whole. As Marshall McLuhan and
Quentin Fiore note, the world in which modern man finds himself is a
world traveling at the "high speeds of electric communication and
circuity," and this development alone forces man to move in a new
direction with regard to learning--"from the habit of data classifica-
tion to the mode of pattern recognition." The developments of the
modern world are impressing upon man more emphatically all the time
that his former way of learning, based mainly upon an isolation of the
"visual sense" is no longer sufficient to deal with the "active
inter-
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play" present not only within the world of personal communication,
but now also within the world of technological communication.
The reader who has watched the emerging directions in
education and psychology today can't help but be struck by the
emphasis placed upon "pattern recognition," systems theory, and
context formation. Questioning the frameworks that have earmarked
Western thought for centuries, therefore, is by no means solely
Heideggerian. Not only a recognition of, but an attempted
overcoming of the traditional subject-object split has become the focal
point of most modern philsophy, especially since the blatant
subjectivist formulations of Descartes allowed man to view clearly the
world-view he was laboring under. The "stirrings" of these attempts
just now seem to be entering epistemological circles in an explicit
way, especially through the efforts of men like Gregory Bateson.
However, to the extent proposed alternatives are linguistically
formulated through contextual frameworks derived from the split
itself--frameworks fashioned upon "the law of contradiction"--efforts
to overcome the split are subsumed within the contextual frameworks
which have evolved from the split, and are consequently rendered
ineffective. This calls for nothing less than a review of the contexts
and processes through which content and contexts alike are passed.
It is here, I believe, that Heidegger's work unearths complexities
which could expand considerably man's awareness of the linguistic pit-
falls that accompany a "forgetting" of the nature of the relationship
between man and being, and subsequently between man and language.
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The beginning steps in the following exploration of epistemolo-
gical concerns include: 1) a description of the term "context" as it is
employed throughout this section; 2) the differentiation between
"primary contexts" and "secondary contexts;" and 3) a discussion of
"partial" and "impartial" expressions of being.
Context
The word "context" comes from the Latin word, contextus
,
"a
joining together, connection, order, construction." (The Latin past
participle is contextus
,
"woven together;" from contextere, "to weave
together.") For the purposes of this paper, a context refers to the
weaving or joining together of words in such a way as to present a
linguistic structure or framework through which the world and the
self are perceived and experienced. A context is simply a linguistic
form through which man "learns to learn."
Primary and Secondary Contexts
In order to explore the epistemological concerns which Heideg-
ger's phenomenology suggests and also in order to differentiate those
contexts commonly associated with traditional Western thought from
those contexts which Heidegger's rethinking of early Greek thought
unearths, I have enlisted the expressions "primary contexts" and
"secondary contexts."
With respect to Heidegger's phenomenology, then, primary con-
texts refer to those contexts which are originial--originial in the
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sense that they are those contexts from which secondary contexts
evolved. Primary contexts, therefore, include the early Greek
contexts of physis
,
noein
,
logos
,
aletheia
,
polemos
,
phainesthai
,
harmonia
,
etc. in all their linguistic interconnectedness. Primary
contexts attempt to express paradox, i.e. being ^ appearance,
setting-apart as binding-together, which is to say, primary contexts
attempt to express the motion of relational being.
Secondary contexts refer to those contexts which have been
derived from primary contexts. Secondary contexts reflect man's
reversal of the nature of the relationship between man and being,
whereby man comes to think that he, rather than being, determines
the essence of being. Secondary contexts are the expressions born
of man when he takes himself to be "the measure of all things."
As such, secondary contexts are expressions of self-contradiction.
Self-contradiction gives rise to a language of contradiction and
polemics, such as subject-object, real-ideal, and to a language of
"logic" based on truth as the merely correct.
Partial and Impartial Expressions of Being
Partial and impartial expressions of being refer to the speech of
man as it mirrors the rhythmic nature of his dwelling being, as set
forth by Heidegger.
Remember here that for Heidegger man, as being-in-the-world,
drifts and wanders from the mysterious whole to the particular and
back again throughout his earthly existence. Man wavers between
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ex-sisting and in-sisting, between will as resolve and will as purpose-
ful self-assertion, between friendship with the gods and flight. Man
faces living ^ dying and flees living as dying. Man, therefore,
"lets-be" and doesn't let-be. A recognition of this rhythmic essence
of man is important in any discussion of learning which attempts to
take its "cue" from the phenomenology of Heidegger. It is Heidegger
who emphasizes that the failure of epistemology and psychology to
acknowledge in-sistent existence as a dynamic mode of being-in-the-
world has veiled the power which resides in in-sistent existence, i.e.
2
in illusion and error.
Based on Heidegger's phenomenology of man, then, the
"speech" of man reflects both his ex-sisting and his in-sisting.
Speech reflects encounter and flight. Man, therefore, can be said to
speak ex-sistently and in-sistently . For the purposes of these dis-
cussions, I will use the words "partial" and "impartial" to refer to
those expressions of speech born of man's rhythmic essence.
Partial expressions of being refer to words born of in-sistent
existence. As discussed in Part One, man in-sists, says Heidegger,
when he mis-takes "this" and/or "that" as the entire story regarding
the essence of being. Words born of in-sisting, then, reflect man's
failure to acknowledge the "wholing" In "parting," and correspon-
dingly, the "parting" in "wholing." Partial expressions, therefore,
are expressions which present a partisan picture of being that
obscures the "Im-partial" essence of being as a whole. That is,
being is whole and multiple; it is not one-sided. Being does not
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"take sides." However, man can "takes sides," in that it is part of
man's essence to in-sist.
In that man both in-sists and ex-sists, one imagines that
language would perhaps reflect a balanced amount of "partial" and
"impartial" speech. However, in Western thought, this has not been
the case. Speech born of in-sistence has almost totally dominated the
thinking life of Western man. Compared with the "center stage"
granted "the formal-logical law of contradiction," "poeting" has been
cast as a "leisure activity" and has been relegated to the "sidelines"
of thought. Subsequently, Western man has "learned to learn" almost
exclusively through contexts born of in-sistent existence. In
An Introduction to Metaphysics
,
Heidegger states that the presence of
speech which reflects the in-sisting essence of man is not surprising,
for in-sisting is one of the modes of man's being-in-the-world . What
is surprising for Heidegger is that in-sistence and the language it
spawns should so completely come to dominate Western thought that
ex-sistence and the language of ex-sistence are totally overshadowed.
That is, words born of in-sistent existence are not to be
understood here as "wrong," if by "wrong" we think of the
traditional sense in which "right" and "wrong" have been employed.
The word "wrong," as the etymology denotes, means "a twist," while
the word "right" means "proper" in the sense of "proportion." If we
take a "hint" from this etymology, "wrong" is essentially a twisted
or
crooked rendering of "right." To wrong is to twist proportioning, to
twist the ratio or proportion of one thing to another.
Therefore,
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words and contexts born of in-sistent existence "blow things out of
proportion" by in-sisting on any part or portion as the final word,
i.e. by taking a word as only a static entity. Man "rights" and
"wrongs.
"
An in-sistence on "this" and/or "that" as the final or complete
word is merely man's attempt to flee his both essence, his essence as
both flame and cinder, his simultaneous love and fear of light and
darkness. Positing words as un-relative, i.e. objective, reflects
man's fear and objection to the relationality and relativity of his own
being. Partial or partisan speech, therefore, reflects man's fear of
his own living as dying. It is an objection to movement, an
unwillingness to mourn says Norman O. Brown. "Admit the void,
accept loss forever. . . . Freedom in the use of symbolism comes
3
from the capacity to experience loss."
It is important to remember in these discussions that when we
refer to speech which acknowledges "relationality or relativity," we
are not referring to speech that is determined by man. Quite the
contrary. Speech which acknowledges "relationality or relativity" is
precisely speech which acknowledges that it is the relational essence
of being as a whole that determines what-is. Relational or "impartial"
speech "lets" being speak. This is an understanding far removed
from a world and a language that is governed by a determining
subject. It is the determining subject who thinks that the essence of
being and truth is dependent on his perception, i.e. that the essence
and nature of being as a whole is determined by a part,
and it is
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this "reversal of roles" that spawns the traditional secondary contexts
of subjectivism and relativism.
Moreover, in that man wavers between partial and impartial
expressions of being, it is not an easy task to question whether a
word is born of ownership or flight. In day-to-day conversation, it
is difficult enough trying to discern whether a person is "speaking"
or merely "talking." Such discernment often requires a long relation-
ship through which each "part-ner" comes to know the "whole" of the
other, and can then more easily perhaps differentiate those essential
and counterfeit words which comprise all relationships. At other
times, however, a long relationship only clouds fine tuning; then only
the surprise of unfamiliarity awakens sensitive discernment. "Let us
be clear about this from the start: it can never be objectively
determined whether anyone, whether we, really ask this question,
that is whether we make the leap, or never get beyond a verbal
formula.
Therefore, whether a word is essential or counterfeit, partial or
impartial, is often "untranslatable like the address."
The pure and the ordinary are both equally something said.
Hence the word as word never gives any direct guarantee as
to wheter it is an essential word or a counterfeit. On the
contrary--an essential word often looks in its simplicity like
an unessential one. And on the other hand that which is
dressed up to look like the essential, is only something
recited by heart or repeated. Therefore language must con-
stantly present itself in an appearance which it itself attests,
and hence endanger what is most characteristic of it, the
genuine saying.
The question under discussion here, then, is not whether to
employ
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the word logos rather than the word "logic," although the two words
express very different world-views, but whether words in themselves
can be released from the acquired partiality which accompanies them,
regardless of the name. For words, like all things which come into
being, offering limits whereby presencing begins, are inherently
impartial . That is, words conceal and reveal simultaneously. Words
hide and show at the same time. Words acquire partial or partisan
leanings when man takes the concealing aspect as the whole story
regarding the essence of language.
However, as Heidegger adds, it is the concealing aspect of
things that accounts for man's "being deceived." "Only because
appearance itself deceives can it deceive man and lead him into
illusion." That is, it is the concealing aspect of being itself which
presents man with the possibility of error. Therefore, the task of
man as gatherer, for Heidegger, is to continually wrest being as
appearance from the mask of setting-apart which being itself
presents.
This section proceeds, then, upon the twofold essence of
language. Like any "thing" which gathers and assembles being into
place, acquiring the limits of form whereby presencing begins,
language conceals and reveals simultaneously. This essence consti
tutes its inherent wholeness or impartiality. When man "owns" his
own essence as concealment and revealment, i.e. when man aligns
himself with the essence of being as a whole, man "speaks" impar-
tially, and being is "let-shown" as it is in all its relationality .
Here,
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for Heidegger, man does the "work" of "gathering" and "unconceal-
ment." And it is through this "work" that man apprehends and
learns. Man encounters being through speech which has aligned
itself with the essence of being. Therefore, to the extent the
essence of being is veiled through language, language cloaks the
paradoxical mystery of being: setting-apart js binding-together.
Here, then, language contributes to a learning that can only be called
"partial .
"
The task of the man who attempts to work with language,
therefore, is itself twofold: 1 ) to divest words of the acquired
partialities and partisan cloakings which obscure the nature and
essence of language as a "thing" that both conceals and reveals,
covers and shows, so that language is able 2) to express the multiple
realities of impartial and relational being, for it is this expression
which lets things-that-are show themselves as they are. And when
things are allowed to "assert their own selfhood, their own multipli-
city of relations," to use Robert Langbaum's phrase, man encounters
not only the essence of being as a whole, but also the essence of his
own being in all its relationality
.
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CHAPTER VIII
ADVANCING AN ALTERNATE EPISTEMOLOGY
Whatever we see when awake is changing--which is to say,
there is coalescence everywhere and at every moment between
some aspects of things dying and some other aspects of
things being born and rising to greater power. It is only by
looking clearly and boldly into the ever-present fact of
universal death--the death of what is familiar and the birth of
something alien--that we can escape the net of self-delusion.
The only valid method of inquiry is to renounce one's
illusions of permanence and to throw one's lot unreservedly in
with the vagaries of the changing world.
Philip Wheelwright
Being expands through dividing, thus every family divides to
multiply. Divisions and differentiations extend the essential possi-
bilities within being and rescue man from one-dimensionality. The
Eskimo, for example, who has twenty or more different expressions to
characterize the textures of snow and ice, experiences snow in its
potential variety and multiplicity.
However, the codetermining dimension of division, which is
acknowledged in the primary contexts of physis and polemos , and
forgotten in the secondary contexts of polemics and polarization, is
that every setting-apart is at once a binding-together. Every
parting is a simultaneous wholing. Physis and polemos , the primary
contexts out of which polemics and polarization eventually arose, were
metaphors that expressed the dif-ference, the rift, whereby separate
things not only come to be, but come to be one with each
other. As
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Octavio Paz states, "all of us are alone, because all of us are two."
Therefore, in the same way a man and a woman come together to
divide, a man and a woman divide to come together. Every "thing"
simultaneously conceals and reveals.
An epistemology is implicit in this phenomenological ground.
That is, man's ability to learn rests upon the twofold essence of
being as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously. It is upon
the twofold essence of being that the primary contexts of learning,
knowing, comprehending, apprehending, and rationality lie grounded.
Proceeding upon this phenomenological ground, then, what can
we say about the way man "learns to learn?" First, we can begin by
stating that man learns through dividing and joining, through
setting-apart and binding-together, through differences and similari-
ties. Additionally, however, in that dividing is joining (in that being
is appearance), man learns through acknowledging each ^ each. We
can say man learns, therefore, through recognizing the sameness
present in difference, and conversely, the difference present in
sameness. This is simply to say that learning requires a recognition
of motion. "... the moving world can only be known by what is in
1
motion," states Heraclitus.
Specifically, learning requires a recognition of the motion of
appropriation; how the one comes into its own through the other.
For it is in recognizing the motion of each as each, the ever-present
motion of relational being, that things are kn-own as they are.
Learning takes place, then, when man relates to that in which
he is
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ultimately and totally related, i.e. when man "stands out into" the
being that he js. Therefore, it is man's encounter with being as a
whole that informs his ability to learn. Learning necessitates being.
".
. .we come to know reality not by merely knowing about it, but
2by becoming of its nature."
Consequently, when man comes to think that he learns only
through dividing or only through joining, man only learns "half the
story," so to speak, or more accurately said, a part of the story, in
that the "twofold" is a metaphor for multiplicity. If, in discerning
difference, man does not recognize the sameness (the motion of
saming) present in all difference, and likewise, if, in discerning
sameness, man does not recognize the difference (the motion of
differing) present in all sameness, his learning is partial and partisan
rather than impartial and whole.
In partial learning, it is difficult to discern just what part of
the story man does learn, or if we can truly speak of man "learning"
at all. For to say that man learns only "part" of the story in
acknowledging solely difference or sameness as the whole story is not
to say that in acknowledging difference to the exclusion of sameness,
man then learns well the essence or "part" of difference. As we just
noted, difference and sameness cannot be understood rightly apart
from one another. Therefore, in acknowledging either one to the
exclusion of the other, man learns neither rightly.
Similarly, Heidegger has noted that man's ex-sisting essence
has suffered just as deeply as his in-sisting essence at the hands of
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traditional apistemology's long-standing failure to acknowledge the
latter as "part" of the twofold essence of man's very being. Modern
man's emerging suspicions that the man who is unable to hate is
equally unable to love, and that the man who refuses to own his
dying doesn't really live either, are about the closest he has come to
acknowledging the inseparable relationship between being and
learning
.
The realization, then, is that in learning parts apart from the
whole
,
man doesn't even learn the parts well. In essence, man
doesn't learn. Man, instead, acquires fragments, which are simply
parts whose relation to being-as-a-whole has been obscured. The
word "fragment" comes from the Latin frangere meaning "to break." A
fragment refers to "a broken piece; a part broken off." Like
children, parts that do not know their closest relations become
orphans. Metaphorically, fragments are orphans whose parents and
relatives are unkn-own . As such, they offer man partial and
partisan realities through veiling the part the "part" plays in the
whole, and also through veiling the part the "whole" plays in the
part. And once parts are unrecognized in their relationship to the
whole, parts (as fragments) act to block further man's view of the
interrelationship of all things.
Therefore, it is the veiling of impartial relationality with partial
and partisan contexts and processes that lies at the heart of modern
man's experience of being as fragmented and deathlike--as decadent.
Decadence arises, notes Havelock Ellis, from processing that subor-
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dinates the whole to the part, from processing that subordinates the
impartial to the partial. This echoes Heidegger's characterization of
the nihilistic age as a time when men "ask" after the being of things
rather than the being of things. The nihilistic age is a time when
man no longer recognizes the parts in relation to being as a whole.
Man s continuing failure to own and therefore to know each
thing as relational is a learning disability which merely reflects and
mirrors man's flight from his own relationality
. Fragmented things
and words simply echo man's in-sistent break with being.
Unfortunately, fragments are like broken glass. Once broken,
reflections are less clear, and man has an even harder time
discerning that words, like glass, don't fragment by themselves. It
requires the in-sistence of man.
Partial processes in languaging and learning, then, are only
mirrors of man's partiality towards his own living as dying. As Hei-
degger notes, it is firstly man's forgotten relation to being which
underscores man's misrelation to language. Man's recasting of same-
ness or difference as the whole story in a word or a world,
therefore, is simply a shadow of man's casting of sameness or
difference as the whole story in himself . Every questioning is a
project, states Heidegger, and when not "owned" as a self-project,
the project becomes a projection (in the psychological sense) that, in
turn, obscures man's view of the interrelatedness of all things.
Man's ability to learn, therefore, involves man's encounter with his
own twofold essence.
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Only man can own or not own himself as relation; only man, so
far as we know, ex-sists and in-sists. That is, man, like all things
which come into being and have form is "gathered." Man,
additionally, however, is "a gatherer." Man holds hands, does jigsaw
puzzles, and connects words. Man likes to see the parts fit; to see
the sections, the sexes, join in being. As Heidegger says, gathering
for man is "a need." This means that man not only is relation, but
also that there is an "essential need" In man to "gather" or
understand relation. Learning for man involves gathering,
unearthing each as each, connecting one in the other
,
which is simply
to say that learning for man means being what one in essence is: a
gatherer. To say that learning necessitates being, therefore, and to
say that learning requires recognizing the motion of each as each are
simply alternate ways of saying that learning for man involves man
owning himself as relational. Learning for man involves gathering
what is permanently gathered, togethering what is always together,
relating to that in which one is ultimately related. Learning requires
man's alignment with being.
Consequently, the man who owns only his saming or differing,
only his living or dying, only his wholing or parting, only his loving
or hating, not only owns just part of his story, but he also only
learns and knows part of history . (Already the intimate
interrelationship between epistemology and psychology is apparent.)
As Heidegger recognizes, language "houses" the story of man. Lan-
guage forms an historical record of man's ex-sisting and in-sisting
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dwelling within being. History is a record of ownership; a record of
how man has "learned to learn,"
In this light, knowing is the "ability to learn." Heidegger
states
;
But to know means: to be able to stand in the truth.
Truth is the manifestness of the essent. To know is
accordingly the ability to stand (stehen) in the manifestness
of the essent, to endure (bestehen) it. IV^rely to have
information, however abundant, is not to know.
As the etymology denotes, "to learn" is "to become full, to become
unbound, to be left remaining, to become whole, to become awake."
The primary contexts of learning, knowing, comprehending, appre-
hending, therefore, acknowledge the necessity of contending with the
motion of being--a contending through which man becomes full,
unbound, whole, awake, which is to say, a contending through which
man learns.
To comprehend means "to bring together." When man compre-
hends, he learns that setting-apart, parting, differing, are not the
final words regarding being, but simply metaphors for the differing
motion which is at once the saming motion of togethering,
to-gathering, wholing. It is not surprising to find, then, that one of
the meanings of "to learn" is "to become unbound," for when man
learns that the boundaries between things are the "parts" through
which presencing, wholing, joining, togethering beg in, man becomes
"unbound." Heraclitus says that men comprehend when they
are
"guided by what is common to all." And it is the same being-motion,
the same "inhuman will," as D. H. Lawrence calls it,
that is common
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to all. Men who comprehend, therefore, "bring together" that which
is permanently together by letting what is together or "common to all"
show itself in its commonality or togetherness. This is simply another
way of saying that men comprehend by owning each as each, by
becoming the gatherers they in essence are. Learning rests upon
appropriation; apprehension and comprehension reside in being.
Subsequently, learning, apprehending, comprehending, ratio-
nality, and knowing, as primary contexts of epistemology, are not
attributes that man possess, no more than being is an attribute that
man possesses. Like being, learning and rationality are the
happenings which "have" man. Man is rational, then, when he
acknowledges the nature of the relationship in which being, not man,
determines the essence of being. Man is rational when he encounters
the determined ratio or relation of parts and portions to whole, i.e
when he encounters the order and fit of each as each. Speech born
of rationality acknowledges ratio and relation as being, and as such,
it is through rational or being-related speech, through essential
words and impartial expressions of being, that man apprehends and
learns. Learning necessitates the motion of being, no less in
languaging than in living.
Lastly, the primary contexts of learning are implicit in the
primary contexts of being. Epistemology proceeds from the essence
of being, whether acknowledged or not. Subsequently, a change in
ontological contexts brings about a change in epistemological contexts.
This simply means that when man's thinking about the nature of being
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alters, man's ideas (i.e. language) about the way man "learns to
learn" alters as well. The secondary contexts of language and
learning that are discussed in the next chapter, therefore, rest upon
the secondary contexts of being which were discussed in Part One.
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CHAPTER I X
SECONDARY CONTEXTS OF LEARNING
Whenever there is a breakthrough of a significant idea in
science or a significant new form in art, the new idea will
destroy what a lot of people believe is essential to the sur-
vival of their intellectual and spiritual world. This is the
source of guilt in genuine creative work. As Picasso re-
marked, 'Every act of creation is first of all an act of
destruction .
'
Rollo May
Picasso's statement that acts of creation are at once acts of
destruction expresses the intent of this chapter. Acknowledging
creating as simultaneously a destructuring signals the twofold essence
of being present in every form and gesture, and in every word.
Moreover, creating which does not acknowledge its inherent
destructuring gives rise to structures which tend to shroud the
twofold essence of being present in all things.
The German language has two words for destruction, Destruk-
tion and Zerstorung . The former word refers to a destructuring
which creates through de-structuring the rigid structures which act
to conceal the concealing and revealing structure and fit of being.
This is the word Heidegger chooses in speaking of his proposed
destruction or de-structuring of traditional metaphysics. The latter
word, Zerstorung
,
refers to a destruction that does not acknowledge
the relationality between destruction and creation. Zerstorung con-
ceives destruction as only an end.
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With this differentiation in mind, this chapter is to be under-
stood as an attempted de-structuring of those linguistic contexts that
shroud the simultaneous concealing and revealing essence of language.
Learning necessitates unlearning, for learning, like all things, is a
simultaneous gain and loss. Learning is the "coincidence" of
coming-to-be and passing-away
. As George Bernard Shaw states,
"whenever you learn something, it seems as if you've lost something."
This chapter, then, stresses the learning processes which
underlie the secondary contexts of learning familiar to Western man,
such as polarization, subjectivism, objectivism, idealism, relativism,
rationalism, positivism, compartmentalization, specialization, standard-
ization, categorization, etc. Much has been written in modern
literature about these secondary contexts, however much of what is
written treats these contexts as if they were "products" that need
only be denied to be rendered impotent. Outdated metaphors are
often treated like rotten apples that merely require disposal. Both
denunciation and dismissal, however, only tend to feed further the
illusions that 1) language is an object or product rather than an
expression of relationality
,
and 2) man can "will" destiny (i.e. being)
by merely saying "yes" and "no" to certain metaphors.
In other words, denunciation and disposal not only feed the
"throw-away" or "disposal mentality" symptomatic of the times, but
underlying this, they feed that which they are trying to overcome:
the excess of will. They express further the dominance of will as
purposeful self-assertion, will as in-sistence. In this process, then.
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words not only become scapegoats for deeper and more personal
issues, but the process itself exacerbates the overdetermism that is
so representative of the disassociative Zeitgeist
.
Furthermore, as Jacob Bronowski states in The Ascent of Man
,
"civilization is not a collection of artefacts, it is an elaboration of
1
processes." Being is not a consumer product; it is an ongoing
motion which disposes itself to man through things. Things are the
figures and forms through which the motioning of being takes place.
Lastly, the reader is reminded that the order of presentation in
this chapter does not mean to suggest a sequence. There is no
sequential way to write what follows, for a discussion of processes is
not an elaboration on that which is sequential by nature, but an
elaboration on that which is "coincidental" by nature. The etymology
of the word "coincidence" means "the falling together of all incidents
and events." It is a word which explicitly expresses the
interrelatedness and interdependence of all things. Therefore, in the
following discussion, the secondary contexts of subjectivism and
objectivism are to be understood as events of coincidence which
simultaneously feed and starve each other , as do the secondary
contexts of rationalism and irrationalism, idealism and realism, etc.
For once the paradox of being is recast linguistically as contradiction,
the semblance of a sequence only veils further the simultaneous
multiplicity of being.
The Contradicting Process
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The novel is a kind of summary and paradigm of our cultural
life, which is perhaps why we speak sooner of its death than
of the death of any other form of thought. It has been of all
literary forms the most devoted to the celebration and inves-
tigation of the human will; and the will of our society is
dying of its own excess. The religious will, the political will,
the sexual will, the artistic will--each is dying of its own
excess.
Lionel Trilling
The secondary contexts of learning discussed in this chapter
have evolved out of a thinking that bases its questioning upon what
Norman O. Brown calls "the formal-logical law of contradiction,"
rather than upon the early sense of paradoxa which characterized
early Greek thought. In the transformation from being as
appearance to being and appearance, the primary context of paradoxa
which says "two things depend on each other for their very
existence" gives way to the secondary context of contradiction which
says "two things cannot be equally true." According to this new
metaphysics, being is not always appearing, and appearing is not
always being. It is here, in the inversion of paradox to
contradiction, that polemos becomes polemics. For once the motion of
each ^ each is veiled, "authentic conflict ceases,
converted into mere
polemics."^ The contradicting process, therefore, is a partial
expression of the impartial relationality expressed in paradox. The
dualism of polemics is a partial expression of the twofold essence of
being. If learning necessitates the motion of being, the motion
of
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each as each, and this motion is now veiled under a linguistic
shroud, then learning itself is partial.
The etymology of the word "contradiction" means "against 'to
speak,' to speak against." In stating that two things cannot be
equally true, contradiction speaks against "to speak." Contradiction
speaks against the motion of gathering ("the speaking of the logos ")
through positing differing as the final word regarding the twofold
essence of being. In this positing, then, the language of contradic-
tion contextually turns being completely around: what-is is cast as
what-is-not. This linguistic inversion accomplishes the epistemological
problematization of being: being-as-mystery becomes being-as-
problem.
The process of contradicting underlying linguistic dualism
inverts the paradoxical essence of differing as saming to differing as
not saming. This linguistic (and, therefore, historical) positing
advances contexts and processes of differing without saming and
saming without differing at all levels of being. Dualistically con-
strued linguistic contexts multiply: realism-idealism, subject-object,
appearance-reality, essence-existence, being-action, being-becoming,
rational-irrational, will-passion, thought-action, and so on. The list,
as we know, is endless. Once based on a process of contradicting,
rather than a process of paradoxing, words no longer express the
impartial "twofold," but now only a partial "two." In a word, alter-
nations become alternatives.
Specifically, then, it is the linguistic veiling of relational motion
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through a process of contradicting (which states "two things cannot
be equally true") that gives rise to the secondary contexts of
difference and sameness (now as detachment and uniformity) familiar
to Western man.
Subsequently, a process of differing which attempts to multiply
and divide without acknowledging the inherent saming (gathering,
wholing) present in all multiplication and division gives rise to
contexts which express differing as the entire story regarding the
twofold essence of being. This process underlies all forms of
polarization, and gives rise to such common secondary contexts as
categorization, specialization, compartmentalization, separatism, and
individualism. Similarly, a process of saming which attempts to bring
together without acknowledging the inherent differing present in all
connection gives rise to such secondary contexts as uniformity,
equality, standardization, centralism, universalism, conformity, and
fusion. Once again, the reader is reminded that language is a mirror
for an underlying process, and as such, it is not so much the words
that are being rethought, but rather those processes which have
spawned them. Too often, words are "framed," which is to say, too
often words "take the rap" for a more powerful underworld.
Two of the processes which "frame" words and accompany the
inversion of paradox to contradiction are 1) either-or processing, and
2) the "see-saw" phenomenon.
The secondary contexts of differing and saming advance dif-
those motions which have nothing in common.fering and saming as
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The underlying "each ^ each" acknowledged in an expression of
paradox is recast as "either-or" in the contradicting process.
Either-or processing asks whether a thing is subject or object,
rational o£ irrational, real or ideal, being or appearance. Man then
starts asking, for example, whether truth and being are in man (i.e.
subjective) 0£ in the world (i.e. objective).
This kind of either-or questioning represents and accelerates
the detachment of man, not only from his surroundings but also from
his own projective thought. That is, either-or processing contributes
to hiding the interrelationship between being and apprehension, thus
veiling further the damage that occurs when man tries to separate
himself from his ability to learn, think, and project.
This obfuscation gives rise to such classical problems as this
one: if a tree falls in the forest, and there is no being around (or,
more broadly, no ear), is there a sound? Such a question can only
arise in a world of detached thought, where the interdependence
between man and being as a whole is forgotten. As Karsten Harries
has noted, "the disengaged way of understanding is not more
3
fundamental than one which is engaged, but derived from it."
Present detachments only point to prior bonds.
All things are like the rainbow, for there is no phenomenon
'rainbow' except where there is a certain relationship of sun,
moisture in the atmosphere, and observer. The rainbow is
'void' because it has no independent existence of its own.
But in Chinese thought it was seen that this is true of every-
thing, including the observer. . . . But man cuts himself off
from it and loses the sense of his original body by consider-
ing himself as an 'I' which h^ these experiences, standing
back from them just as one looks at a picture.
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Primarily then, either-or processing acts to obscure the realization
that the contradicting process in language simply mirrors self-contra-
diction : the detachment of man from his perceptions.
Self-contradiction advances the detachment of one of the
senses--the visual one. Man becomes "the detached observer," "the
passive spectator." "The detached observer is also the major premise
of the Lockean or Cartesian mind, waxen tablet for passive
impressions: 'The mistake in empiricist theories of perception has
been the representation of human beings as passive observers
5
receiving impressions from the outside.' "
'The principal reason which Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and others
assign for the fact that primitives do not perceive with the
same minds' as ours, is that in the act of perception, they
are not detached, as we are.' Primitive participation, parti-
cipation mystique
,
is self and not-self Identified in the
moment of experience. 'Primitive mentality' involves participa-
tion; an extrasensory link between the percipient and the
perceived; a telepathy which we have disowned.
However, as Norman O. Brown adds, it is not upon participation and
closeness that modern representative institutions are based, but
rather upon distance, upon keeping "the multitude in remote contact
with reality."
Representative institutions depend upon the distance
separating the spectators from the actor on the stage; the
distance which permits both identification and detachment;
which makes for a participation without action; which
establishes the detached observer, whose participation
consists in seeing and is restricted to seeing; whose body is
restricted to the eyes. Everything which is merely seen is
seen through a windowpane, distantly; and purely: a pure
aesthetic experience. Representative institutions depend upon
the aesthetic illusion of distance.
That is, the primary contexts of saming and differing, which
acknow-
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ledged each as each, the participation mystique
,
give way to a
"vicarious" experience of saming and differing, through the secondary
contexts of identification and detachment. For once man is cast as
"the detached observer," cast as that animal whose ability to learn is
based on distance from his own relational being, all experiencing
becomes vicarious . Man becomes the voyeur . Man now learns
through copying, imitating, aping what he sees, through the
correspondence or agreement of "internal image and external reality."
Cognition based on correspondence as agreement, rather than
correspondence as "active participation," allows man to identify with
what he likes, and detach or distance himself from what he doesn't
like.
The distinction between self and not-self is made by the
childish decision to claim all that the ego likes as 'mine,' and
to repudiate all that the ego dislikes as 'not-mine.' . . . Here
is the fall: the distinction between 'good' and 'bad,' between
'mine' and 'thine,' between 'me' and 'thee' (or 'it'), . . . The
aim of the possessive orientation is to keep the loved object
entire and intact: to separate and keep the good, to separatg
and expel the bad. An either/or or undialectical attitude.
The "either-or" framework, therefore, allows man "vicarious satis-
faction." It allows man the secondary contexts of identification and
detachment, through which man can voyeuristically take part in that
which he flees: each as each. Although now, man, as Emerson
states, is only "a dwarf" of his former self, and identification and
detachment are merely "shrunken vestiges" of the twofold essence of
being wherein sameness is difference. However, as Marshall McLuhan
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notes, these "shrunken vestiges" are not meeting "the need" of man-
as-gatherer, and young people now are searching out ways "for
putting on the universe -- participation mystique ," rather than "for
ways of relating themselves to the world.
Either-or processing, therefore, acts to obscure the relation-
ality of all things to one another not only by advancing differing and
saming as two distinct and separate realities, but by advancing them
as entities which man can will to have or not to have.
Furthermore, either-or processing veils language as man's expression
of "gathering" or "letting-show" the relationality of being. Here,
words are "framed" as rigid and separate. They, too, are born of
distance ; and they, too, become a screen of idols which allows man to
experience existence vicariously.
When any favorite pair of alternatives becomes so stereotyped
that all our questions (however apparently free and far-
ranging they may be) are asked in terms of that particular
'either-or,' or are asked as covertly presupposing it, that is
equivalent to saying that an Idol of the Theater has grown up
and taken possession, usually unconscious possession, of our
minds.
"Idols of the Theater" is Francis Bacon's metaphor for the iconesque
quality that language acquires through the either-or framing of
words. For once words are seen through a grid of alternatives,
rather than understood as an expression of alternation, they lose
what Philip Wheelwright calls their "plurisignative" quality of being
able to challenge the reader to experience more than one direction at
a time.^^ That is, either-or processing tends to obscure the active
interplay of relational being by forcing man to "talk" from only one
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point of view at a time. This obscures the twofold essence of
language as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously, where
that which is said always signals that which is "unsaid though
spoken .
"
The veilment of the essence of language through either-or
processing gives rise to discussions in which two people need to take
opposing viewpoints in order to experience "both sides" of every
question. For example, a man who finds himself speaking with
someone of a "liberal" persuasion may experience himself inexplicably
wanting to "take up" the "conservative" banner (even if he shares
the other person's viewpoint). Similarly, that same man, when faced
with an expression of a "conservative" view, may find himself moving
towards the "liberal" end of the spectrum. While unconsciously
flagging the nature of being as relational (in that the relational whole
determines the "part" man takes), such "taking of sides" mirrors the
daily dilemmas which arise when language is cast into "either-or"
frameworks that stand at the end of man's will. Here, words are
taken only literally
,
one-dimensionally
,
historiographically ; multiple
meaning reduced to uniform or single meaning, reduced to "conscious
12
meaning: intentio auctoris
,
the author's intention."
Literal-mindedness conceals the twofold essence of language. It
conceals the symbolic essence of language as "the union and
interpenetration of the universal and the particular," to borrow a
phrase from Coleridge. And once the multiple meanings inherent in
each word are obscured, the word "differ" comes to mean literally or
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difference, and the word "same" comes to mean only sameness.
Man then imagines that he must speak (i.e. will) the opposite word to
achieve the "participation" he craves. Life now becomes "problematic"
for man is constantly trying (i.e. willing) "to go where he thinks he
isn't." "... life is problematic and 'fallen' so long as it seems that
there is a real choice between the opposites.
This brings us to a discussion of the see-saw phenomenon
,
the
expression I use to describe man's "taking of linguistic sides," his
continual "standing on one foot and then another" approach to
meeting his "need" for a sense of wholeness and balance.
Once the relational motion expressed in a language which
acknowledges the twofold essence of words is hidden beneath a cloak
of literal expressions, man is confined with rigidity. "Literalism
makes a universe of stone, and men astonished, petrified." It
produces words which are "stone maidens," and men bewitched from
1
5
hypnotic spectatorship . The "see-saw phenomenon" offers a
semblance of motion to men rigid with distance.
As approached in the example above, once saming ^ differing
is filtered through an "either-or" framework, whereby "each" becomes
only one, man then reasons that an overemphasis on one can only be
"healed" or "wholed" by an overemphasis on the other . Man reasons
not only that "wholeness" can be willed, but that movement itself is
dependent upon the will of man. The "see-saw phenomenon," there-
fore, is merely another expression of will as purposeful
self-assertion, another manifestation of the contradicting process.
248
Essentially, then, once the saming of differing (oppositing) is
obscured, opposites are cast as those things which have nothing in
common, rather than as those things which depend on each other for
their very existence. This contextual framing advances a "partial"
view of being as only difference, i.e. as only detached,
disassociated, unrelated. In this advancement, man no longer
experiences the "saming" of all that differs, and becomes overwhelmed
with "bits and pieces," with fragments. Man experiences a gnawing
alienation and fragmentation.
Moreover, in an effort to overcome the experience of
fragmentation and disassociation
,
man advances a "saming" which fails
to acknowledge its inherent "differing." Then man experiences being
as uniform and standard, and becomes in-different
,
apathetic, bored.
Man is overwhelmed by a sameness that is only sameness.
(Interestingly, the word "apathy" is from the Greek apatheia and
means "without suffering." Man becomes apathetic and in-different
when he refuses to mourn, when he refuses to suffer the "differing"
inherent in saming. Man becomes in-different when he refuses "to
accept loss.") In an attempt to release himself from the boredom of
uniformity, from indifference, man then advances a differing that fails
to acknowledge saming. The willed circle begins again.
For once differing as saming is divided and juxtaposed, not
only are secondary contexts of differing and saming advanced, under
the names "detachment" and "uniformity or identification," but man
reasons that an overemphasis on one is corrected ^ willing the
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other. Man reasons that detachment is "healed" through uniformity,
and, similarly, that uniformity is "healed" through detachment. On
the "see-saw" born of contradiction, processes of saming without
differing feed processes of differing without saming, and vice versa.
Partial expressions of being breed partial expressions of being.
This discussion now looks at some examples of "the see-saw
phenomenon." In the first example, the secondary contexts of ratio-
nalism and irrationalism are chosen (although almost any dualistically-
framed words can be inserted).
Once the words rationalism and irrationalism have been cast as
two words which have nothing in common, man reasons that he
reduces an overemphasis on rationalism through stressing
irrationalism, and vice versa, not realizing, firstly, that irrationalism
is an outg rowth of rationalism, and secondly, that rationalism, as a
secondary context, refers to a reasoning that does not acknowledge
the ratio or relation of "each ^ each." As such, the traditional
sense of rationalism as reason (i.e. as a tool that man "possesses" for
the attainment of information) is itself a partial expression of the
impartial relationality of ratio-nality in that it does not acknowledge
the "ratio" of part-ing to being as a whole. Therefore, the dualistic
contexts of rationalism and irrationalism are secondary contexts born
of the contradicting process. Subsequently, to emphasize
irrationalism to reduce rationalism only "entangles" man rnore in a
partial expression of being as rationalism.
Irrationalism is only the obvious weakness and failure of
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rationalism and hence itself a kind of rationalism. Irrational-
ism is a way out of rationalism, an escape which does not lead
into the open but merely entangles us more in rationalism,
because it gives rise to the opinion that we can overcome
rationalism by merely saying no to it, whereas this only
makes its ^igachinations the more dangerous by hiding them
from view.
The "see-saw phenomenon" is "more dangerous" because it obfuscates
further that it is man's will or in-sistence, his self-contradiction,
which lies at the base of dualism and contradiction in language.
Therefore, willing harder to overcome the excesses of will entangles
man more and more in the illusion that it is man who determines the
essence and nature of being as a whole. This characterizes the
constriction of will as purposeful self-assertion into its most extreme
form: the will to will.
A similar example is found in modern man's efforts to undercut
the chaos and confusion of the day through "narrowing down,"
through specialization. Caught in contradictory frameworks of
thinking, man reasons that he can avoid the confusion that abounds
by becoming more precise and more specific. Chaos and confusion,
however, are born of man's failure to recognize the "saming" that is
present in the complex and multiple aspects of being. It is in failing
to recognize the "belonging-together" inherent in expansion that all
things are viewed as fragmented, unrelated. Therefore, in
approaching expansion as fragmentation only, man reasons, firstly,
that confusion comes through expansion, and secondly, that
the
confusion of expansion can be reduced through "willing" the
opposite
of expansion: narrowing down. Man wills "narrowing down"
processes
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in an effort to reduce the confusion that he feels is a result of
expanding out" processes. The confusion, however, comes from a
failure to see both expansion and reduction as "twofold" processes.
Ironically, then, it is secondary contexts of specificity and
precision (which fail to acknowledge their inherent expansion) that
give rise to the confusion man is trying to combat. That is to say,
attempts to decrease confusion through the secondary context of
specialization only increase confusion. Partial expressions of being
feed partial expressions of being. Partial expressions of being
ensnare man in partiality by failing to acknowledge the "twofold"
essence of language, where expansion or multiplication is that through
which simple joining and ordering occur.
Consequently, the "Catch-22" that accompanies the contradicting
process is this: man accomplishes what he wills to avoid . That is,
in linguistic inversion (which is an expression of man's inversion of
the nature of his relationship within being), reversion takes place .
Why? Because paradox expresses the essence and nature of
being, whether recognized or not. "The paradox of life is inborn
17 . •
and not socially determined." Being determines beings, says
Heidegger. Being as a whole is "the measure and order" of things,
and not man. Therefore, being doesn't buckle under criticism, nor
negation, nor flight, which is to say, being is not dependent upon
the will of man. The "inhuman will" subsumes "human will." The
relational ambiguity (Latin ambigere , means "to drive both ways") of
being continues regardless of man's positing to the opposite, regard
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less of man's failure to recognize the nature of his relationship to
being as a whole. Paradox overrules contradiction.
Linguistic contradiction does not alter the motion of relational
being, no more than self-contradiction alters man's living as dying.
Therefore, for example, in man's attempt to flee living as dying
,
by
trying "to separate and keep the good, to separate and expel the
bad," man ends up facing a deathlike existence, for in his flight from
one, man is in flight from both . Then, adds Norman 0. Brown, "the
prevailing forms of knowledge, are ruled by the instinct of aggression
1
8
and division, are under the dominion of the death instinct."
The question, then, is; "How is 'the dominion of death' over-
come?" Depth psychology answers by stating that man "heals" or
"wholes" by facing what he flees. History answers with what is
called "the homeopathic principle," similia similibus curantur , like is
1
9
cured, healed, wholed, by like. Similarly, Martin Heidegger begins
his search into the nihilism of the day by asking the question of the
nothing. "Only by asking the question of the nothing can nihilism be
countered . And Norman 0. Brown states that a revitalization of
"the dead metaphor" calls for man to "get the nothingness back into
words." Therefore, if it is the relational motion of living as dying
that man flees, through positing "each as each" as "either-or, it is
the relational motion of each ^ each that he must face to
reduce his
experience of existence as alienated, fragmented, and cold.
For, as Heidegger has pointed out, when man's projects are no
longer owned as self-projects, i.e. when the motion between being
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and apprehension is forgotten, man divorces himself from his percep-
tions. Language mirrors self-contradiction, distancing, flight. The
language of contradiction then becomes a defense against encountering
the motion of relational being, and therefore a defense against a
speaking which acknowledges the "nothing" present in all words.
Accordingly, learning becomes a defense against learning.
The external enemy is (part of) ourselves, projected; our
own badness, banished. The only defense against an internal
danger is to make it an external danger: then we can fight
it; and are ready to fight it, since we have suc^eded in
deceiving ourselves into thinking it is no longer us.
Here, language becomes a scapegoat for deeper realities, for through
the language of contradiction, man starts "talking of the danger/as if
it were not ourselves," to borrow a phrase from the poet Adrienne
Rich
.
Nonetheless, man and language are in a vital, ongoing
relationship in which language, like being, is "maiden and master" of
man. The language man degrades, therefore, becomes the language
which in turn degrades man. Language, like being, determines man's
experience of being. That is, language determines learning and
behavior, for language [s action, and behavior stems from what is
said and how it is said.^^ Therefore, the contradicting process and
the frameworks it spawns not only symbolize but also perpetuate the
"split" of self-contradiction within man.
Peep: When tyranny is restored we'll call it discipline and
liberty. The misfortune of one is the happiness of
gll_ ^ ^ _ Our reason will be founded on anger.
And there'll be soup kitchens for all.
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Crowd: Long live Mother Peep!
. , .
Peep: Objectivity is subjective in the para-scientific age.
They'll be stupid, that means intelligent. Cowardly,
that means brave. Clear-sighted, that means blind.
. . . We'll march backwards and be in the forefront
of history. ... If an ideology doesn't apply to real
life, we'll say it does and it'll be perfect.
. . . We'll
replace the my^s ... by slogans
. . . and the
latest platitudes!
The Idealizing Process
We've made a great mess of love
Since we made an ideal of It.
D.H. Lawrence, "The Mess of Love"
The devolution of being as appearance to being and appearance
(idea and semblance) to being or appearance constitutes a devolution
of language from archetype to prototype to stereotype. In Heideg-
gerian phenomenology, this constitutes the movement of language from
logos to "logic," which, in more traditional language, is the movement
of language from symbol (the coalescence of the particular and the
universal) to symptom (i.e. when language mirrors the demands of
the ego--an expression of what Freud called reaction-formation).
An archetype, according to its etymology, is an "original
figure, primal form, organic pattern or mold." Archetypes are the
primal forms and organic patterns from which copies are made and
subsequent formations evolve. A prototype is, etymologically, "the
first copy or type," while a stereotype is "a hard and stiff copy or
type." A stereotype was originally a solid plate for printing copies.
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As the expression of being moves from an expression of the
archetypal, organic unity of living ^ dying, i.e. from an expression
of paradox which acknowledges the motion of "each as each," to an
expression which "captures" the "two," but forgets the motion of the
"twofold," language moves from an expression of fluidity to an
expression of fixation. In this sense, contradiction is a partial
expression of the impartial expression of being as paradox, in the
same way that dualism is a partial expression of the impartial
"twofold." Contradiction and dualism are "copies" or "prototypes" of
an archetypal form: coming-to-be ^ passing-away
.
... at the biological level life and death are not in conflict,
. . . That is to say, they are some sort of dialectical unity,
as Heraclitus said they were: 'It is the same thing in us that
is alive and dead, awake and asleep, young and old: by a
reversal the former are the latter and the latter are the
former.' . . .life and death are in some sort of unity at the
organic level, that at the human level they are separated into
conflicting opposites, and that at the human level the extro-
version of the death instinct is the mode of^^esolving a con-
flict that does not exist at the organic level.
^
Man attempts to avoid his own archetypal motion of living as dying by
"putting a stop to things," by positing the ever-moving as the
non-moving, by speaking of the immovable fact of his own death "as
if it were not ourselves," by "framing" the motion of being in static
ideas . Ideas are prototypes or copies of an original organicity.
The idealizing process is man's objection to the ambiguous (i.e.
to the constant "driving both ways") essence of being as a whole. In
objecting to the motion of differing, man casts being as only a uni^,
as only saming . Being is spoken of as a "unified idea, i.e. as an
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ideal, a prototype, which is also to say, as an object.
To idealize is to idolize; to make an idol; to translate into a
fixed image for contemplation; to turn into monumental form;
to turn into stone. To concentrate on seeing is to turn into
stone; Medusa's head; castration.
That is, objecting to differing makes saming an object . Furthermore,
if objecting to differing makes saming (wholing, being) an object,
objecting to differing makes differing (parting, appearing) an object
as well. Paradox overrules contradiction; the whole determines the
essence of the parts.
This, then, is the paradox that the greater our ethical
idealism, the darker is the shadow that we cast, and that
ethical monotheism became, in^^ttitude if not in theory, the
world's most startling dualism.
In inversion, reversion takes place. Therefore, the idealizing
process turns being into a defense against being . Idealizing being is
a defense against the motion of being. In the same way that man
tends to idealize "parental" relations which have passed away, man
idealizes being as his distance from the relationship increases.
Ironically, it is the relationship itself--the motion of saming ^
differing --that makes life interesting to man. Death "releases man
from boredom," says Alan Watts. Therefore, as the previous
discussion noted, when man flees the "differing" aspect of his
"twofold" essence, he becomes in-different, apathetic. Consequently,
as man's distance from "motion" increases, his "need" to idealize
increases also for now man must try and "fill the space" created by a
forgotten relationship. "At a certain point, human life becomes
,
,i27
uninteresting to man. What then? They turn to some universal.
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In that the idealizing process is man's objection to differing,
this process reflects a "willed saming" which tends to advance
uniformity and standardization: saming that overlooks its inherent
differing. In objecting to the order and ratio of "each as each," man
sets up a "willed" order of being which, in turn, veils "the order of
being." Man, then, wills the unity and order he no longer
experiences.
. . . 'the desire and pursuit of the whole' remains and is, as
a matter of fact, all the stronger in mythological traditions
which veil the ultimate identity of the many and the One.^°
"The pursuit of the whole," however is a "makeshift" unity when it
joins without regard for the differing aspect of all gathering. Then,
"willed saming" embraces only the general, and shuns the particular.
This "saming" forgets its reliance upon the particular. The poet
Holderlin calls the "willed unity" which breeds generalizations "the
root of all evil . "
In reaction to this, of course, there is the "see-saw" of "willed
differing," Zerstbrung
,
"intentional disorder," to borrow e. e.
Cummings' phrase. There is the willed subtraction of today's "punk
rock," and the willed illogic of Ionesco's non sequiturs :
"
'One walks
on his feet, but one heats with electricity or coal'; 'He who sells an
. ii29
ox today will have an egg tomorrow.'
L.: The cat has four paws. Isidore and Fricot both have
four paws. Therefore Isidore and Fricot are cats.
G.: My dog has four paws.
L.: Then it's a cat. 3q
G.: ... Logic is a very beautiful thing.
While mirroring the extent to which language has degenerated from
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logic through an excess of will, willed illoqic is in danger of
committing the very error it is combating if the "willed differing" it
advances does not acknowledge its inherent saming. Then, as Joyce
Carol Oates says of the Pataphysical Movement, willed differing "sees
only the particular, never the general.
. .
In the play The Lesson
,
Eugene Ionesco has his professor say:
"One must be able to subtract too. It's not enough to integrate, you
must also disintegrate. That's the way life is. That's philosophy.
That's science. That's progress, civilization." Here, the professor
is reacting to Western man's long-standing tradition of idealization,
i.e. to Western civilization's tradition of "only adding." It is a
response to a tradition that fails to acknowledge the "place" of
subtraction in all addition. However, emphasizing subtraction to
reduce an overemphasis on addition not only typifies the "see-saw"
approach to "balance," but also contributes to the problem if the
expression of subtraction is not acknowledged as simultaneously an
expression of addition. When placed within the "mold" of contradic-
tion, expressions of addition and subtraction, of difference and
sameness, only hide the "adding ^ subtracting" twofold essence of
being as a whole.
That is, ideals and Ideologies of both adding and subtracting,
differing and saming, promote a stasis and rigidity that cloaks the
relational motion of being. It is here that "fixing in place" as the
forming, limiting, bounding, through which motioning, relating,
presencing begin becomes a secondary or partial "fixing in place
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through which motioning and relating end . It is here that parts are
seen as fragments, things are seen as objects, figures are seen as
frames, and relations are seen as facts. Then, as Rollo May says,
our creations become only protections against being, rather than
extensions that simultaneously protect being.
. . . the danger always exists that our technology will serve
as a buffer between us and nature, a block between us and
the deeper dimensions of our own experience. Tools and
techniques ought to be an extension of consciousness, but
they can just as easily be a protection from consciousness.
Then tools become defense mechanisms--specifically against
the wider and more complex dimensions of consciousness that
we call the unconscious. Our mechanisms and technology
then make us 'uncertain in t|^ impulses of the spirit,' as the
physicist Heisenberg puts it.
William Barrett adds:
. . .
wholesale rejection of technology is only the other side
of the coin of that blind worship that regards technology as a
cure for all human ills. The really troubling thing is that
technology is a human product and like everything human
wears the Janus face of good-and-bad at once, which makes
the task of discrimination ^^1 the more tedious and difficult
but all the more necessary.
The danger present in technology, of course, is the same danger that
plagues language, and consequently learning: the ability to discern
the ambiguous or "twofold" essence of every thing .
When language becomes seen as only a protective tool, as only
an object, learning becomes defined as "the acquisition of static
ideas" through the language of reason. This process is called
"the
attainment of knowledge." It is not surprising, then, that
knowledge
and learning become equated with "the non-moving," rather
than with
motion. This is consistent with the inversion that
accompanies the
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^stancing and self-removal expressed in the transmutation of paradox
to contradiction, whereby what-is becomes advanced as what-is-not.
Therefore, unlike the pre-Socratic epistemologies which acknowledge
motion as the crux of learning (e.g. Heraclitus states: "the moving
world can only be known by what is in motion"), the post-Platonic
epistemologies base knowledge on staticity and distance. The inver-
sion in the way man "learns to learn," then, takes this form: the
primary contexts of learning which state that man learns through
"standing out into the truth of being--'contending with the essent',"
become secondary contexts of learning which state that man "learns to
learn" by "standing back from" being and truth. In the former,
learning, being, truth, and man cannot be divorced from one
another, while in the latter, learning, being, truth, and man in-sist
on detachment and distance.
Knowledge becomes of a thing, where the 'of is emphasized to
suggest the detachment, the lack of engagement. This
conceals the intimate relationship between understanding and
what is underst^(^d. The discovered is separated from the
act of discovery.
Now, knowledge depends on the disassociation of differing from
saming, rather than upon the association of differing as saming.
"... the result in our day is that science gets identified with
methods of isolating factors and observing them from an allegedly
detached base--a particular method which arose out of the split
between subject and object. . Recently, however, even
Rorschach tests are beginning to show that people observe things
37
more accurately when they are related, involved, engaged. There-
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fore, the ironic reversion which occurs in an inversion within
learning is this: in removing himself from the motion of being in
order to learn more, man only learns less. For the "detachment
factor" representative of secondary contexts of learning is simply a
mirror of man's progressive detachment from himself as learning,
which is to say, from himself as a relational being whose differing is
at once a saming. "To think is the same as the thought that it is,"
states Parmenides, as he attempts to express the inseparable relation-
ship between being, man, and learning.
It is important for the reader to understand that this discussion
does not negate a process of learning that proceeds from particulars.
On the contrary. This discussion is an attempt to review what
happens when man perceives learning as that which is only
particulars, only isolated factors, only difference, and also when man
perceives learning as that which is only generalities, only ideas, only
saming. As Heraclitus states, man learns through "comprehending"
one as the other, through recognizing setting-apart as binding-to-
gether. Man learns through acknowledging language as symbolic--as
the place where the particular and the universal coalesce.
Truth comes riding on a donkey; . . . finding revelations in
little contemptible events; infinity in a grain of sand. . . .
Regal tragedies (the Oedipus complex) in every household.
. . .
'Everything is a symbol, and while it perfectly presents
itself, it points to everything else.' . . . The many are made
one when the totality is in every part. When one thing is
taken up, all things are taken up ^ith it; one flower is the
spring. It is all there all the time.
Similarly, Heraclitus says both of the following: "Men who love
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wisdom should acquaint themselves with a great many particulars."
(Fragment 3) and "Men should speak with rational awareness and
thereby hold on strongly to that which is shared in common.
.
."
(Fragment 81). Likewise, Fragment 83 states; "Law (logos ) involves
39
obeying the counsel of one." Heraclitus speaks to a learning that
acknowledges the multiple aspects and particulars as the one "inhuman
will .
"
It is the idealizing process, therefore, that not only makes
being (saming) an ideal, but makes non-being (differing) an ideal as
well. In a process of detachment and self-removal, both aspects of
the twofold become idealized, i.e. objectified. Objecting to either one
makes each, i.e. both, into objects. Therefore, if it is the idealizing
process that accomplishes the objectification of being, it is subjec-
tivism (self-removal) which underlies idealism and objectivism.
Before discussing subjectivism, however, this section looks
briefly at the valuing process which follows on the "back" of the
idealizing process. The valuing process is man's attempt to restore
meaning to the meaninglessness he experiences in the fragmentation
that accompanies objectivism.
As we have just noted, idealism recasts relations as ideas,
moving parts as only stationary objects. In idealism, relations are
seen as facts. However, facts and fragments do not answer man's
"need" for meaning, motion, relationality . Meaning, for Heidegger, is
grounded in relational motion. Meaning is grounded, and therefore
discovered, in the motion of each ^ each. Once relational
motion is
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V6il6d, then, meaning itself is veiled, and man comes to experience
himself and the world as meaningless, motionless, fragmented. In an
effort to answer his inborn need for motion and meaning, while
alleviating the experience of meaninglessness, man starts placing
"values" on the objects, fragments, and facts which confront him as
without meaning.
The demand for values is a demand that there be something
without man which can answer his needs, including the need
to live and the need to understand. A world of facts cannot
assure these demands. It is not related to man and his
needs. The refusal of the world to heed man's needs
constitutes its absurdity. To defeat this absurdity the
metaphysician resorts to value. He remedies the lack he
discovers Ir^^the world of facts by 'pasting value labels' on
these facts.
The valuing process, therefore, is an attempt to "will" meaning upon
the fragments and facts that confront man as meaningless. Conse-
quently, the valuing process, in addition to disguising the underlying
absess of meaninglessness with a mask of painted meaning, fuels
further man's view of himself as a determining subject who can
"assign" or "will" the essence and nature of being. As Karsten
Harries notes, value theory does not question the subject-object
dualism upon which it is based, and by failing to do so, is doomed
not only to repeat but also to perpetuate the errors it is trying to
correct. By positing certain objects and facts as "valid" or "valu-
able," man advances the illusion that meaning and truth can be
assigned by man, i.e. that meaning and truth are both arbitrary and
subjective. The valuing process, therefore, veils further that it is
man's attempt to determine the meaning of being (the Idealizing
pro-
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cess) which leads to the experience of meaninglessness he is
attempting to overcome. As such, the valuing process is merely
"rubbing salt" in the nihilistic wound. In speaking to Heidegger's
view of value, Karsten Harries elaborates;
Indeed, in substituting a discussion of values for a discussion
of meaning it (traditional metaphysics) will conceal what really
matters, for man's existence can become meaningful only
where he discovers the meaning of the things around him and
the meaning of Being. But all understanding of meaning
presupposes a willingness to listen to the claims of the things
around us, a willingness to let Being be what it is. The
discovery of meaning presupposes a will to the truth. Value
theory lacks this will. In giving something a value we refuse
to let it be what it is, but subject it to conditions which we
have posited. 'All evaluation, even where it is positive,
subjectivizes. ' 'It has to be recognized that precisely in
marking something a 'value' we rob the thing evaluated of its
dignity. This means: in esteeming something as a value, the
evaluated is admitted only as an object for the estimation of
man.' Just as certainty implies a loss of truth, so value
implies a loss of meaning. . . . Hoping to conquer^^ihilism,
value theory only succeeds in intensifying its reign.
There is an inherent devaluation in stating, for example, that man is
valuable. Like the idealizing process, then, the valuing process is a
further defense against being "by not permitting things to be the
standard for what is real."^^ Consequently, the valuing process
cloaks further the underlying subjectivism that is the root of the
objectivism which valuing attempts to alleviate. Essentially, there-
fore, the valuing process "values" fragmentation.*.
*For Martin Heidegger's discussion of value, refer to An
Intro-
duction to Metaphysics , trans. by Ralph J^anheim (Garden City,
N . Y. : Doubleday & Co. , Anchor Books, 1961), pp.
164-167.
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Subjectivism
Did you hear about those pigeons who found they could alter
the behavior of lab technicians just by refusing corn pellets?
Lily Tomlin
In positing being as "idea," or as "valuable," the question
immediately arises: "Whose idea of being?" And to that question, man
can only answer with "man."
That is, if idealization accomplishes the objectification of being,
and the idealizing process arises through man's objection to his own
living as dying, then it is the self-removal of the objecting or willing
subject that accomplishes both idealization and objectification. In
self-removal or self-contradiction, man posits himself as the detached
and "determining subject" who wills objective "ideas" of being, which
of course includes an objective "idea" of man as the "determining
subject." Consequently, it is subjectivism which accomplishes the
objectivism of all things, including man himself.
If death gives life individuality and if man is the organism
which represses death, then ^gpan is the organism which re-
presses his own individuality.
In an attempt to flee his own motion of differing as saming, through
positing being as the "non-moving" (i.e. an idea, an object), man
accomplishes the negation or "stationing" of his own being. Man
accomplishes his own objectification. Once objectified, adds Karsten
•
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Harries, "beings are drowned in the immanence of subjectivity.
Man is "drowned" in his own will, his own in-sistence, his own self
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removal. Then, as Freud has pointed out, the history of man be-
comes a history of repression.
It is not surprising that subjectivism accomplishes the objec-
tivism of everything, including man. This is the reversion that takes
place in inversion: what-is is set forth as what-is-not, and man
accomplishes what he sets out to avoid. In this instance, the ironic
reversal brought about by subjectivism is that, on the surface,
subjectivism seems to elevate the individual through "casting" man as
a "determining" and "detached" subject who controls, measures, and
orders being, while in essence subjectivism initiates a process that
belittles the individual by making him a detached and unrelated object
which, like all other things, now stands at the end of man's own will.
Let's look at this process a little more closely. In subjectivism,
man attempts to flee his own relationality
,
his own "being-determined"
or temporality, by positing himself as un-related and re-moved from
the motion of the "objective" or determed world--specifically through
assigning himself the role of determiner. This "self-assignment" is
what Heraclitus calls "the world of private intelligence," and what
Heidegger calls "opinionatedness" or "insistence." It is the beginning
of man's "hardening into selfhood," to use Philip Wheelwright's
phrase. It is the beginning of man's "measuring" without regard for
the inherent measure and order of being.
In subjectivism, the impartial "selfhood" or "will" of gathering
gives way to the partial "selfhood" or "will" of ordering. Subjecti-
vism, essentially, constitutes an "inversion" of the will.
Turning to
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the thought of Freud for a moment, the "will" of subjectivism can be
unmasked as none other than "the instinct of aggression"--the
aggressive will--which is "the result of an extroversion of the death
instinct, the desire to die being transformed into the desire to kill,
46destroy, or dominate." In a more poetic tone, the German poet
Rainer Maria Rilke says "killing merely is one form of our wandering
47
sadness." So, too, Norman O. Brown speaks of man's ability to
accept loss, the ability to "mourn" one's own living as dying
,
as the
very cornerstone of language as the symbolic. Otherwise, language
becomes rigid and literal from "housing" a death denied.
The flight from death, however, is what distinguishes man from
the animals. Insistence, therefore, is the purely "human" choice. It
not only forms the heart of religion, but the heart of culture and
civilization itself. "History is what man does with death," says
Hegel. Consequently, for Hegel, "history as class struggle (the
dialectic of Master and Slave, in Hegel's terminology) is based on an
extroversion of death," and therefore labor or human work is "a
transformation of the negativity or nothingness of death into the
extroverted action of negating or changing nature." For at the
heart of the insistent will of subjectivism lies man's attempt to
"change" nature before nature "changes" him. Intentionally,
perhaps, the extroverted will "wills death" (i.e. man tries to control
the "nature" of his demise) before the "will" of death--"the inhuman
will"--determines him. Not surprisingly, then, man's flight
from
death has created both the most frantic (due to polarization) and
the
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most nihilistic culture man has ever known.
The simultaneous combination of frenzy and apathy is
decadence--the creative extremism that results when the essence of
being is portrayed as contradictory (i.e. determined by man) rather
than as paradoxical (i.e. determined by being). Decadence (from the
Latin decadere, "to fall down, to fall apart") mirrors the reversion
that takes place in subjective inversion. In decadent times,
man is owned by what he fails to own . The death man flees becomes
"the state of decay," the deathlike existence, the nihilism, that man
ends up facing. Likewise, in that man's flight from death constitutes
a flight from life as well, the flight from life becomes the frantic
frenzy of constant motion that characterizes the "modern man." This
combination of frenzy and nihilism deals man a "death" more
frightening than the one he had hoped to postpone. The image that
comes to mind is the proverbial one of two men backing around the
same tree in order to avoid one another: both men back into that
which they are avoiding. Paradox subsumes contradiction. Being
determines beings, regardless of the subjectivist inversion which
states that beings determine being. (To say that "being determines
beings" does not, for Heidegger, nullify free choice but rather con-
stitutes free choice, for only when man understands limitation, deter-
minism, boundary as th^ through which possibilities begin does man
truly choose.
)
It is subjectivism or "insistent existence" which acts to obscure
the nature of the relationship between man and being
as one in which
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"being determines beings while remaining something indeterminate," to
recall Heidegger's attempt to express the paradoxical essence of
being. It is subjectivism, therefore, which restricts choice and
possibility, for it is through subjectivism that being as a whole
becomes cast as simply another "part," another "thing among things."
Once man thinks that he determines the essence of being, everything
(and that, of course, includes man himself) becomes an object: a-part
whose relationality or togethering within being as a whole is
obscured. It is subjectivism, then, which underlies idealism and
objectivism. It is subjectivism, states Heidegger, which accomplishes
the historical "forgetting of being"--whose very forgetting culminates
in the nihilism of the day.
Furthermore, when man sees himself as only "determiner,"
rather than as "being-determined" (where man's possibilities arise
from temporality or "boundedness"), not only is the essence of the
relationship between man and being obscured and inverted, but it is
this obfuscation which constitutes an inversion in the relationship
between man and language. This obfuscation gives rise to contextual
processes which subordinate the whole to the part. Self-contradiction
gives rise to processes of linguistic contradiction that present words
as mutually exclusive entities. Words become dominated by "the death
instinct," by the will to separate and divide, and language becomes
subordinate to the will of man. Here, language is "taken literally,
rather than symbolically; historiographically , rather than as an
expression of concealment ^ revealment. And once language is taken
270
only literally, words become diabolic. The symbolic (from the Greek
p-Q^ &a.Xec-v ("to throw together, to bring together, compare")
gives way to the diabolic (from the Greek & cot 6^ XX €^7/ ("to
throw against, to pull apart, to slander"). Words, like all things
(e.g. technology), become diabolic when their motion of concealing as
revealing, differing ^ saming, is set forth as only one or the other.
Words become diabolic when they are seen as only limits or as only
extensions.
Subsequently, the linguistic contexts born of man's attempt to
flee his determined "differing as saming" relationality--his own
"twofold" essence--comprise those secondary or partial contexts of
detachment and identification which, in turn, "determine" man. As
man flees from motion to fixation by positing himself as a detached
and determining subject, language devolves from the fluid to the
static, from the symbolic to the literal, from archetype to prototype.
Yet, it is upon the secondary contexts of language--language as "the
literar'--that man's attempt to learn takes place.
However, once language is taken only literally, the primary
context of man-as-gatherer becomes the secondary context of man-as-
orderer
.
That is, once the order, ratio, and proportion of man to being
is obscured, man not only no longer "comprehends" the order and
essence of his own being, but man no longer comprehends the order
of being as a whole. Man, then, increasingly measures without
regard for "the nature of measurement." Karsten Harries states:
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"Man's affirmation of himself is only partial; indeed it cannot be more
than partial until the meaning of his own being is transparent to him.
Lacking the whole, man is essentially heil-los (without whole).
Now, for man, not only his own being, but the world as a whole
seems un-related and dis~orderly
. Complexity is seen as merely
confusion and chaos.
In an effort to combat this experience of the world as chaotic
and disorderly, man sets out to "assign order" to the disorder, not
realizing that the chaos and disorder he attempts to address have
arisen precisely through his initial "ordering" without regard for the
order of things, through his "taking himself to be the measure of all
things." Ordering and categorizing is man's attempt to correct "the
errors of the will," to use Lionel Trilling's phrase, with the will.
However, as long as "the will" man employs does not "will" in relation
to being's will, man only succeeds in "drowning" in the excesses of
his own subjectivity. What is required of man, then, is neither
"more" willing nor "less" willing, but rather a "different" willing--a
willing which aligns itself with "the inhuman will."
According to Heidegger, gathering for man is "a need." Man's
attempt to "order" the world, then, is a partial expression of his
innate gathering essence. Such ordering, however, remains a partial
expression of impartial gathering as long as man assumes that he can
order without regard for the order of being as a whole, i.e. that man
can will without regard for being's "inhuman will." Order, like
paradox, or rather the order that is best expressed as paradox, is
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not "socially determined," to re-enlist Joyce Carol Oates' phrase.
Similarly, Freud says that "truth cannot be tolerant," and, indeed,
truth IS not tolerant to the intolerance of man for ambiguity and
paradox. That is, truth, ^ being, does not "break down" through
man's flight from its ambiguous ("driving both ways") essence. In
flight, truth may remain shrouded, but it does not dissolve. This is
why Heidegger says that the order of truth rests in being, in
unconcealment, and therefore cannot be assigned nor removed from
the being of things by man.
Man for centuries has "named the gods" in an effort to control
them. There is no doubt that such naming provides "personal
relief," for words, by their very "twofold" nature, conceal as well as
reveal. They shield as well as show. Speaking, therefore, is a
protection as well as an exposure.
However, if in expressing his fear or friendship with the wind,
man thereby comes to think that he controls and determines the wind,
man has deceived himself as to the nature of the relationship. The
winds and the gods come and go and blow as they will. They cannot
be summoned at will, nor pushed away. They can, however, be
recognized and not recognized as the determining forces they are.
If, then, in naming, man comes to think that he has more
control than words inherently provide, his words become static gods
which, in turn, come to control man. Man, then, is not only con-
trolled by wind and rain, but by his own overcontrolling linguistic
creations. Not surprisingly. Western man's attempts to categorize.
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control, and determine the essence of things through "literal" lan-
guage has created an elaborate system of external controls which have
acted to render man powerless and out of control. For when man
thinks that he was meant to be "in control," man starts to fear
"losing control," and in this fear, man increases his own controlling
devices--devices which frequently render him powerless and out of
control. This is simply another one of the countless contextual
"see-saws" which accompany self-contradiction. Not surprisingly, the
ironic reversal which takes place in this particular inversion is that,
at no time in history, has man seemed so paradoxically "in control"
and "out of control" at the same time. In this light, modern man's
heated denial of behavioristic tenets is perhaps only a reaction to his
own suspected and feared determinism.
One of the more pervasive "see-saws" accompanying the
subjective inversion of the relationship between man and being,
however, is the one that arises from man's failure to recognize
subjectivism as the root of objectivism, to acknowledge
self-contradiction as the heart of linguistic contradiction, i.e. to
question the ground of his own figural projects.
Consequently, Western man attempts to combat the depersonali-
zation and dehumanization that he experiences in his object-dominated
existence by readdressing the individual--by restressing the subject.
Once again, reasoning within the context of contradiction, man thinks
that an overemphasis on the objective is reduced through an over-
For in a society rampart with objectifica-emphasis on the subjective.
274
tion and depersonalization, man seeks constant reassurance that he is
not also a mere object, which is to say, man seeks to be reassured
that he is still human. It is precisely this search for validation,
however, that can lead (and in the Western historical tradition, most
often has led) to further subjectivism, only under new names and
titles, such as individualism, romanticism, identification, relativism,
and humanism.
Emphasizing "the human" in an attempt to combat a
"dehumanized" world, however, only continues the story of "I"
against "non-l," the story of hot man pitted against cold world.
This emphasis merely perpetuates self-contradiction by projecting the
coldness which accompanies man's subjective removal of himself from
relational being onto the external world. Once again, the world
becomes the "scapegoat" which allows man to continue talking of the
danger "as if it were not himself."
Yet we see that it is the same metaphysics--the same
automatic assumption that there is an 'average' reality
somewhere distinct from us, either superior (and therefore
terrifying) or inferior (and therefore saved from 'rot' and
'stink' only by our godly subjective blessing). This is still
the old romantic bias, the oppo^'^ion between self and object,
'!' and non-'l,' man and nature.
And, as Joyce Carol Oates further notes; ". . . one must never ask
'Who manufactured these things? who brought them home? who
arranged them?'." For such questions might just reveal that it is
man who deemed related things "unrelated;" that it is man who
linguistically removed himself from the "objective motion" of being by
labeling himself "a determining subject." This realization, however.
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would not only destroy countless romantic illusions, but, in so doing,
it would bring man face to face with this awareness: it is not the
world which is the nemesis of man, but man's own conception of the
world. As Freud attempted to demonstrate, represson on the inside
becomes exclusion on the outside.
It is when the nature of this relationship between man and
being, and therefore between man and his own linguistic projections,
is forgotten that technology, for example, becomes a scapegoat for
man's undaunted objection to his own limitation. That is, when man
fails to see his own limitation as that through which "the unlimited"
occurs, man subsequently fails to acknowledge the "twofoldedness" of
technology. It is here that man, by taking separation as the final
word, becomes "a victim of the Event," to use Philip Wheelwright's
phrase, and as victim, loses his sense of the unlimitedness and power
inherent in limitation. It is here also that technology (and all other
things) become recipients of a very human anger--an anger they were
never meant to hold. Under the weight of this anger, things crack
and harden, wither and die.
Therefore, modern forms of subjectivism, starting with the
Renaissance man (in itself an outgrowth of man's attempt to reset
the imbalance of a "God-centered universe"), which characterize the
struggle as man vs. world, the relative vs. the objective, the human
vs. the dehuman, veil further that the precursor of objectivism and
dehumanization is man-as-subject. Modern forms of subjectivism
succeed in hiding the underlying "constriction of will" from
view by
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advancing the illusion that man combats objectivism through "doing"
the opposite. Man combats the errors that arise from "an excess of
will" by further in-sistence. These efforts, says Heidegger,
characterize the constriction of the primal will into its most extreme
form: the will to will.
It is here that "the human" itself becomes an object. That is,
in what some people call "the final stages" of nihilism, man turns his
negation on himself. Nothing is untouched by in-sistence. The
motions within the spirit of man--those human motions that we have
come to call love, sorrow, joy, despaii—become demands . As
Heidegger states, the spirit itself becomes "a holiday ornament" that
is packaged and sold in man's desparate attempt to reassure himself
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that the spirit is not dead. Here, joy and love become objects of
will as in-sistence, as do sorrow and hate. However, when joy and
sorrow become commands, man-as-victim merely continues to be a
"passive witness"--this time to his own emotions. Man "successfully
dehumanizes himself," says Joyce Carol Oates. It is here that the
modern forms of subjectivism--humanism, individualism, relativism,
identification --humanize dehumanization.
It is here also that the primary context of change as alternation
and metamorphosis--coming-to-be ^ passing-away--gives way to the
secondary context of change as alteration and improvement. As both
Nietzsche and Freud explored, altruism and morality--whether
directed towards the world (social change) or towards the self (per-
sonal growth)--are often expressions of repressed hostility and re-
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sentment. Under the "mask of social or personal betterment,"
change as alteration often punishes and negates others and oneself
through the imposition of countless limits and demands--through the
creation of countless goals. (The word "goal" comes from the Middle
English limit, a barrier"], and also g^len ["to impede, to
delay"].) Once limitation ^ potentiation is forgotten, projects become
projections or goals, which is to say, additional limits. Then, so to
speak, being stands ahead of being, and man uses both activism and
mysticism to starve off relationality . Here, change as alteration is
that which takes place in lieu of change as metamorphosis, i.e. being,
for change as alteration usually bases itself upon
man-as-subject--whether this be the "subject" of "transcendence," or
the "subject" of "social change." In this light, America's consuming
altruism has often been attributed to the early Puritan repression of a
young and emergent nation. Perhaps, in part, this accounts for the
present premium placed on "alteration"--be it alteration of the self or
of the other.
If the novel is "a kind of summary and paradigm of our cultural
life," as Lionel Trilling says, then poetry should be an indicator as
well. Regarding the direction modern poetry has taken, Joyce Carol
Oates, in an essay on Sylvia Plath entitled "The Death Throes of
Romanticism," states:
Most modern poetry is scornful, cynical, contemptuous of
subject (whether self or others), bitter or amused or cold y
detached. It shrinks from the activity of making the woHd
sacred because it can approach the world only through
the
self-as-subject; and the prospect of glorifying oneself is an
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impossible one. Therefore, the ironic mode.
. . . Most lyric
poets explore themselves endlessly, like patients involved in a
permanent psychoanalysis, reporting back for each session
determined to discover, to drag out of hiding, the essential
problem of their personalities--when perhaps there is no
problem in their personalities at all, except this insane pre-
occupation with the self and its moods and doubts, while
much of the human universe struggles simply for survival.
If the lyric poet believes--as most people do--that the
he inhabits is not integrated with the entire stream of life,
let alone with other human beings, he is doomed to a
solipsistic and ironic and self-pitying act, in which metaphors
for his own narcissistic predicament are patched from news-
paper headlines concerning real atrocities.^
Consequently, in the same way that rationalism cannot be over-
come by stressing irrationalism because the secondary context of
irrationalism is only an outgrowth of the secondary context of
rationalism (as one-dimensional), so, too, the secondary context of
objectivism cannot be overcome by stressing the secondary context of
subjectivism. What is required is understanding that the secondary
context of subjectivism (man as "the measure of all things," man as
the romantic individual--collar to the wind, back to the world) is a
partial expression of impartial selfhood.
The impartial expression of selfhood rests in appropriation: a
recognition of how one comes into its own through the other . This is
the selfhood that arises when the "human" will aligns itself with "the
inhuman will." "... what is interesting in the laugh of the
woman," says D. H. Lawrence, "is the same as the binding of the
molecules of steel or their action in heat; it is the inhuman will
. .
that fascinates me."^^ Robert Langbaum elaborates.
The 'logic' of a character's actions, his unity or identity, is
not to be found within the ego, in rational or moral consis-
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tency, but in the force, the 'inhuman will,' that flows
through him and all matter. The unity is in the extern^
field of energized matter to which the character belongs.^
Man needs to turn from the "internalized individuality" of the locked-
in ego to some sort of "archetypal identity" if he is to regain "a
vibrant individuality open to connection with other people and the
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universe.
"
When the epic promise of 'One's-self I sing' is mistaken as
the singing of a separate s^f, and not the universal self, the
results can only be tragic.
What results is the tragic nihilism of the day, for when man fails "to
touch life," he is prey, as Peter Marin states, "to both a feeling of
59deadness and the dream of salvation." Man is prey to both detach-
ment and identification, indifference and equality, separatism and
centralism, relativism and objectivism, which is to say, to partial
expressions of the impartial relationality of differing as saming.
No one expresses the Zeitgeist of the times more accurately
than a Madrid executive speaking about Spain's centuries-old struggle
between centralism and separatism:
'We have some virtures and some big faults. We are very
idealistic, and so we tend to go to extremes. But we also are
very individualistic--we all want to be first, and when we
can't be, we criticize fiercely. 'We are loyal to family and
friends. We have orgullo . ' That means pride, also
stubbornness, sometimes arrogance. very hard
with our enemies. Dialogue is difficult.'
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CHAPTER X
IMPLICATIONS AND SUMMARY
We have taken from the defeated
What they had to leave us--a symbol:
A symbol perfected in death.
T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding"
The interrelationships between language, behavior, and learning
are "going public" more and more all the time. It seems years now
since the early voices of Sapir and Whorf said that language not only
reports and communicates experience, but that language in different
cultures "defines" experience; years since Stanislavski said "language
is action;" years since Alfred Korzybski searched for alternate ways
of expressing existence other than the Aristotelian language orienta-
tions of subject-predicate and either-or.
Today, in both personal and political realms, voices are joining
together in a mutual recognition of the inseparability between learning
and language.
As far back as 1967, Rollo May stated: "neuroses are functional
in root, due, that is, to forms of behavior and mental attitudes
'1
rather than organic disorder." More recently, Gregory Bateson's
work with "the double-bind hypothesis" in family communication
patterning has shown that "the pairing of mutually contradictory
. 2
messages" can lead a member of the family to psychosis.
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John Weakland's work with communication theory and clinical
change demonstrates that in responding to a patient's words as meta-
phorical rather than as literal, the patient speaks more clearly.
... if we responded to patients' statements as metaphori-
cal--instead of the common response of taking them literally,
and trying to get the patient to acknowledge their illogic or
unreality, a covert form of arguing with the patient--they
then spoke more plainly. Different communication led to
different communication. Somewhere along the line we began
to see, perhaps aided by our prior insight that report and
command are matters of analytic distinction rather than
separate kinds of messages, that communication and behavior
are not separate and different, bu^ essentially the same thing
viewed from different perspectives.'^
Turning our attention to the "political" arena--to the broader
collective "family," we find that both Paulo Freire and Ivan lllich
speak to the "impaired learning" which comes from an individual's
ingestion of societal contradictions.
Paulo Freire, in his popular book Pedagogy of the Oppressed ,
outlines the dilemma of "the oppressed" as one that begins with the
oppressed's recognition of his own internalized contradictons of
oppressor/oppressed, teacher/student, etc. which have come about
through his identification with the oppressor. Conscientizacao ,
Freire's term for "learning to perceive social, political, and economic
contradictions," begins with the oppressed's awareness of himself as a
4
dual, divided, contradictory person.
Similarly, Ivan lllich, in his book Deschooling Society , speaks
of schooling as "the institutionalization of society's
contradictions.'
The school system today performs the threefold function
common to powerful churches throughout history. It is
simul-
taneously the repository of society's myth, the
institutionalize-
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tion of that myth's contradictions, and the locus of the ritual
which reproduces and veils the disparities between myth and
reality.
. . . the ritual which demands tolerance of the
fundamental contradictions between myth and institution still
goes largely unchallenged, for neither ideological criticism nor
social action can bring about a new society. Only
disenchantment with and detachment from the central social
ritual ^d reform of that ritual can bring about radical
change.
The question immediately arises: how does man begin to "detach"
himself from "the central social ritual" of contradiction?
Working from the phenomenological and epistemological ground
set forth in the preceeding chapters, we must venture to say:
through questioning
.
This questioning involves acknowledging two aspects of one
ongoing process: 1) the relationship between man and language as one
in which man creates words; and 2) the relationship between language
and man as one in which language determines man. At first, these
two aspects may sound contradictory, but they are not. Rather,
they constitute the paradoxical essence--the "twofold" motion--inher-
ent in the ongoing relationship between man and language.
1) The relationship between man and language . To say that
man creates words is to acknowledge that words are "self-projects,"
and as self-projects, language can be created and recreated. In
acknowledging words as self-words, man acknowledges himself as a
form-maker. It is here that man encounters and thus regains his
inherent power for not only questioning existing external forms, but
for also creating new forms.
Linguistic contradiction (which states that two things cannot be
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equally true) begins in self-contradiction which says: I am not also
my forms. And, as Norman O. Brown has aptly pointed out, modern
representative institutions are based upon the contradiction of
distance-
-upon distancing man from the forms he has created, upon
separating the questioner from his questioning, upon detaching "the
subject" from the "things" of the world--thereby keeping "the multi-
tude in remote contact with reality." "Representative institutions
depend upon the aesthetic illusion of distance."^ Man's questioning
participation
,
then, is what is initially required if man is to begin
"cutting through" both the personal and collective "myth of detach-
ment." In the act of questioning, man "relates to that in which he is
totally related." (p. 52)
Therefore, man begins his detachment from "the central social
ritual" through questioning the detachment myth upon which institu-
tionalized contradiction is based and, subsequently, perpetuated .
Man begins by questioning the "self-view" of "a detached and deter-
mining subject." For to say that man has the innate power, poten-
tial, possibility, ability, i.e. the "need," to create and recreate forms
is not to say that man is, therefore, either the detached being or the
being which determines the essence of being.
2) The relationship between language and man . In that the
essence of being is one in which the whole determines the essence of
the parts (including the essence of man both to in-sist and ex-sist),
language determines man.
It is important to note here that neither Whorf nor Heidegger
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are proposing that words proceed existence. Rather, they are
making statements about the relationship between language and man.
Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's
relation to being
,
the question of being will involve us deeply
in the question of language.
Language houses" the relationship between man and being, says
Heidegger. It is firstly
,
for Heidegger, man's destroyed or forgotten
relation to being that becomes his subsequent misrelation to language.
This misrelation to language, in turn, acts to veil further man's
forgotten relation to being, (pp. 188-190) For Heidegger, language
"houses" a nation's relation to being, and as such, language
influences and determines subsequent learning and behavior.
Aptitude is inextricably linked with attitude.
If we say, then, that linguistic contexts express
"contradiction," we are saying that language "houses" the relationship
between man and being in its state of "self-contradiction." Language
expresses man's present relationship with being. Therefore, a
language which stresses detachment expresses an underlying
relationship of detachment. Language expresses contradiction when
man's relationship within being is no longer a participatory,
paradoxical one.
Language is not contradictory by nature; rather, language is
paradoxical by nature. Language gives two messages at once: in
speaking, something is left unsaid. "Language is as a cord of silence
with sounds the knots--as nodes in a Peruvian quipu , in which the
empty spaces speak. Language sounds as it silences. As Heideg-
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ger states, language conceals and reveals simultaneously; it closes
and discloses, veils and unveils.
It is not initial I
V
language that renders man powerless; it is
initially man himself. This is the ironic reversal that accompanies
subjectivistic inversion; in detaching himself from objective reality,
man thinks that he is elevating himself, but in truth, man belittles
himself by "framing" himself "detached determiner." Man, then,
tosses between the subjectivist extremes of relativism and objectivism
by stating either 1) that truth is relative to only him (therefore, he
is alone); or 2) that truth is dependent upon agreement between
subject and object, and consequently exclusive (therefore, he is
alone)
.
These are but a few of the aspects relative to the relationship
between man and language that are inherent in the preceeding
chapters. For implicit in the theory of learning presented in Chapter
VIII is a theory of identity (as "twofold" appropriation : how one
comes into its own through the other) and a theory of language (as
"twofold" expression or "poeting").
Like the theory of learning (which is essentially a theory of
language), both appropriation and poeting reside in man's ability to
encounter self-motion, in man's ability initially to question his own
forming as that being which lives, dies, and chooses. "Overcoming
the dread of nothingness, man expresses concern and care over his
own being, and therefore over being itself, in questioning that
very being ." (p. 52)
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Acknowledging man's encounter with his own "temporality" as
that which empowers both life and language is by no means solely
Heideggerian
. Robert Jay Litton states: "every significant step in
9human existence involves some inner sense of death." Similarly,
Norman O. Brown says that "freedom in the use of symbolism comes
from the capacity to experience loss." Both Litton and Brown
acknowledge "the connection between impaired mourning and
murderous violence," where man's "inability to mourn" (his own or
another's passing) leads to a literalization or "killing" in both words
and actions, not to mention a one-dimensionality in man. The rebel-
lion against death--both through apathy or indifference (not feeling)
and through acts of violence (feeling something)--"has in it a quest,
however misdirected and pathological," says Litton, "to overcome the
11
broken connection" caused through some unmourned loss.
In a society ruled by the ritualized myth of contradiction, with
its attendant fragmentation and uniformity, man desires nothing more
than total dissolution. Man craves some form of "wholy" consum-
mation--however distorted. For when the individual self can no
longer find dissolution and communion in the larger collective self,
the alienated self drives towards the dissolution promised by both
indifference and annihilation.
The only hope, or else despair
Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre--
To be redeemed from fire by fire.
Who then devised the torment? Love.
Love is the unfamiliar Name
Behind the hands that wove
I
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The intolerable shirt of flame
Which human power cannot remove.
We only live, only suspire
-p
Consumed by either fire or fire. ^
It is the "broken connection" that comes back to haunt man in dis-
torted forms. It is the lost touch that places demands on
"things"--demands from the human soul that things were never meant
to hold.
The 'painful cleavage' of culture from life 'is responsible for
the revenge of things ; the poetry which is no longer within
us and which we no longer succeed in finding in things
suddenly appears on their wrong side: consider the
unprecedented number of crimes whose perverse
gratuitousness is explained..^nly by our powerlessness to take
complete possession of life.
Regaining possession of the life we have been entrusted involves what
Albert Camus calls "lucidity," which "depends not on man's will, but
14
on its contrary, which is death." This, then, is the paradox: in
letting-be, man possesses life. When man no longer takes himself and
his relationships within being "for granted," the human will finds
itself aligned with Lawrence's "inhuman will."
The theory of language implicit in the theory of learning pre-
sented in Chapter VIII, therefore, is grounded in the "twofold" and
paradoxical essence of being. This theory requires an amplification
that is not possible in a concluding chapter; however, I would like to
briefly note the essence of its intended direction.
Man has been left with a symbol, "a symbol perfected in death"
says T. S. Eliot. The word "symbol" not only means "to bring to-
gether," as stated in Chapter IX, but as "a bringing together,
a
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symbol for the early Greeks denoted both "sign" and "union." Lan-
guage, as an expression of the "twofold," speaks being as
appearance, concealment ^ revealment, metaphor as paradox.
Language "gives signs," and "loves to hide." It is, says
Wheelwright, "in Goethe's sense, the fullest coalescence of the
15particular instance and a general idea."
In short, if metaphor and paradox are to serve a metaphysical
purpose, each must to some degree involve the other. If
metaphor is employed without a touch of paradox, it loses its
radically metaphoric character and turns out to be virtually
no more than a tabloid simile. If paradox is employed without
metaphor, it is no more than a witticism or sophism.
Wheelwright discusses the implications of this passage in beautiful
detail, stating first, that metaphor, if semantic (rather than merely
grammatical) involves paradox; and second, that if metaphor involves
paradox, it is "also conversely true that serious paradox involves
metaphor. Similarly, Robert Jay Lifton states; "... each image
and form is understood both as a configuration in itself and as part
of a larger configuration." Accordingly, both aspects of language
suffer when one is stressed to the exclusion of the other .
When the paradoxical essence of metaphor is obscured, and
conversely, when the metaphorical essence of paradox if obscured,
man is faced with a literalization of the word in both its "particular"
and "whole" aspects, i.e. the word is obscured as what Lifton calls
"a symbolizing process." When only the "particular" essence
(differing without saming) is advanced, the word becomes divisive,
"fragmenting," and, likewise, when only the "universal" essence
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(saming without differing) is advanced, the word becomes uniform,
"equalizing." While a divisive word may lead to a numbing
detachment, a uniform word usually leads to "a sterile uniformity."
Thus, where a symbolic word empowers both particularization and
connection, a literal word perpetuates both fragmentation and
uniformity. And, as language moves from its symbolic or "twofold"
essence to a literal or "one-dimensional" essence, man moves from
both fluidity and particularity to both flaccidity and rigidity. For
when impartial expressions of being give way to partial expressions of
being (i.e. when paradox gives way to contradiction), man is
consumed by irony.
The failure to acknowledge metaphor as paradox has led, for
example, to the Catholic/Protestant polarization over whether a sacra-
ment is either a metaphor or a reality. If being is appearance, i.e.
if existence is a "twofold" and paradoxical mytery, a sacrament is at
once both metaphor and reality.
Interestingly, Robert Jay Lifton proposes that one of the
reasons Freud and Jung "broke" with each other had to do with
conflicts around symbolization.
In particular, the three great early 'defectors,' Adler, Jung,
and Rank, could be said to have broken with Freud (apart
from their personal conflicts with him) around issues of sym-
bolization. On the issue of 'incest taboo,' for instance, all
three stressed suprapersonal , nonsexual (that is, symbolic)
elements having to do with family continuity and community,
in opposition to Freud's focus on the more literal expression
of the taboo in individual psychology, in the
Oedipus
complex.' Hence Jung, in his posthumous autobiography,
claimed that while working on his early study
of
transformations of the libido, 'I knew in advance that its
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publication would cost me my friendship with Freud (because)
to me incest signified a personal complication only in the
rarest case.
. . But Freud clung to the literalinterpretation of it and could .(Oot grasp the spiritual
significance of incest as a symbol.
By way of further clarification, Lifton comments at a later stage on
Jung's tendency to stress the "general" aspect of the symbolic
process to the detriment, perhaps, of the "particular."
The configuration of images which constitutes the psychic
core is unique to each individual. In this sense Jungian
archetypes can be confusing pJn their overgenerality and
appearance of preexistent form.
Thus, while Freud may be said to have stressed the "particular"
essence of an action or word, Jung may be said to have stressed the
"general" essence of words and actions.*
*lt is interesting to note that, generally speakng, Heidegger is
either placed within an existential framework (and then critiqued for
his failure to address "collective humanity," i.e. "the masses") or
placed within a totalitarian framework (and then critiqued for his
failure to address "the individual" with directives for practical
action). My personal bias is that much of both Heidegger's
acceptance and critique have come from interpretations which place
the either-or context onto an ontology that speaks to the "twofold" or
paradoxical essence of being. Perhaps, then, the extreme
either-or-ing that plagues Heidegger and his thoughts may not only
reflect society's fear of dispensing with its ritual of contradiction,
but also account for Heidegger's critique as both an existentialist and
an essentialist. Wheelwright, in commenting on the charges often
levelled at Heraclitus for being "obsure and difficult" in his language
(which are some of the same charges levelled against Heidegger)
states: "... the main reason for the obscurity and difficulty in
Heraclitus was not anything so simple and naive as a wish to mystify,
but rather a need to speak appropriately and not too inadequately of
that Nature which surprises us with the unexpected, which does
affirm or deny but merely gives signs, and which loves to hide."
It is not, as it is often supposed, "dark" language which leads to
cliches of fragmentation and uniformity (or else poetry would have to
be questioned for its obliqueness, and its attendant mystification and
fragmentation), but rather one-dimensional expressions spawned when
people "assume" they know only too well what the "one" way is.
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Briefly, then, the theory of language implicit in the preceeding
phenomenological and epistemological discussions, like the theory of
learning, rests upon the "twofold" essence of being as an unconceal-
ment which both conceals and reveals simultaneously. Therefore, a
"twofold" or symbolic contextualizing of language resides in man's
ability to encounter and question his own "twofold" being-in-motion.
It is this encounter, this self-questioning, which empowers man not
only to create and recreate both new and old expressions, but also to
question those external forms and contexts that currently comprise
"the central social ritual" of contradiction--a ritual which has acted
upon man to render him powerless. It is this self-questioning that
will also allow man to question his own expression of being as "two-
fold," and move on to new words, forms, and expressions.
Questioning keeps man aligned with the motion of learning as being.
"For to be aware of one's world means at the same time to be
22designing it."
. . .
significant learning or change in human systems is
always explicitly revolutionary: it involves the death of one
order and the creation of another. Whether the change be
the elimination of racism, or the learning of a mathematical
theorem, or the finding of love, or the cancellation of
conditioning that gives priority to women and to authority
figures, what is involved is always the disruption and death
of an organic system, and the birth of a new order. That
birth may become easier if the revolutionary aspects are
better understood.
^
If learning is revolution, then the goal of education
should not be thi"acquisition of a degree, but the creation of
a healthy process and its attendant skills. This involves
three main factors: (1) learning to break free from old and
crippling frameworks of control; (2) learning to build in the
freedom creat^^; (3) learning to think about the process
of
change itself.
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Understanding learning as ex-change, revolution (Latin reuoluere, "to
roll again," meaning "to roll round, move round a center, circle"),
rests, for Heidegger, upon the circular essence of man. "Because
Dasein is itself historical, all inquiry concerning it must scrutinize its
own history. . ."(p. 43) It is through questioning one's changing
"self-process," to enlist Lifton's expression, that man begins "to
think about the process of change itself." Perhaps it is this
questioning that will rescue man from both the indifference and
voilence which seem directly related to a constriction of choices. "We
24
are limited by our agreements on possibility." This paper,
therefore, through questioning existing forms and contexts, has been
an attempt to create a space for learning as questioning, a space for
"learning to learn" through questioning the agreed-upon contexts of
contradiction. "Experimental neuroses in animals occurs because the
25
animal cannot change the 'context' which it has already learned."
In 1976, Robert Jay Lifton published a book entitled The Life
of the Self (Toward a New Psychology), in which he outlined the
emerging direction--what he called "the paradigm shift"--evolving in
the linguistic forms and contexts through which man learns to learn.
If a new historical consciousness is emerging, as I believe it
is, we must also speak of a significant shift, if not mutation,
in cultural evolution. We would expect an emerging psycholo-
gical paradigm to conn^^ with (or at least be open to) a new
evolutionary awareness.
This cultural shift is one which confronts man with the possibility of
both instant communication and instant annihilation, with the potential
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for immodiato contact and imminGnt loss. This, of coursG, is undGC”
scored by an electronic and technological expansion that accentuates
man's capacity for rapid communication, as well as for rapid extinc-
tion
.
As Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore have noted, the old
method of learning based on "data classification" is no longer
sufficient to deal with this new evolutionary awareness. What is
required in learning, state both McLuhan and Fiore, is "pattern
recognition .
"
Since the frontiers of knowledge are changing so rapidly,
there is no use in burdening children with data that will be
outdated in ten years, or with skills that will soon be better
performed machines; rather children must learn to
learn . . .
The "shift" in learning is moving towards a language that stresses
forms and formations, contexts, structures, configurations, systems,
patterns, and relationships.
However, if this language is plagued by "lingering nineteenth-
century assumptions about science, about this particular cause
resulting in that particular effect and either-or approaches to
truth, man will simply find himself rehearsing an old story line;
either being or appearance. The words "form," "context," "process,
etc. are not immune from literalization , any more than the words
"content" and "substance" are inherently literal.
If the emerging language is to offer man opportunities for
encountering and integrating the possibilities of both communication
and annihilation, it will involve a structural shift in the ^ (m the
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how) man approaches words such as "context" and "content." It will
involve man in a process of symbolization that acknowledges the "each
as each" essence of all words-"a process that acknowledges the
coexistence of both context and content in our lives. Otherwise, a
discussion of contexts and patterns will become simply another
linguistic avenue for man's undaunted subjectivism that assumes
exchange demands in-sistence.
The language of "context," therefore, will, at its best, direct
the reader to the question of his own existence as appropriation (as
that being which comes into its "own" through the "other"). At its
worst, the language of "context" will simply become another prescrip-
tion and demand, and it is learning (like being) as imposition and
demand that leads to both the merchandizing of being and
appearance, where both "reading" and "relevance" are packaged and
sold. It is imposition that transforms learning from man's encounter
with being as things ("being disposes itself through things" and
"limits are that through which presencing begins" says Heidegger) to
learning as the merchandizing of both particulars and generalities.
(Refer to pp. 259-261.)
One need only look at the discussions that "dog" educational
theory today to realize the persistence of old contexts: either books
or technology (language vs. antilanguage), either visual or verbal,
either "back to basics" or "relevance," etc. A "paradigm shift"
in
our thinking patterns will not emerge easily, and it certainly
won't
"emerge" by saying "all together, now shift," as if "the
shift" were
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the latest dance craze.
That which is imposed tends towards death (for demands, as
Freud stated, are ruled by "the downward way"). Impositions
(whether they be impositions of content or context) drive the unfet-
tered life underground (where it then must vent its anger on itself
and others). Being ^ potential and possibility is inherent. That is,
learning for man is "a need," and as a need, learning turns against
man when it it contradicted through demand.
In fact, learning is the human activity which least needs
manipulation by others. Most learning is not the result of
instruction. It is rather the result of unhampered participa-
tion in a meaningful setting. Most people learn best by being
'with it,' yet school makes them identify ^eir personal growth
with elaborate planning and manipulation.
... I have not heard of any method whatever, scholastic or
otherwise, of teaching the humanities without killing them. I
remember how at age twelve, browsing in the library, I read
Macbeth with excitement; yet in class I could not understand
a word of Julius Caesar
,
and I hated it. I'm pretty sure this
is a common pattern. The survival of the humanities would
seem to ^0pend on random miracles which are becoming less
frequent."^
Learning, like truth, happens "when the control breaks down. By
great good fortune, gratis, by grace; and not by our own work or
will."^^ "Incidental learning," says Paul Goodman, does not depend
upon "deliberate intervention." Learning is coincidental , "the
falling together of things and events," where man encounters each as
each. It is the participation mystique , man's unhampered questioning
participation in life--what Heidegger calls "the ability to stand out
into the truth of being."
Not surprisingly, then, the paradox that has subsumed the
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contradiction of learning ^ imposition, i.e. learning as in-sistence, is
that the more man has tried to make people learn, the more
"irrelevant" learning has become. The see-saw response to this irony
is the 'predictable' one:
. .to refine the process; to make the
curriculum relevant, to start schooling earlier, to employ new
technologies in teaching, to eliminate friction by admitting students to
33
administrative functions."
However, knowledge, like freedom, cannot be sold, whether it
be in an "open" or "closed" classroom, or a "global" classroom.
Broadening the parameters within a contradictory framework only
succeeds in making the agreed-upon social ritual more pervasive.
Moreover, broadening the "scope" of the program often acts to silence
emerging questions about the program itself. This is not unlike
I Mich's recognition that a few reformers are permitted within the
agreed-upon context in order to raise expectations, i.e. in order to
keep the present context going.
The inherent contradiction begins, of course, with man's
separation of himself from his thought. Thus, we witness, for
example, a so-called "liberal" parent demanding that his child share
his views of freedom.
Vicarious satisfaction: the deed is both theirs and not theirs.
On this self-contradiction, this h^^ocrisy, this illusion,
representative institutions are based.
However, if man truly believes in man, man believes in man's freedom
to participate and therefore to choose something as distorted
as
slavery. Man believes in man's freedom to both in-sist and
ex-sist.
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Otherwise, man lives and perpetuates contradictions between his
actions and his words (advancing the separation between being and
thinking). This self-contradiction leads not only to alienation within
the individual family (e.g. the "double-bind" in schizophrenic family
patterning), but also to alienation within the collective family (e.g.
the oppressed/oppressor political patterning). "Anxiety, in fact,
35brings about the thing it fears, creates its own disaster."
The irony here, then, is that when learning is imposed
(whether as "content" or "context"), neither the intended content nor
the intended context is learned. What is learned is this; 1) man is
not to trust his own perceptions of reality, his own capacity and
potential for being able to understand what he wants; 2) man is not
to trust others to be able to understand what they want; 3) freedom
lies in the realm of in-sistence, and as such, freedom (not unlike
truth and love) is man's to "grant;" and 4) freedom, if it is man's to
grant, is therefore man's to "take away." The first aspect instills
suspicion of the self; the second aspect instills suspicion of the
other; and the last two aspects mirror the polemics of a subjectivism
which does not acknowledge that "the creative process itself is not a
free activity if by free we mean arbitrary, or unrelated to cosmic
law."^^ Freedom, like truth, is not socially determined.
Learning as imposition, then, through the promulgation of an
old defensive tactic "divide and conquer," advances the central social
ritual of contradiction in both the political and personal realm.
For
through learning as imposition, man learns not to trust his own
power
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and when man no longer trusts his own power, he no longer trusts
other people's power. Imposition, therefore, breeds imposition.
Admittedly, it is extremely difficult for the critic not to avoid
punishing his subject for not being a form of the critic him-
self, a kind of analogue to his ego! There is a slightly
paranoid fear, perhaps connected with political and social
prejudices, that chaos will come again if rules established in
the eighteenth century are violated; and having begun as a
monastic labor, the role of the academic to keep order, to
insist upon hierarchies, to be continuously grading
,
is one
that coincides far too easily with a puritanical fear of and
loathing ^^r the processes of life that most artists
celebrate.
Grading
,
moreover, in overlooking the "differing" inherent in people
and things, levels . The irony of grading, then, is that grading
levels and levelling grades. "Once people have the idea schooled into
them that values can be produced and measured, they tend to accept
all kinds of rankings. . ." That is, once man is schooled
in/through the imposition of grades and ranks, he not only accepts
grades and ranks imposed on him, but he also begins to impose ranks
and grades on others (in an effort to overcome the levelling that
imposed grading brings). (Refer to pp. 134-136.) Both grading (a
partial expression of impartial differing) and levelling (a partial
expression of impartial saming) perpetuate the paradox of children
who are both uniform and detached--children who can no longer
differentiate degrees of danger and degrees of art. "Beethoven and
Rock 'n Roll are considered equivalent. Everything new and
old
becomes both suspect and equal. And it is the man who experiences
being as both uniform and detached that is ripe for
"the thrall of
totalitarianism of both left and right," prey to both
"proletarian
303
authoritarianism" and "secularized humanism.
Thus, while levelling is a distortion of the saming essence of
learning which "lets" man understand that, as Norman 0. Brown
says, "when Cain slew Abel he slew himself, grading is a
distortion of the differing essence of learning which "lets" man
understand that all men are not created equal (if by equal we mean
uniform)
.
The question of being is not bloodless after all, but vital.
For what?
For pondering the fact that as we surrender the diverse
senses of Being to a sterile uniformity, to one that can no
longer entertain variation and multiplicity, we become immea^
surably poorer--and that such poverty makes a difference.^
The question facing education as learning today (as always),
then, is not the question of books or technology; it is the question of
both books and technology. (Refer to p. 259.) For when man takes
into account the "differing" essence of each child, he acknowledges
that one child may learn with a book the "same" thing that another
child may learn with a tape recorder. When man, as that "gathered
being" which does the work of gathering, "lets" possibilities, neither
books nor media are imposed or excluded.
More and more, cultural evolution and survival seem to require
that man come to terms with his potential for the inclusive pursuit of
varying yet interdependent modes--that man come to terms with his
essence as the "twofold" being that both ex-sists and in-sists. For it
has been epistemology's long-standing failure to acknowledge insistent
existence as one mode of man's being-in-the-world that has led to
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its overriding dominance in our present lives. It has been man's
flight from his essence as the "twofold" being whose words of praise
are also epitaphs that has brought man face to face with the very
real possibility of destroying himself with his own praying hands.
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